Abbink, K and Dasgupta, U and Gangadharan, L and Jain, T
(2012)
Letting the Briber Go Free: An Experiment on Mitigating Harassment Bribes.
Working Paper.
Indian School of Business.
(Unpublished)
Abstract
This paper examines the effectiveness of using asymmetric liability to combat harassment bribes. Asymmetric liability is a mechanism where bribe-takers are culpable but bribe-givers have legal immunity. Results from our experiment indicate that while this policy has the potential to significantly reduce corrupt practices, weak economic incentives for the bribe-giver, or retaliation by bribe- takers can mitigate the disciplining effect of such an implementation. Asymmetric liability on its own may hence face challenges in the field.
| ISB Creators: |
| ISB Creators | ORCiD |
|---|
| Jain, T | UNSPECIFIED |
|
| Item Type: |
Monograph
(Working Paper)
|
| Uncontrolled Keywords: |
harassment bribes, experiment, asymmetric penalty, retaliation |
| Subjects: |
Policy |
| Depositing User: |
LRC ISB
|
| Date Deposited: |
31 Oct 2014 05:18 |
| Last Modified: |
20 Jan 2015 10:33 |
| URI: |
http://eprints.exchange.isb.edu/id/eprint/86 |
| Publisher URL: |
http://www.isb.edu |
| Related URLs: |
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