Identifying ever-greening: Evidence using loan-level data

Tantri, P L (2021) Identifying ever-greening: Evidence using loan-level data. Journal of Banking & Finance, 122. p. 105997. ISSN 0378-4266

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Abstract

We identify ever-greening motivated by loan officer incentives. We devise a novel evergreening measure in a setting dominated by non-verifiable information. We identify loans that are renewed quickly after repayment of the previous loan, where the same officer is in charge during the issuance of both loans, and transactions are consummated close to the repayment deadline for the first loan as cases that are plausibly ever-greened. We find that loans get repeatedly evergreened during the tenure of a loan officer and default soon after the officer moves out of a branch due to time-based mandatory job rotation.

Affiliation: Indian School of Business
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Tantri, P L
UNSPECIFIED
Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Zombie lending, Banking, Incentives
Subjects: Finance
Depositing User: Gurusrinivasan K
Date Deposited: 28 Mar 2021 07:01
Last Modified: 28 Mar 2021 07:07
URI: https://eprints.exchange.isb.edu/id/eprint/1415
Publisher URL: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/...
Publisher OA policy: https://v2.sherpa.ac.uk/id/publication/13778
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