Takeover Immunity, Takeovers, and the Market for Nonexecutive Directors

Ashraf, R and Chakrabarti, R and Fu, R and Jayaraman, N (2010) Takeover Immunity, Takeovers, and the Market for Nonexecutive Directors. Financial Management, 39 (1). pp. 83-127. ISSN 0046-3892

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We develop and test two competing hypotheses that relate the market for nonexecutive directors to the level of external monitoring mechanism of the firms they serve. The Reward for Discretion Hypothesis posits that directors are valued more when they display discretion concerning their choice of antitakeover provision (ATP) levels rather than follow a rule. Alternatively, the CEO Risk Aversion Hypothesis implies that CEOs seek directors with inclination for uniform and high ATP levels. We examine how changes in ATP levels and approval of value creating/destroying acquisitions affect the careers of nonexecutive directors. Our results, based on data from about 3,000 listed US companies during 1994‐2003, support the Reward for Discretion Hypothesis.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: Finance
Date Deposited: 23 Nov 2023 09:47
Last Modified: 23 Nov 2023 10:03
URI: https://eprints.exchange.isb.edu/id/eprint/2208

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