Unprincipled Principals: Strategic Communication and Firm Performance

Devalkar, S K and Garg, P (2017) Unprincipled Principals: Strategic Communication and Firm Performance. Academy of Management Proceedings, 2017 (1).

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Abstract

Extant research in the principal-agent paradigm has analyzed implications of upstream strategic communication from the agent to the principal. In contrast, this study examines implications of downstream strategic communication in organizations. Central to our theory is the idea that while strategic communication by the principal provides her insurance to hedge against information asymmetry vis-a-vis the agent, it can also reduce the agent’s willingness to exert effort. We find that relative to the case of transparent communication, strategic communication reduces the region over which the agent exerts effort and lowers firm performance. The results shed light on the limits of authority in organizations and the micro-foundations of firm performance.

Affiliation:	Indian School of Business
ISB Creators:	ISB Creators ORCiD Devalkar, S K http://orcid.org/0000-0002-3708-9104
Item Type:	Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Strategic Communication, Firm Performance, Transparent communication,
Subjects:	Operations Management Operations Management > Supply Chain Management
Depositing User:	Veeramani R
Date Deposited:	01 Apr 2019 10:05
Last Modified:	01 Apr 2019 10:05
URI:	http://eprints.exchange.isb.edu/id/eprint/731
Publisher URL:	https://doi.org/10.5465/AMBPP.2017.15504abstract
Publisher OA policy:	http://sherpa.mimas.ac.uk/romeo/issn/0065-0668/
Related URLs:	Google Scholar

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