Costs of Job Rotation: Evidence from Mandatory Loan Officer Rotation

Bhowal, S and Subramanian, K and Tantri, P L (2020) Costs of Job Rotation: Evidence from Mandatory Loan Officer Rotation. Management Science.

Full text not available from this repository. (Request a copy)

Abstract

Job rotation inside an organization creates two conflicting effects. It disciplines agents by creating the fear that their successors may discover and report their hidden information. Thus, the agent takes actions that align with the principal’s objective. However, job rotation can create a moral hazard problem. If information is soft and therefore, nonverifiable, the principal cannot attribute blame to the agent or the successor. Agents shirk, thereby hurting performance. Thus, the importance of disciplining versus moral hazard effects depends on the availability of hard information. Using unique loan-level data, we show that job rotation hinders performance when the information is soft.This paper was accepted by Giesecke Kay, finance.

Affiliation: Indian School of Business
ISB Creators:
ISB CreatorsORCiD
Subramanian, KUNSPECIFIED
Tantri, P LUNSPECIFIED
Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Bank, Loan, Agency cost
Subjects: Finance
Depositing User: Gurusrinivasan K
Date Deposited: 05 Jul 2020 05:17
Last Modified: 05 Jul 2020 05:17
URI: http://eprints.exchange.isb.edu/id/eprint/1375
Publisher URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2020.3628
Publisher OA policy: http://sherpa.ac.uk/romeo/issn/0025-1909/
Related URLs:

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item
Statistics for DESI ePrint 1375 Statistics for this ePrint Item