RESOURCE MOBILIZATION THROUGH BRICOLAGE IN SOCIAL ENTERPRISES

BY

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DISSERTATION

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Abstract

The primary focus of social enterprises is on improving welfare in society. Its rise in recent times has induced significant research interest, especially in factors that affect their performance. One of these crucial factors includes the mobilization of both tangible and intangible resources that are continuously orchestrated to create social returns. Since these social enterprises often lack access to traditional sources of capital, they tend to resort to resource mobilization through 'bricolage', which is using locally available resources within a resource-constrained environment in order to address social problems. Through this study, I explore how social enterprises mobilize their resources using (1) recruiting for gender parity, (2) non-traditional Ricardian rents and (3) caste-based dissimilarity, through bricolage. To conduct my analyses, I use data from an Indian social enterprise that focuses on reducing social backwardness through digital literacy. Taking advantage of a natural experiment, I find that women bricoleurs are more likely to align with the social enterprise's mission by focusing more on generating social returns. My second dataset belongs to social enterprises from a public-private partnership (PPP) organization related to an Indian government program on nationwide skill building. In my second study, I find that bricolage of intangible resources aids in value creating activities while bricolage of tangible resources can have a negative impact on the same. Internal bricolage of both tangible and intangible resources enhances value creation. In my third study (based on the first dataset), I investigate a particular form of ethnicity-based homophily (caste-based homophily), and how it influences welfare disbursement. Caste based similarity among bricoleurs, and their beneficiaries increase both propensity and amount of economic transactions. When similarity does not exist, the difference in social status between the two parties can create a similar effect as homophily in some inter-ethnic groups, leading to a positive outcome in welfare disbursement. I further study how caste based homophily can change the nature of

transactions over time through broadening and deepening of relationships. My dissertation contributes to strategy literature on bricolage in social enterprises. In terms of the managerial and policy-level implications, I believe that my research could help social enterprises judiciously manipulate some of these indigenous levers found through my study in order to enhance their social performance, and thereby mitigate global challenges, like poverty reduction, women empowerment, and gender equality.

Table of Contents

List of Tables and Figures

Chapter 1: Introduction

Social enterprises (SEs), driven by a dual commitment to positive societal impact and financial sustenance, have induced research interest in factors that affect their success. Existing research has delved into several factors influencing the socio-economic returns that form the foundation of their performance (Flynn et al., 2015; Musinguzi et al., 2023; Zahra et al., 2009). These enterprises primarily pursue social missions aimed at generating value for the community, balancing financial self-sufficiency, innovation, and social transformation to varying degrees (Brouard & Larivet, 2010; Ko & Liu, 2021). Negotiating indigenous challenges in resource-scarce environments is a common hurdle for SEs (Busch & Barkema, 2021; Mair & Marti, 2006). Consequently, it becomes imperative for SEs to adeptly mobilize the available resources to navigate these challenges effectively. Resource mobilization is a process, where new or additional financial and non-financial resources are organized or gathered either externally or internally to support the larger organizational purpose and activities. In fact, resource mobilization in any enterprise is a critical determinant of its success. It involves an endless combination, recombination, and replacement of physical, human, and social capital for innovative usage. It also involves stakeholders, who partake in SE's mission to create social value (Di Domenico et al., 2010). Accessing and garnering sufficient resources for solving social problems is an enormous challenge for these enterprises, because of which, they attempt to address the challenges through a resourcing behavior, known as 'bricolage'.

Bricolage enables social enterprises to overcome resource constraints and creatively use what is available, to address social problems or to seek opportunities (Baker & Nelson, 2005; Levi-Strauss, 1966; Mair & Marti, 2009; Mateus & Sarkar, 2024; Zahra et al., 2009). Using locally available resources, such as physical capital or indigenous human capital and

social capital, it helps social enterprises empower communities to solve their problems, adapt to the contextual reality, and create legitimacy, as well as provide long-term organizational sustainability (Korsgaard et al., 2021; Scuotto et al., 2023; Servantie & Rispal, 2018). Resource challenges due to a lack of environmental munificence and unfavorable institutional environments are met through bricolage, a novel use of scarce resources to scale social impact (Bacq et al., 2015; Desa, 2012, Scazziota et al., 2023; Sarkar, 2020). Entrepreneurial bricolage is thereby believed to be associated with the constructs of *making do*, *refusal to be constrained by limitations*, and *improvisation* (Mateus & Sarkar, 2024). When adapted to the context of social enterprises, social bricolage relates to the additional constructs of *social value creation*, *stakeholder participation*, and *persuasion* (Di Domenico et al., 2010). Different from effectuation (Sarasvathy, 2001), which is a decision-making logic under uncertainty, bricolage complements effectuation to navigate these enterprises' survival and growth phases.

To reduce economic and social disparity across the world, the United Nations has postulated 17 sustainable development goals (SDGs) to be achieved by 2030 (Eisenhardt et al., 2016; George et al., 2016). This has led several social enterprises to align their social mission to achievement of these global goals, which by no means, is an easy task. The 2023 SDG Report[1] presents a candid assessment of the status of achievement of these goals so far and identifies several gaps that need to be filled through utilization of available technologies, resources, and knowledge. This has made resource mobilization in social enterprises a topic that demands attention. Extent literature on entrepreneurial resource mobilization has identified disproportionate focus on financial resources as a gap that needs to be addressed to

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[1] https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/report/2023/

progress resource mobilization research (Clough et al., 2019). Through my research on deployment of non-financial resources by social enterprises through bricolage, I hope to address this gap and contribute to literature in this space.

In this study, I explore the performance consequences of bricolage, through mechanisms such as gender diversity, non-traditional Ricardian rents, and caste-based dissimilarity. At the beginning of my exploration, I ask three key questions pertaining to social enterprises, and some of their explicit and implicit resourcing practices. The research questions are as follows:

(i)   *How do proactive recruitment practices that promote gender balance increase alignment with institutional values and mission?*

(ii)   *How can social enterprises judiciously allocate their financial resources to mobilize physical, human, and social capital for value creation?*

(iii)   *What is the effect of social dynamics that arise due to ethnicity-based homophily and differences in relative social status among inter-ethnic groups of entrepreneurial agents and their beneficiaries on poverty reduction?*

Notably, each of these phenomena has indigenous roots, and leveraging them can accentuate or attenuate the efficacy of the enterprise's practices.

Empirical Contexts

I situate my first and third studies in the empirical context of the Digital Empowerment Foundation (DEF), which deploys bricolage as a resourcing technique for sourcing human capital. For my second study, I collated data on social enterprises belonging to a public-private partnership (PPP). The empirical context of this PPP study was conducted through a government program called 'Pradhan Mantri Kaushal Vikas Yojana' (PMKVY). This program (i.e. PMKVY) chose to reap the advantage of India's huge demographic dividend in terms of the working-age population.

DEF Dataset

DEF is a large non-profit social enterprise that works with social bricoleurs in several backward districts of rural India. These social bricoleurs are small-scale, locally focused micro-entrepreneurs affiliated with DEF, who use "intimate knowledge of both local environmental conditions and locally available resources" (Zahra et al., 2009: 524). DEF's goal is to connect difficult-to-reach and underprivileged villages in India, and bring them out of digital darkness and information poverty with the help of the bricoleurs, who they train and give initial financial aid in the form of digital equipment. The social bricoleurs in turn, become knowledgeable about government welfare programs, and are thus able to help in addressing the needs of specific groups of people in particular locations. In fact, they combine this knowledge about available resources with the needs of the local villagers to meet social needs, disburse welfare and reduce poverty in the process. DEF ties up with large multinational corporations that are increasingly engaging in philanthropic initiatives and working with non-government organizations to have a significant social impact through their corporate social responsibility initiatives (Aims et al., 2021; Aguilera et al., 2007; Davis, 1973; Gibson, 2022). For instance, Qualcomm and the European Union supported DEF's vision in starting a rural-based entrepreneurship program, while investing in local communities. This program aimed to facilitate information sharing on government-sponsored programs, enroll suitable beneficiaries and claim their entitlements among those living in rural communities. Examples of these programs include free health insurance for those living in poverty, nutrition for children, getting pension for the elderly and widows, financial and resource assistance for marriages of daughters, especially of widows, school fee reimbursements, scholarships for young women/girls, etc.

DEF also helps social bricoleurs through the entrepreneurial process of starting a business; for example: they help the social bricoleurs find a location to set up their

businesses, provide digital equipment, and train them in how to use the equipment and run their businesses. Notably, by encouraging participation of rural women, DEF empowers them to create a sustainable enterprise, mobilizing social change by improving their financial and social standing (Datta & Gailey, 2012; Haugh & Talwar, 2016; Lee et al., 2018). Summarily, it may be said that DEF acts like a franchisor that looks to replicate its business model in order to amplify its social mission (Volery & Hackl, 2010). Social bricoleurs on the other hand, reach out to, inform, and enroll consumers into government programs that provide consumer benefits. The social bricoleurs are expected to feel socially obliged to care more about their mission of uplifting the poorer section of society than simply making money as personal earnings. As practiced today, a social bricoleur earns an income by charging a nominal enrolment fee for preparing and submitting the required government documents for the beneficiary. DEF also allows the bricoleur to earn additional income by using enterprise-supplied digital equipment to pursue their entrepreneurial activities, such as videography for a wedding or photocopying for a school.

One of DEF's primary missions is to achieve gender equality and women empowerment and they ran an initial survey that indicated that rural women were open to exploring micro-entrepreneurship. In a major change from their earlier recruitment policy, in early 2018, DEF recruited and trained more women social bricoleurs to tackle the low ratio of women to men. DEF carried out this intervention in randomly selected regions in 'economically backward' districts of Alwar, Guna, and Ranchi. At that time, DEF also worked in three other economically backward districts, viz. Bargarh, Barmer and West Champaran, where it did not change its recruitment policy. DEF chose not to intervene in all the six districts simultaneously because they felt supporting the newly enrolled women bricoleurs round the year would be important, but challenging in the latter three districts (Bargarh, Barmer and West Champaran) due their road conditions and heavy rainfall. Around

the same time, DEF started operating in another backward district named Barabanki, where it started by recruiting only women bricoleurs. The districts are spread out across the rural parts of India (see Figure 1.1). Importantly, all these seven districts being economically-backward also have similar socioeconomic profiles. Socioeconomic and demographic statistics of the districts are shown in Table 1.1.

Once the districts were identified for implementing the new recruitment process, areas within the districts, called *panchayats*, were randomly picked for the intervention, and recruitment of women entrepreneurs commenced. Notably, a *panchayat* is a basic unit in the Indian administrative system for rural areas; it comprises a cluster of villages, with a population of about 5000 for the smaller ones and about 20000 for the larger ones. While the proportion between women and men was achieved across locations after the intervention (4:6), the intervention resulted in the treatment group (7:3) being distinct from the control group (1:9). This change in recruitment process, an intervention, in some panchayats and not in others, gives me the opportunity to treat this as a natural experiment (Leatherdale, 2019), an empirical approach that has been increasingly used in management research to study various organization-related outcomes (Jia et al., 2020; Lee & Puranam, 2017). For my first research question, I conduct my analysis at the *panchayat* location level in the six districts of Alwar, Guna, Ranchi, Bargarh, Barmer and West Champaran. For my third research question, I analyze the data of dyadic transactions among social bricoleurs and their beneficiaries in all seven districts, including Barabanki. Demographic details in the data, like religion and caste information, enable me to identify transactions with similar or different ethnicities and measuring the relative social status between the bricoleurs and their beneficiaries to see their impact on economic transactions and value generated.

Insert Table 1.1 and Figure 1.1about here

PMKVY Dataset

PMKVY refers to the Prime Minister's Skill Enablement Mission, under the aegis of the Ministry of Skill Development and Entrepreneurship (MSDE, GOI). As an important vision of India's Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, PMKVY was incepted to bridge the global demand and supply gap of a 'skilled workforce'. It is a formal skilling initiative intended to make India the 'global skills capital', while harnessing the potent force of a young workforce. It also endeavors to make the underprivileged youth employable or entrepreneurial, improving in the process, their well-being through capabilities development (Sen, 1985), and also increase their social recognition. At this point, it may be also noted that as a country, India's skill-based education has had a 'secondary status'. However, there is a considerable demand for the same in organizations, and as self-employed partners in the country's rising gig economy. Since India has high school dropout rates (Chatterjee et al., 2018; Ramachandran, 2022), the program's intent is also to secure livelihood for such dropouts through short-term training programs, assessment and certification, with the latter being more applicable for people with prior learning experience. There are several phases of the program: PMKVY (2015-16), PMKVY 2.0 (2016-2020), and the pilot of PMKVY 3.0 (2020-21), which have been implemented or are ongoing. The data set of this study relates to PMKVY 2.0 (i.e. August 2016-December 2017). Given the fact that more than half of India's 1.39 billion people are of working-age, aged between 15 and 64 (Parida & Madheswaran, 2023), owing to the sheer numbers and scale, the Indian government has had to rope in many 'private' partners to achieve this ambitious mission of skill-building, creating in the process, a PPP model.

The PPP model began in earnest in 2004; within the larger ambits of PMKVY, the objectives were to both upgrade and modernize government-run Industrial Training Institutes

(ITI). Notably, ITIs have been in existence for some time, spread across the country; however, they weren't utilized completely. Effectively, ITIs are post-secondary training schools, meant to enhance skill-building across various trades. Thus, under the broader aegis of PMKVY, about 100 ITIs were upgraded, using domestic resources; 400 were upgraded through World Bank Loans, while 1,396 through the PPP model, where 0.5 million USD or INR 3.6 Crores was given as interest-free loan to private players for upgrading training infrastructure (Chenoy, 2013). India's 2009 Skill Development Policy made the agreements, in which, the main aim was to link skills training to jobs and employability. The National Skill Development Commission (NSDC) was officially launched in October 2009 with a mandate to train 150 million people by 2022 across 20 high-growth and unorganized sectors. Notably, the government ownership in this PPP model has been limited to 49% of equity capital, while the rest has been passed on to the private sector, comprising industry associations and organizations. In fact, a trust named National Skill Development Fund (NSDF) was created; it has bilateral, multi-lateral, and private funding, and is the guardian of the funds that are available to NSDC, which takes all fund-related decisions (Chenoy, 2013).

On receiving project proposals from private parties, NSDC thoroughly vets them, regardless of them coming from potential or existing training partners. Several parameters are actually used in this entire process, for instance, market demand for the training, effectiveness of curriculum design, whether practical sessions of the training meet industry standards, what is the model of sourcing trainers and how training centers collaborate with other partners for recruitment, etc. NSDC also has a robust monitoring system for evaluating the training partners at various stages of their projects. Chenoy, (2013) described NSDC's role as "a social venture capital-cum venture debit/development bank" (pp. 187). It has deployed patient capital, flexible terms and conditions, and monitoring framework. It has helped its partners create a business out of skills training, showing its potential to become a major social

enterprise sector that need not depend on donations or CSR initiatives. NSDC has been known to engage its training partners to be competitive, be result-oriented, and have outcome and milestone-based funding agreements, while being driven by both social and financial returns. In such arrangements, the training partners are always motivated to stay ahead of competition, and thereby create value for customers to secure their funding. The outcomes also matter if they're going to scale up and open new training centers for which, they may require additional funding.

NSDC through this PPP model runs several training centers across multiple states. In my dataset, I have data pertaining to 1,400 training centers with 4,616 cohorts of vocational training programs. After the training, the participants are recruited by organizations and become salaried employees. However, some may prefer to become entrepreneurs, and start earning by setting up their own ventures. The training centers are funded by the government, depending on what percentage of the trainees have been employed. By treating investment in training infrastructure by the training centers as a form of physical capital, the trainers as human capital, and alumni of the centers as social capital, I study how different types of resources influence overall earnings, wages from salary, and discretionary income through entrepreneurial ventures.

Chapter Summaries

In my first research question (Chapter 2), drawing on the Social Role Theory (SRT), I theorize how the performance of men and women differ depending on gender alignment or deviation from norms. I find that women are more likely to align with the enterprise's mission by focusing more on social return (earnings for beneficiaries) than financial return (their own earnings). My qualitative findings further reveal that being affiliated with a social enterprise makes stickiness with the enterprise's mission grow, especially for women entrepreneurs, who otherwise do not have any identity of their own. If DEF can employ both men and

women, it can increase both social and financial performance for them. Having an optimal gender ratio through recruitment (2 women : 1 man in the current context) could also help enhance mission alignment.

In my second essay (Chapter 3), I study how social enterprises create more value for their customers by judiciously using their scarce financial resources to mobilize other non-financial resources, especially in a resource-scarce world, where they compete for funds. Resource mobilization in social enterprises can happen predominantly through optimization, which acquires resources with proven efficiencies, or bricolage that often utilizes resources available at hand. Physical capital (tangible resource), acquired through optimization, can generate traditional Ricardian rents, while human and social capital (intangible resource), acquired through bricolage, can generate non-traditional Ricardian and entrepreneurial rents. I hypothesize and show tangible resources obtained through optimization are necessary, but not sufficient to create value and bricolaging them, could have a negative impact on value creation. On the other hand, intangible resources, obtained through bricolage, can be used innovatively to create value. Notably, social enterprises often reuse resources through the process of 'internal bricolage'; and my third hypothesis relates to internal bricolage of both tangible and intangible resources, and is seen to enhance value creation.

In my third essay (Chapter 4), I study a particular form of ethnicity-based homophily (caste-based homophily), and how it influences resource mobilization. Importantly, ethnicity-based homophily does affect both people and businesses through improved cooperation, communication, and trust between actors and their contacts; but it can also alienate dissimilar people, and reduce the availability of information, ideas, or resources. The difference in the social status of actors can further confound the competing forces. Therefore, I examine the impact of social dynamics on poverty reduction through welfare disbursement. The dynamics arise due to ethnicity-based homophily and differences in relative social status among inter-

ethnic groups of social bricoleurs, vis a vis their beneficiaries. For example, two individuals of the same ethnicity may naturally trust one another due to the similarity attraction theory. However, how does their performance effectively differ from those that are dissimilar? Based on existing theory and evidence, I first hypothesize that ethnicity-based homophily increases the probability of economic transactions and the amount involved. Building on the social dynamics theory (SDT) and status characteristics theory (SCT), I posit how the difference in social status can actually create a similar effect as homophily in some inter-ethnic groups, leading to a positive outcome in welfare disbursement. I further study how homophily can change the nature of transactions over time. Hereby, I posit that the number of beneficiaries initially increases to broaden networks of people of similar ethnicity. When this advantage is exhausted, a deepening effect occurs, in which entrepreneurs strive to deepen existing ties by increasing the monetary amount of transactions. After sometime however, the effect of caste-based homophily tends to decrease on both broadening and deepening effects.

Contributions

In addition to enhancing extant literature on usage of bricolage in social enterprises (Kwong et al., 2017; Langevang & Namatovu, 2019; Mzembe et al., 2019) and its impact on social value creation and competitive advantage (Liu et al., 2021; Steffens et al., 2022), my study makes other notable contributions. First, I contribute to gender and social entrepreneurship literature by examining how recruiting women entrepreneurs affects a social enterprise's social performance, underscoring thereby the significance of global initiatives for development, aimed at mobilizing and empowering women. My contribution entails the discovery of a new causal mechanism that aids social enterprises in differentiating themselves by remaining committed to their social mission while focusing on financial gains (Battilana et al., 2015). In order to quantify the focal phenomena, I also developed a new construct, the mission alignment indicator (which has not been empirically examined in prior studies),

thereby contributing to theory (Makadok et al., 2018). I employ a natural experiment that has recently been applied to gender and entrepreneurship settings ,and is increasingly used in research to introduce causal elements (Croson & Gneezy, 2009; Dhar et al., 2022; Healy & Malhotra, 2013; Jia et al., 2020; Lee & Puranam, 2017; Venkatesh et al., 2017; Younge et al. 2015).

Second, I contribute to social entrepreneurship and resource-based view by demonstrating how diverse non-financial resources, such as physical capital, human capital, and social capital, can influence both traditional and non-traditional Ricardian rents, as well as entrepreneurial rents. I also add to the existing body of knowledge on resource mobilization in social enterprises by examining the benefits and drawbacks of the two techniques of optimization and bricolage (Bacq & Eddleston, 2018; Bloom & Chatterji, 2009; Day & Jean-Denis, 2016; Desa & Basu, 2013). Third, I contribute to homophily and status literature (Belliveau et al. 1996; Ertug et al., 2018; Pearce & Xu, 2012). Specifically, my findings contribute to research on ethnicity-based homophily by showing the caste system's significant influence at various levels in Indian and other contexts (Chen et al., 2015; Damaraju & Makhija, 2018; Freeman & Huang, 2015; Hegde & Tumlinson, 2014; Ruef, 2014). Further, given the significance of context in homophily research (Ertug et al., 2022), the backdrop of a rural environment does add uniqueness, since most past research has been conducted within an urban setting. My dissertation has managerial and policy-level implications too, and could be of help to social enterprises that could judiciously manipulate these indigenous levers to enhance the efficacy of welfare policies, like achieving gender equality or poverty reduction.

However, it may be noted that while this dissertation has addressed some aspects of resource mobilization in SEs through bricolage, the investigation is far from complete. My studies have been performed in the Indian context and while the findings should be

generalizable, it may be worthwhile to investigate the boundary conditions by conducting similar studies on SEs in other geographies, to study bricolage's role in internalization (Donbesuur et al. 2023; Kollmann et al., 2022). Scientific inquiry, focusing on theory building and ultimate impact, that probes into successful practices, often through experiments on a small scale (Banerjee & Duflo, 2013) can be done in other SEs to study their myriad resource mobilization challenges. Academically rigorous findings and practically implementable, replicable solutions can result in SEs sharing their best practices with other similar organizations in a process known as intentional replication (El Ebrashi, 2013). Extending my research can help SEs meet the UN grand challenge, and positively impact more than 800 million people worldwide.

Table 1.1. Socioeconomic and demographic statistics of the seven districts in the natural experiment

District	Per Capita District Domestic Product (INR)	Total Area (sq km)	Total Population	Population Density	Gender Ratio	Literacy	Hindu (%)	Muslim (%)	Christian (%)	Scheduled Caste (%)	Scheduled Tribe (%)
Alwar	104366	8380	3674179	438	895	70.72	82.72	14.9	0.07	17.77	7.87
Barabanki	33556	3892	3260699	687	910	61.75	76.84	22.61	0.15	26.51	0.02
Bargarh	22458	5837	1481255	254	977	74.62	94.83	3.18	1.22	17.94	5.38
Barmer	135987	28387	2603751	92	902	56.53	86.22	12.34	0.04	16.76	6.76
Guna	22047	6390	1241519	194	912	63.23	94.42	3.96	0.1	15.55	15.36
Ranchi	15359	5097	2914253	572	949	76.06	64.31	16.42	8.52	1.73	7.44
WChamparan	8860	5228	3935042	753	909	55.7	77.44	21.98	0.22	14.07	6.35

Per capita District Domestic Product data is adopted from Hanagodimath (2019)

Figure 1.1 Districts of the natural experiment

Chapter 2: Gender and Mission Alignment: Evidence from a Natural Experiment of Social Bricoleurs

Introduction

Social enterprises often have hybrid business models with a dual objective of increasing both social and economic value. However, these enterprises may compromise on the social purpose for financial gain, popularly known as 'mission drift' (Lazzarini, 2020; Pache & Santos, 2013; Santos et al., 2015). Mission drift can hamper the dual mission objectives of social enterprises (Kwong et al., 2017; Siebold et al., 2019). Mission alignment, on the other hand, indicates whether the enterprises retain focus on their social mission in spite of having the opportunity to increase their financial return. Many of these enterprises also seek to mobilize women to promote gender diversity (Lee & Huang, 2018; Yang et al., 2020) and reduce poverty, which are two of the most important sustainable development goals (SDG), as per United Nation's SDG Report, 2023. However, the social and financial performance implications of having more women needs to be more thoroughly investigated.

Social bricoleurs are micro-entrepreneurs associated with a social enterprise and seek to address the small-scale needs of the surroundings through bricolage (Baker & Nelson, 2005; Welter et al., 2016; Zahra et al., 2009). They often accomplish the goals with minimal resources, encouraging stakeholder participation in their enterprise's mission (Agarwal et al., 2020; Di Domenico et al., 2010; Nason & Bothello, 2022). Social organizations employing these social bricoleurs often face competing goals of fulfilling the enterprise's social mission and helping the bricoleur earn a sustainable income (Dacin et al., 2010; Dacin et al., 2011; Haugh, 2007). I posit that understanding gender differences and the gender composition of teams among the social bricoleurs may help address the social enterprise's dual goals and understand whether they

22

remain aligned to their social mission or not. The research question I want to investigate is how male and female social bricoleurs will perform differently given that their job roles in the social enterprise have both communal (social) and agentic (entrepreneurship) elements.

I draw on social role theory that explains how gender-role beliefs, gender stereotypes, and gender-based division of labor emerge from a combination of multiple disciplines and perspectives (Eagly, 1987; Eagly & Wood, 2012; Wood & Eagly, 2002). I build on the recent works on gender and entrepreneurship (Castellaneta et al., 2020; Hmieleski & Sheppard, 2019; Lyngsie & Foss, 2017; Rocha & Praag, 2020). Biological dissimilarities, societal prescriptions, individual dispositions, and labor efficiency have largely supported the finding that women are more communal and men are more agentic (Bakan, 1966; Diekman & Eagly, 2000; Koenig & Eagly, 2014). In other words, women are more likely to hold caretaking, nurturing, and family-oriented roles, while men are more likely to have more breadwinner, authoritative, and career-focused roles. Gender and role congruity theory (GRCT) further explains how deeply embedded, and psychologically ingrained these gender differences exist in individuals' mental models that the specific gender tends to endorse and follow associated behaviors in the workplace (Eagly & Karau, 2002; Yang et al., 2020). I further draw on norms to help understand how social bricoleurs' traits align or deviate from their associated role congruent behavior (Eagly et al., 2000).

I adopt a contextualized approach by embedding a phenomenon into the theory to develop deeper insights into social bricoleurs' behavior (Dacin et al., 2010; Dacin et al., 2011). My context is the Digital Empowerment Foundation (DEF), a social enterprise that connects unreached and underserved communities of India to address persistent problems in emerging economies, such as unemployment, poverty, and lack of access to information. Social bricoleurs

are men and women hired by DEF to start their micro social ventures in a rural context. I use a natural experiment, an empirical approach that has been increasingly used in management research to study various organization-related outcomes (Jia et al., 2020; Lee & Puranam, 2017; Younge et al., 2015). I employ the difference-in-differences (DID) methodology to examine the outcome of an intervention. In early 2018, DEF implemented a notable change by bringing in more female social bricoleurs to achieve gender equality and empower women. My study examines the performance effects of DEF's intervention to hire more female social bricoleurs in three of its six districts in rural India. I discovered that women are more likely to support and remain aligned to the company's social objective. My qualitative findings also show that recognition and opportunity provided to the poverty-stricken people give 'identity' a new meaning, especially for women bricoleurs who have increased moral commitment and alignment with the enterprise's objective.

I make three contributions to the gender and entrepreneurship literature. To the best of my knowledge, this study is the first to examine how hiring women bricoleurs can positively change the social performance of a social enterprise, highlighting the importance of global developmental initiatives focused on mobilizing and empowering women. My theoretical contribution lies in identifying a new causal mechanism that helps social enterprises differentiate themselves by aligning with their social mission while keeping their focus on financial returns (Battilana et al., 2015). I also contribute theoretically by creating a new construct, the *mission alignment indicator*, to quantify the focal phenomenon, which has not been measured in prior studies (Makadok et al., 2018). Second, I add to the existing literature by shedding light on a specific case of intended and unintended social outcomes (Castellaneta et al., 2020; Zhou et al., 2020). While intended to reduce the gender gap, an unintended consequence of achieving a

gender ratio of 2:1 (women: men in this specific context) addressed mission drift problems, and a novel solution emerged. Third, using a natural experiment, which took place in remote villages in India, allowed me to study gender ratio and mission drift in the context of social bricoleurs in an indigenous setting, thereby adding to the literature on causal elements in research (Croson & Gneezy, 2009; Healy & Malhotra, 2013; Jia et al., 2020; Lee & Puranam, 2017; Venkatesh et al., 2017; Younge et al., 2015).

Social Entrepreneurship Context

I adopt a contextual approach based on the social entrepreneurship mission of the social enterprise to embed the phenomena to allow for deeper insights and develop novel theories (Dacin et al., 2010; Dacin et al., 2011). Social enterprises with the dual mission of social and financial returns are gaining legitimacy (Lucas et al., 2022; Neuberger et al., 2021). They differ from other types of organizations in their primary goal of creating social value and explicitly endorsing a social mission, regardless of the legal or ownership structure they adopt (Brouard & Larivet, 2010; Mair & Marti, 2006; 2009). Due to the multiplicity of their internal institutional logic, these organizations are increasingly confronted with contradictory expectations from their institutional settings (Besharov & Smith, 2014). This can result in meeting some expectations at the expense of others (Pache & Santos, 2010; 2021). Because financial returns are essential for the sustenance of these organizations, sometimes a trade-off can arise when they tend to focus on more profitable customer segments while excluding more vulnerable groups (Lazzarini, 2020; Mersland & Strøm, 2010). The sacrifice of social returns for financial gain results in mission drift (Cornforth, 2014; Doherty et al., 2014; Pache & Santos, 2013; Santos et al., 2015). Mission drift affects social performance, which is intrinsically ambiguous, and evaluated differently from financial performance (Kroeger & Weber, 2014; Nason et al., 2018). It should be controlled

since social enterprises must demonstrate social value creation to stakeholders for getting grants or investments for their growth and sustenance (Kuan & Thornton, 2021). One of the ways of doing this is to measure whether the social enterprises remain aligned to their social mission by either (i) increasing social return at the expense of financial return or (ii) by increasing both at commensurate rates.

The behavior of individuals can influence mission drift (Andersson, 2004; Beisland et al., 2019). The role of the social entrepreneur becomes vital in this context since s/he is an embedded agent who must be motivated to assume that role (Miller et al., 2012). The motivation can come from compassion and emotion-driven processes that compel individuals to act (Creed et al., 2022). Individuals can vary on several parameters, one of them being gender. Many of these social enterprises aim to deploy women to achieve gender equality, but research on the social and financial consequences of having more women is sparse. There have been few studies in microfinance organizations on how the gender of loan officers impact repayment rate, but the results are inconclusive (Van Den Berg et al., 2015). Due to inherent differences among women and men in traits like compassion, altruism, and care-giving (Croson & Gneezy, 2009; Eagly & Wood, 2013; Koenig & Eagly, 2014), I propose that looking at the gender composition of social bricoleurs in a social enterprise can help understand mission alignment in terms of whether the behaviour of the social bricoleurs is intended towards garnering more social returns or whether they tend to behave opportunistically by earning more discretionary income at its cost

Theory and Hypotheses

My primary research question is to study how the gender of social bricoleurs affects the performance of the social enterprise. Recent studies have shown how the role of gender is critical in social enterprises (Anglin et al., 2022; Dimitriadis et al., 2017; Lee & Huang, 2018). Because

of socially and culturally prescribed stereotypes and expectations, women tend to show more communal attributes, such as care and compassion. In contrast, men display more agentic attributes, such as risk-taking and rent-seeking behaviors (Eagly & Wood, 2012). DEF has a dual focus on social and financial returns (Dacin et al., 2010; Dacin et al., 2011), which naturally presents a conundrum since social entrepreneurship has both communal and agentic elements, respectively. How can an enterprise be socially focused and entrepreneurial at the same time? Will male and female social bricoleurs pursue both performance objectives, or will a particular gender focus on social or entrepreneurial returns?

On the one hand, social bricoleurs working for social enterprises are supposed to help society. Based on social role theory, women display more communal attributes and, therefore, would naturally align better with the social elements of the enterprise. On the other hand, often, social bricoleurs are encouraged to be financially independent and earn a profit. Such entrepreneurial focus and risk appetite are associated more with men than women (Croson & Gneezy, 2009; Gupta et al., 2009; Gupta et al.,2019; Murnieks et al., 2020). It can create mission drift when it aligns with the male's agentic identity (Cardon et al., 2009; Fauchart & Gruber, 2011).

The social enterprise needs to monitor whether its agents are working in the enterprise's best interest or themselves (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). DEF invests in monitoring technology and administrative staff to measure the behavior-based outcomes of these workers (Eisenhardt, 1989; Levinthal, 1988). At the same time, it also provides outcome-based contracts that shift the risk to the entrepreneurs and allow for the growth of entrepreneurs in developing markets (Cappelli & Keller, 2013). Although counter-stereotypical behavior can sometimes act as positive supplements of characteristic traits (Hmieleski & Sheppard, 2019), the

dominant traits for men and women are universal (Eagly & Karau, 2002; Eagly at el., 2000; Koenig & Eagly, 2014). The gender composition of female and male social bricoleurs has communal and agentic traits that align with a social enterprise's social and entrepreneurial activities, respectively.

Two types of norms, viz. descriptive and injunctive, can explain why the largely universal roles of communal women and agentic men influence a particular gender's associated congruent behavior (Cialdini & Trost, 1998; Eagly et al., 2000). Injunctive norms explain what a gender 'ought' to do based on their agentic and communal stereotypes, while descriptive norms describe what a gender 'is' actually doing, such as taking on the role of a caretaker or breadwinner (Cialdini et al., 1991). While the two norms can often be aligned, there may be deviations. Deviations from descriptive norms can often evoke emotions tinged with admiration or surprise, whereas deviations from injunctive norms are typically associated with moral disapproval (Eagly et al., 2000). I study these alignments and deviations to explain the performance differences between male and female social bricoleurs.

Hypotheses

The performance of a female social bricoleur in a social enterprise depends not only on their motivations but also on society's perceptions. Society's perception of DEF suggests that it is truly helping society rather than making a profit (even though both social and financial elements are present). While female entrepreneurs holding leadership positions is inconsistent with the gender stereotype of women and leads to gender penalty (Eagly & Karau, 2002; Lee & Huang, 2018), in my context, female social bricoleurs can occupy a caretaking perspective. Therefore social role theory would predict that the female social bricoleur's role working for the social enterprise would show alignment between descriptive and injunctive norms since she is working

28

for what society views as a communal role (Lee & Huang, 2018).

The deeply entrenched beliefs of gender role congruity would also predict that women entrepreneurs would seek to serve the community rather than pursue economic indicators (Anna et al., 2000), such as showing compassion and offering emotional aid. Women tend to be more generous and altruistic when they know their roles and are aware of the context (Croson & Gneezy, 2009). Due to their typical roles as caregivers, women social bricoleurs might be especially motivated and efficient in embracing helping disadvantaged groups than men social bricoleurs (Eagly & Wood, 2013; Koenig & Eagly, 2014). Further, they may be favored for pursuing social activities, such as when women entrepreneurs seek support for social causes or projects (Anglin et al., 2022; Johnson et al., 2018; Lee & Huang, 2018). Given their agentic nature, if men work in the social enterprise to increase social returns, this deviation from injunctive norms may be unacceptable to society. As a result, men would be less likely to seek social work beyond the extent to which it provides them a (limited) source of income. Women, thereby, are more likely to align to the social mission for which they were recruited, leading to my first hypothesis:

Hypothesis (H1). *Adding more female social bricoleurs results in greater social returns*

Due to their need to earn more income, male social bricoleurs may be more financially driven than their female counterparts. DEF provides a fixed commission for fulfilling the social mission, irrespective of the welfare to society. While this may be enough income for women, who may be secondary providers and have other household responsibilities to devote time towards (Becker, 1985; Perry-Jenkins et al., 1992; Swendener, 2021), it is not enough for men. Men may have to earn a separate income to support their families or risk financial deprivation (Haugh, 2007). As a policy, in addition to the fixed commission from enrolling beneficiaries,

DEF allows their social bricoleurs to pursue their own financial returns. Even if women had the

desire and opportunity to have a more agentic approach in a social enterprise, they would tend

not to do so since this would be inconsistent with society's role expectations and thus deviate

from injunctive norms (Stets & Burke, 2000; Thoits, 1991; Wood & Eagly, 2015). A female

social bricoleur would not seek financial returns for fear of negativity and unfavorable societal

views (Eagly et al., 2000), perception of being ineffective (Eagly & Karau, 2002), poor

performance and growth due to 'gender penalties' and potential sanctions (Venkatesh et al.,

2017).

By contrast, if men were to engage in agentic behaviors, even in non-opportunistic

settings, they may be forgiven because they are not deviating from injunctive norms (Eagly &

Wood, 2012). From social role theory, we know that the male agent may naturally seek to earn

more financial returns, aligned with the attributes of the breadwinner and risk-taker (Koenig &

Eagly, 2014; Sexton & Bowman-Upton, 1990). In fact, DEF can guide the men's independent

microenterprise on how to seek growth and greater financial returns by implementing more

robust governance mechanisms, better operations and policies, and the right economic incentives

and financing options (Grimes et al., 2019; Santos et al., 2015; Young & Kim, 2015).

Given an opportunity to be entrepreneurial, men would tend to be so and start earning

from innovative usage of resources, sometimes even at the cost of social returns, rather than earn

through enrolment fees which is a more stable and probably more mundane source of income.

For example, instead of using photocopy machines only for making copies to enroll beneficiaries

in welfare programs, he may want to negotiate with a local school for its entire photocopying

business, splitting his time and commitment between social and commercial activities. Or he

may employ an external trainer and start providing computer training for interested children

using his laptop. In the present context, the costs for male social bricoleurs are higher; they incur

setup and rent-related expenditures, while female social bricoleurs are allowed and encouraged

to work from home, thus incurring minimal costs. From the above logic, male social bricoleurs

may be more financially (and entrepreneurially) motivated than their female counterparts in a

social enterprise, leading to our second hypothesis:

Hypothesis (H2). *Adding more female social bricoleurs results in lesser financial returns*

The combination of Hypothesis 1 and 2 indicates that adding more female social

bricoleurs results in more alignment towards social mission i.e., the proportion of social return to

total return will increase with more female social bricoleurs.

Data, Sample and Econometric Models

I use data from the in-house developed multilingual mobile application that social

bricoleurs use to enter enrolment data for their clients. DEF monitors social bricoleurs and

evaluates them based on the number of rural villagers they register and enroll in government

programs to reduce insufficient effort (moral hazard) and free-riding (misappropriating

resources). To verify the data, district coordinators frequently visit social bricoleurs and connect

with local enrollees to confirm enrollment and self-reports of their income.

Social bricoleurs are required to charge for services based on DEF guidelines so that poor

villagers can afford it. They strictly cannot take or give bribes. For these reasons, villagers often

work with social bricoleurs rather than government-designated agents. Though the formal service

charge of social bricoleur is higher than that of the government agent, the informal bribes are

relatively higher for the agent. Further, a formal agreement is signed between the social bricoleur

and DEF, in which there are non-negotiable clauses, such as no bribery, which if breached, can

lead to termination of the contract. In a few cases, the social bricoleurs expanded their business

and started generating employment in the districts by hiring local villagers.

Initially, I conducted open-ended interviews with the founder and two other executive

officers of DEF. The discussions happened over two days, November 19-20th 2019, for about 8

hours at DEF's Headquarters in New Delhi. This was useful in understanding the day-to-day

activities of the entrepreneurs and the context of their work. The interviews also helped build

rapport with the DEF officials. I also gained access to data collected through DEF's mobile

application used for tracking and monitoring the entrepreneurs. I received the mobile application

data in two languages: English and Hindi. I translated, interpreted, and validated the accuracy of

the data with DEF's support. I have data on demographics of the social bricoleur (such as age,

caste, gender, and religion) and the month's earnings based on enrollment fees for government

programs as well as using digital equipment for their own discretionary income. In addition, I

have data on welfare programs linked against each beneficiary and the status of whether the

application was approved, pending, or rejected. Based on this information, I calculated the social

welfare amount each bricoleur could generate for their beneficiaries.

I have monthly observations for 278 unique social bricoleurs (62 from Alwar, 9 from

Bargarh, 33 from Barmer, 76 from Guna, 62 from Ranchi, and 36 from West Champaran) from

January 2018 to December 2019. There was some voluntary turnover of older social bricoleurs

leaving and newer social bricoleurs joining during the period of study. On average, there are 45

social bricoleurs per month in the control districts and 120 social bricoleurs in the treatment

districts. Based on a conservative power calculation for observations with repeated measures

(Guo et al., 2013), I have a power of 0.83, within the acceptable range of 0.8 to 1. My panel

consists of monthly individual data of social bricoleurs aggregated to the panchayat level of

analysis. I have data pertaining to 42 panchayats in Alwar, 5 in Bargarh, 14 in Barmer, 48 in

Guna, 17 in Ranchi, 16 in West Champaran, a total of 142 panchayats, out of which 87 are

treatment and 55 are control locations.

Empirical Strategy

A natural experiment occurs when the intervention implemented is (1) not under the

control of the researchers, (2) independent of the evaluation, and (3) may not be randomized due

to ethical, political, and social reasons (Leatherdale, 2019). These experiments are frequently

used in social work and can be advantageous if adequately designed (Meyer, 1995). Multiple

treatment and comparison groups and longitudinal data with pre-intervention and post-

intervention measures make the results reliable (Leatherdale, 2019; Meyer, 1995). The fact that

entry conditions are less stringent than randomized control trials (RCTs) reduce the biases

associated with their external validity.

To examine the impact of the intervention of recruiting more female social bricoleurs, I

use a difference-in-difference (DID) approach (Angrist & Pischke, 2009). The panchayats in the

three districts of Alwar, Guna and Ranchi which were randomly picked up for the intervention

become my treatment locations, while the panchayats that were not picked up become my

control locations. In subsequent robustness checks, I test my hypotheses across all six districts,

treating the panchayats in the three districts of Bargarh, Barmer and West Champaran as

additional control locations. I use staggered DID, commonly employed in the accounting and

finance literature (Goodman-Bacon, 2021; Lilienfeld-Toal et al., 2012), in that the intervention

was implemented in a phased manner and further validate my results using a stacked regression

estimator (Baker et al., 2022). Based on the data shared by DEF, I see a jump in the proportion of

female bricoleurs from period 4 (April 2018) in most districts, except Ranchi, where the leap

happens in period 6 (June 2018). The periods before the jump in the female ratio are 'pre-intervention', and the ones after are 'post-intervention'. For control districts, period four onwards is taken as 'post-intervention'.

The first six months after the intervention can be considered a learning and adjustment period for the newly recruited female social bricoleurs. For example, the new social bricoleurs did not have the government identity cards required for applying for the various welfare programs. Hence, they had a revenue-sharing arrangement with the senior male social bricoleurs in the regions where they operated. While the women social bricoleurs registered the beneficiaries, gathered information about the programs they would need to apply for, and collected the required details, the senior male bricoleurs would take the applications to the block offices and submit them using their government IDs. For this, they used to take a 30% cut, but this arrangement did not continue beyond six months when female bricoleurs started working independently. To test the impact of these trained female social bricoleurs, a more accurate comparison group, I take a subsample excluding the first six months after the intervention for robustness check.

Measures of Variables

Dependent Variables

The data allow me to have distinct measures of social and financial returns. I measure *social return* as a three-month average of the welfare amount social bricoleurs in a panchayat can generate for beneficiaries from enrolling them in government programs. The welfare amount includes monetary and non-monetary benefits of the program and savings from beneficiaries not having to lose their daily wage from taking a day off to travel and submit documents to the government office. I measure *financial return* as a three-month average of the discretionary

income that the social bricoleurs can earn for themselves in a panchayat through standard and innovative usage of digital resources at their disposal. Examples of generating business include photocopying, digital photography/ videography, online form filling, and digital training, to name a few. The welfare amount generated per month is a measure of the social bricoleur's social returns, and other income earned is a measure of the social bricoleur's financial returns. While both types of return are important, a classical mission drift problem can arise when bricoleurs spend more resources like their time and energy in earning more discretionary income in comparison to social return. On the other hand, being able to generate more social returns in spite of having the opportunity of earning financial returns for themselves is a measure of mission alignment. I construct the *mission alignment indicator* as a proportion of social returns to total returns (sum of financial and social returns). It denotes alignment with DEF's mission, as a higher value indicates the social bricoleurs are focusing more on the social welfare of beneficiaries, than on their own financial earnings. It is to be noted that the mean of social return is INR 1679615, while the mean of financial return is INR 1086.5. The measure of social return is scaled (divided by 1000 in 000 INR) while financial return is in INR. This is done for mission drift (ratio of social return to total return) to be meaningful as non-scaled measure of social return would make total returns extremely skewed towards social return.

Independent Variable

To employ the DID method to test my hypotheses, I create an indicator variable *Treatment* equal to one for observations in panchayats where the intervention happened and zero for the remaining panchayats. I define another indicator variable *Post* which is given a value of one for observations related to periods after an increase in female ratio in the treatment panchayats (period 4 in Alwar and Guna; and period 6 in Ranchi). This variable is assigned a value of one from period 4 for the control panchayats in districts of Bargarh, Barmer and West

Champaran and zero for remaining observations. An interaction variable, *Treatment X Post*, captures the intervention effects of increasing the ratio of female social bricoleurs and is my primary variable of interest.

Controls

I have longitudinal data with repeated observations for twenty-four months. I use a fixed-effects model and include dummy variables that capture time-invariant differences between the six districts with unique cultures and languages. In addition, the dummy variables also control for differences between districts, such as prior intervention experience, which might increase awareness among potential customers. The constant inflow and outflow of social bricoleurs every month creates a variation in the number of female bricoleurs across each district. Hence, I control for *Female-to-Total Ratio* measured as the proportion of female social bricoleurs and *Size* measured as the total number of bricoleurs in a location. I also control for the average age of the bricoleurs, as age can influence the experience, knowledge as well as energy level of the bricoleurs.

Econometric Models

I employ a DID regression on my three dependent variables, social return, financial return and alignment ratio, on the entire dataset. I find the means of the treatment and control groups for each of my dependent variables is not statistically significant during the pre-intervention period (Table 2.2). I also check for parallel trends, which is a necessary condition in DID estimations, and assume the difference between the treatment and control groups is constant over time without the intervention. I do not find a statistical difference between the slopes in the pre-intervention period. I run the analyses on data pertaining to the three districts of Alwar, Guna and Ranchi where the natural experiment occurred. The panchayats where the women bricoleurs

were deployed are considered as treatment and the remaining panchayats as control locations.

I estimate an ordinary least squares (OLS) model with district fixed effects and include year and month fixed effects in addition to my control variables in both models. I use Huber-White (robust) standard errors throughout my regression analyses to adjust for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. I also estimate the regressions on the subsample data after dropping the first six months of post-intervention data (due to training of female social bricoleurs) in the treatment districts on social and financial returns. Fixed effects panel models minimize biases from time-invariant district-level omitted variables. Year and month dummy variables account for time-varying omitted variables that would equally affect all districts (Angrist & Pischke, 2009). The natural experiment enables me to address endogeneity concerns (Duncan et al., 2004; Gippel et al., 2015). In addition, my three-month average for the dependent variable mitigates reverse causality concerns.

Results

Table 2.1 reports the descriptive statistics and the correlations among variables. Mean social return is 1.7M INR, while the range is from zero to 76.8M INR because there is significant variation in values associated with the welfare schemes themselves, ranging from 200 INR for membership applications to 1M INR for an overseas scholarship. The average monthly income for bricoleurs is 1,086 INR, which is similar to a farmer and slightly less than a government employee in rural India. The social bricoleur's age ranges from 18 to 45, with the average age being around 28. No two variables are highly correlated with each other aside from social return and mission alignment indicator. This is understandable since mission alignment is calculated based on social return.

Insert Table 2.1 about here

Table 2.3 to 2.8 shows the coefficients of the regression for each hypothesis. I predict that panchayat locations with more female social bricoleurs will have higher social returns and lower financial returns than those with more male social bricoleurs. Table 2.3 shows the results of my first hypothesis (social return). Model 1 has only the control variables, Models 2 to 4 introduces one independent variable at a time, viz. treatment, post and number of women bricoleurs. Effect of treatment ($\beta = 272.6$, $p = 0.000$) and women bricoleurs ($\beta = 535.6$, $p = 0.000$) is positive and significant while that of post is not significant. Model 5 has the results with all independent and control variables added. It shows that treatment panchayats where more women bricoleurs were added, on average, generate 1.3M INR more welfare than the control panchayats ($p = 0.007$). In Table 2.4, I run the above regressions on the subsample data, the results are similar and the increase is 1.7M INR ($p = 0.007$) as seen in Model 5. These results are expected since the subsample does not include the initial six months of learning, making the average social return in the entire dataset lower than that of the subsample.

Insert Table 2.3 and 2.4 about here

For my second hypothesis (financial return), I run similar analyses as shown in Tables 2.5 and 2.6. The effect of adding women bricoleurs is negative and significant as seen in Model 4 of both Tables 2.5 ($\beta = -434.1$, $p = 0.000$) and 2.6 ($\beta = -472.0$, $p = 0.000$). In Model 5 (Table 2.5) the coefficient of the interaction variable shows that financial returns in treatment panchayats are lower than in control panchayats by 1180 INR ($p = 0.00$). In the subsample

(Model 5, Table 2.6), the decrease in amount is 1530 INR (p = 0.00). Thus, these results support

both my hypotheses.

Insert Table 2.5 and 2.6 about here

I predict that the mission alignment indicator should increase with addition of more

female bricoleurs. Model 5 in Tables 2.7 and 2.8 show that the mission alignment indicator is

higher in treatment districts than in control districts. Treatment panchayats are 29% more aligned

to their social mission (p = 0.00) as seen in Table 2.7; in the subsample as seen in Table 2.8,

treatment districts are 45.4% more aligned (p = 0.00). My reported estimates are from OLS, but a

linear functional form for the conditional mean may be mis specified when the dependent

variable is a proportion. I use fractional logit to model the proportion (Papke & Wooldridge,

1996), and the results remain unchanged. Table 2.9 gives the snapshot of the main results

discussed above.

Insert Tables 2.7 to 2.9 about here

Additional Analyses

For additional analyses, I ran the above regressions on data pertaining to six districts. The

randomly picked panchayats in Alwar, Guna and Ranchi are considered as treatment locations

while remaining panchayats in these three districts and all panchayats in the districts of Bargarh,

Barmer and West Champaran are treated as control locations. Table 2.10 shows the results of

these analyses. These results support my earlier findings. To see the effect of adding women on

panchayats that had men, I compare means of social return and financial return in panchayats

with only men bricoleurs and panchayats where women bricoleurs got added pre and post

intervention (Table 2.11). While the difference in means of social return in panchayats with only

male bricoleurs increases marginally, in panchayats with both men and women post intervention

there is a positive and significant increase post intervention. In case of financial return the

difference is positive and significant in both groups of panchayats: those with only male

bricoleurs and those where female bricoleurs got added. This further supports my hypothesis that

women bricoleurs help in aligning to social mission of social enterprises by focusing more on

social return. To see if there is any selection bias due to missing values in financial return, I run a

regression using Heckman selection model (Heckman, 1979) with financial return as the

dependent variable. The results (available on request) hold and the inverse mills ratio is not

significant, indicating there is no selection bias.

Insert Table 2.10, 2.11 and Figure 2.1 about here

All the six districts are classified as 'backward' and any time invariant cultural and socio-

economic differences between the districts are accounted for in my fixed effects models. I also

tracked the progress of each bricoleur from joining to study the effect of time on their focus on

enrolment fees and financial return. The results indicate that men seem to perform better than

women on both enrollments and financial returns; however, they are relatively better at earning

financial returns than enrolment fees. On the other hand, women tend to focus more on enrolling

beneficiaries than gaining financial returns. Due to their inclination, male bricoleurs, overall,

tend to focus more on financial returns than enrollments, thereby reducing overall mission

alignment. Figure 2.1 shows the graphical representation of the three dependent variables.

Discussion

I find that efforts to employ more women social entrepreneurs can enhance mission alignment of supporting the enterprise's endeavour of serving the underserved. Based on social role theory, women are more aligned to the enterprise's goal of increasing social performance. Identifying an optimal gender ratio (2 women: 1 man in the present context) can improve social and financial returns. Thus having gender parity helps achieve both goals of the social enterprise.

After completing the analysis, I had informal conversations and discussions with seven male and seven female social bricoleurs across control and treatment districts to understand our findings better. Women react to discrimination differently than men (Tost et al.,2021) and being associated with the social enterprise gives identity a very different meaning, an added dimension in the minds of the women bricoleurs. Identity, be it at the individual or organizational level, is known to influence actions that can lead to mission drift (Grimes et al., 2019; Kouamé et al., 2021; Wry & York, 2017). Change in the self-identity of subjugated or stigmatized people can lead to positive outcomes (Hein & Ansari, 2022; Tracey & Phillips, 2016). Ex-ante, the women are non-entity; they are identified as someone's daughter or wife. The entrepreneurial opportunity by DEF gives them a reason for "survival, destiny and hope" (Shepherd et al., 2021: 2). Ex post joining the social enterprise and earning for themselves, they gained an identity and were looked upon as a role model by other women. The female social bricoleurs are grateful for the opportunity and are morally committed and dedicated to the mission and values of the social enterprise. Due to their communal nature, they can also spread information among other women and elderly beneficiaries. Since many of the government welfare programs target this population, the women micro-entrepreneurs can generate more welfare than their male counterparts. While the men bricoleurs were also committed to the 'spirit of serving,' they wanted to serve and earn.

In contrast, women only wanted to serve, valuing any income earned through their service to society.

My theoretical contribution is discovering a new causal mechanism that aids social enterprises in differentiating themselves by aligning with their social mission while maintaining a focus on financial returns (Battilana et al., 2015). I also provide a theoretical contribution by developing a new construct, the mission alignment indicator, to quantify the focusing phenomena, which has not been quantified before (Makadok et al., 2018). I add to the research on intended and unintended consequences (Castellaneta et al., 2020; Zhou et al., 2020). An unforeseen effect of reducing the gender gap was reducing mission drift at the firm/district level. This novel approach can potentially become a "conciliatory business strategy" of "doing well by doing good" (Lynn, 2021: 512).

Gender diversity can have a strategic advantage at not only senior managerial levels in a commercial enterprise (Tang et al., 2021), I claim it also has an advantage in rural social enterprises that promote necessity entrepreneurship (Dencker et al., 2021). Female social bricoleurs are likely to create an impact at the grassroots level by making a dent in poverty alleviation and empowering rural women to earn a livelihood (Blundel & Lyon, 2015). Becker (1985) explains why women have lower earnings, but working women can positively impact their families (Powell & Eddleston, 2013), such as reducing domestic gender discrimination. With greater emphasis given to social responsibility and gender balance (Surroca et al., 2013; Wang et al., 2016), social enterprises should create entrepreneurial opportunities for both genders, make better and informed policy decisions regarding recruitment, selection, job allocation, and job design to achieve desired performance outcomes over sustained periods (Logue & Grimes, 2022).

I want to point out some limitations of the current study. Unlike in a laboratory or field experiment, the current intervention had already happened, meeting the criteria for studying it as a natural experiment (Leatherdale, 2019). The selection of recruitment location for the intervention was effectively random, although entrepreneurs were not randomly assigned during the intervention. DEF's criteria for selecting districts was not sufficient in distinguishing between them, and it was not based on any prior performance of the bricoleurs. While natural experiments increase the external validity of a study, the specific context may also reduce generalizability to nations with a wide gender gap. In addition, since female bricoleurs were more closely monitored during their training and development period, they may have been inclined to align with their own abilities (a selection effect). However, my subsample taken post-training period shows that this trend persists. Although all bricoleurs were monitored with the mobile app, frequent site visits, and an online network, monitoring by mentors may have an effect in reducing mission drift.

There are several interesting questions that scholars can probe into and build on the present work. It would be interesting to see if the female bricoleurs would have performed the same way in absence of monitoring or what can be the effect of interaction between genders like male seniors and male freshers or female seniors and female freshers or female seniors and male freshers. Another pertinent question related to the boundary conditions is whether women would behave in an analogous manner in countries with lower gender gap, where they already have economic independence and sometimes may even be playing the breadwinner role more than the care-giving role. Some questions about the present context are: would male bricoleurs have had more social returns if they did not incur rental costs or are women more amenable to training and mentoring because of their (mostly) first experience outside home? Would women bricoleurs

behave differently if they were primary, rather than secondary earners? Given the growth in working from home due to the current pandemic, it would be interesting to study the performance of male and female bricoleurs working in identical environments. Answers to these questions will have several managerial implications over and above, making academic contributions in an emerging field. Social enterprises have their challenges, and mission drift is one that inhibits the scaling up of these enterprises. Social enterprises that can address gender parity problems may be able to tackle mission drift and significantly make progress in addressing issues like poverty alleviation through human capital development, women empowerment, and social entrepreneurship.

Table 2.1. Descriptive statistics and correlation among variables.

	n	Mean	SD	Min	Max	1	2	3	4	5
1) Social Return (in 000)	1,803	1679.615	6923.28	0	76847.2					
2) Financial Return	1,284	1086.502	1288.402	0	9590	-.0052				
3) Mission Alignment	1,281	0.3	.327871	0	1	0.3898	-0.2463			
4) Size	2,332	1.53	1.28	1	10	-.0303	-0.1139	0.1203		
5) Female-to-Total Ratio	2,332	0.543	0.477	0	1	0.0805	-0.3651	0.1531	-0.1694	
6) Average Bricoleur Age	2,113	28.08	5.27	18	45	-0.0791	-0.0037	0.1597	0.0207	0.1333

Table 2.2 Differences in mean of dependent variables (three districts)

Period	Social return (in 000)		Financial return		Mission alignment indicator	
	Treatment	Control	Treatment	Control	Treatment	Control
1 to 3	326.68	494.05	754.01	863.76	0.22	0.25
	[877.67]	[1403.81]	[580.64]	[784.74]	[0.26]	[0.34]
	$F = 1.01$ ($p = 0.3159$)		$F = 0.23$ ($p = 0.6373$)		$F = 0.07$ ($p = 0.786$)	
1	286.51	446.23	953.33	1213.21	0.19	0.27
	[760.73]	[873.69]	[579.44]	[1175.98]	[0.25]	[0.38]
	$F = 0.55$ ($p = 0.4612$)		$F = 0.20$ ($p = 0.6609$)		$F = 0.19$ ($p = 0.6757$)	
2	362.51	242.31	714.5	652.31	0.31	0.27
	[969.82]	[622.14]	[730.71]	[573.85]	[0.36]	[0.38]
	$F = 0.20$ ($p = 0.6598$)		$F = 0.03$ ($p = 0.8668$)		$F = 0.03$($p = 0.8724$)	
3	325.79	807.27	620.83	769.44	0.17	0.19
	[887.80]	[2293.29]	[503.09]	[487.22]	[0.21]	[0.31]
	$F = 1.71$ ($p = 0.1943$)		$F = 0.31$ ($p = 0.5877$)		$F = 0.02$ ($p = 0.8782$)	

Standard errors in brackets, p-values in parentheses

Table 2.3. Regression results on Social Return (three districts)

	(1) Controls	(2) Treatment	(3) Post	(4) Women	(5) All IVs
Treatment X Post					1286.7**
					(0.007)
Post Dummy			135.6		-902.7
			(0.854)		(0.332)
Treatment Dummy		896.2***			-237.8
		(0.000)			(0.567)
Size	272.6***	247.5***	272.0***	-69.25	242.6***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.437)	(0.000)
Female-to-Total Ratio	1341.9**	660.1	1341.0**		672.3
	(0.002)	(0.099)	(0.002)		(0.098)
Women Bricoleur				535.6**	
				(0.006)	
Bricoleur Age	-79.53*	-78.40*	-79.39*	-80.77*	-78.36*
	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.034)
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	189.2	44.28	139.6	1285.8	885.2
	(0.819)	(0.957)	(0.863)	(0.194)	(0.348)
N	1194	1194	1194	1194	1194
Adj R Square	0.0395	0.0402	0.0387	0.0354	0.0395
Log likelihood	-12171.5	-12171.5	-12171.5	-12171.5	-12171.5

All tests are two tailed. p-values in parentheses. SE values available on request.
Notes: $*p < 0.05$, $**p < 0.01$, $***p < 0.001$

Table 2.4. Regression results on Social Return (three districts subsample)

	(1) Controls	(2) Treatment	(3) Post	(4) Women	(5) All IVs
Treatment X Post					1680.1**
					(0.007)
Post Dummy			29.71		-1280.7
			(0.985)		(0.445)
Treatment Dummy		768.9*			-645.9
		(0.012)			(0.195)
Size	394.1***	377.2***	394.0***	-58.68	366.8***
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.658)	(0.001)
Female-to-Total Ratio	1811.7**	1238.3*	1811.6**		1271.5*
	(0.003)	(0.026)	(0.003)		(0.025)
Women Bricoleur				709.7*	
				(0.014)	
Bricoleur Age	-113.9*	-112.9*	-113.9*	-114.4*	-113.0*
	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.031)
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	336.3	200.6	332.6	1804.6	1295.3
	(0.743)	(0.844)	(0.748)	(0.168)	(0.289)
N	838	838	838	838	838
Adj R Square	0.0370	0.0367	0.0358	0.0310	0.0358
Log likelihood	-8673.3	-8673.3	-8673.3	-8673.3	-8673.3

All tests are two tailed. p-values in parentheses. SE values available on request.
Notes: *$p < 0.05$, **$p < 0.01$, ***$p < 0.001$

Table 2.5. Regression results on Financial Return (three districts)

	(1) Controls	(2) Treatment	(3) Post	(4) Women	(5) All IVs
Treatment X Post					-1180.3***
					(0.000)
Post Dummy			-230.9		428.2*
			(0.171)		(0.040)
Treatment Dummy		-296.1*			819.4***
		(0.029)			(0.000)
Size	-9.463	-2.740	-14.08	250.7***	-20.07
	(0.649)	(0.889)	(0.477)	(0.000)	(0.299)
Female-to-Total Ratio	-993.0***	-791.4***	-974.7***		-775.6***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)		(0.000)
Women Bricoleur				-434.1***	
				(0.000)	
Bricoleur Age	-5.749	-4.904	-5.859	-7.771	-5.644
	(0.374)	(0.451)	(0.367)	(0.250)	(0.384)
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	1270.3***	1298.7***	1435.3***	558.6*	945.6***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.044)	(0.000)
N	865	865	865	865	865
Adj R Square	0.218	0.222	0.219	0.172	0.231
Log likelihood	-7375.5	-7375.5	-7375.5	-7375.5	-7375.5

All tests are two tailed. p-values in parentheses. SE values available on request.
Notes: *$p < 0.05$, **$p < 0.01$, ***$p < 0.001$

Table 2.6. Regression results on Financial Return (three districts subsample)

	(1) Controls	(2) Treatment	(3) Post	(4) Women	(5) All IVs
Treatment X Post					-1530.3***
					(0.000)
Post Dummy			-487.4		292.7
			(0.104)		(0.380)
Treatment Dummy		-275.5			1151.0***
		(0.124)			(0.000)
Size	3.712	5.655	-4.321	272.3***	-35.23
	(0.914)	(0.865)	(0.896)	(0.000)	(0.294)
Female-to-Total Ratio	-1106.4***	-930.3***	-1079.1***		-913.2***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)		(0.000)
Women Bricoleur				-472.0***	
				(0.000)	
Bricoleur Age	3.056	3.964	2.855	0.251	2.751
	(0.733)	(0.662)	(0.751)	(0.979)	(0.759)
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	1160.3***	1189.7***	1335.4***	450.3	787.5*
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.236)	(0.020)
N	576	576	576	576	576
Adj R Square	0.193	0.195	0.194	0.139	0.212
Log likelihood	-4990.7	-4990.7	-4990.7	-4990.7	-4990.7

All tests are two tailed. p-values in parentheses. SE values available on request.

Notes: $*p < 0.05$, $**p < 0.01$, $***p < 0.001$

Table 2.7. Regression results on Mission Alignment (three districts)

	(1) Controls	(2) Treatment	(3) Post	(4) Women	(5) All IVs
Treatment X Post					0.290***
					(0.000)
Post Dummy			0.200***		0.0353
			(0.000)		(0.567)
Treatment Dummy		0.149***			-0.127
		(0.000)			(0.127)
Size	0.0121	0.00875	0.0162	-0.0156	0.0159
	(0.205)	(0.356)	(0.095)	(0.147)	(0.102)
Female-to-Total Ratio	0.0655*	-0.0363	0.0497		-0.0496
	(0.014)	(0.321)	(0.064)		(0.164)
Women Bricoleur				0.0551***	
				(0.000)	
Bricoleur Age	0.0130***	0.0125***	0.0131***	0.0132***	0.0128***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	-0.207**	-0.221**	-0.350***	-0.168*	-0.234**
	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.000)	(0.018)	(0.003)
N	865	865	865	865	865
Adj R Square	0.0651	0.0805	0.0750	0.0712	0.0964
Log likelihood	-287.1	-287.1	-287.1	-287.1	-287.1

All tests are two tailed. p-values in parentheses. SE values available on request.

Notes: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001

Table 2.8. Regression results on Mission Alignment (three districts subsample)

	(1) Controls	(2) Treatment	(3) Post	(4) Women	(5) All IVs
Treatment X Post					0.454***
					(0.000)
Post Dummy			0.437***		0.208*
			(0.000)		(0.021)
Treatment Dummy		0.0576			-0.372***
		(0.105)			(0.000)
Size	-0.00657	-0.00697	0.000632	-0.0147	0.0101
	(0.610)	(0.590)	(0.958)	(0.308)	(0.383)
Female-to-Total Ratio	0.0315	-0.00540	0.00700		-0.0230
	(0.302)	(0.888)	(0.816)		(0.505)
Women Bricoleur				0.0146	
				(0.463)	
Bricoleur Age	0.0159***	0.0158***	0.0161***	0.0160***	0.0163***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	-0.352***	-0.359***	-0.509***	-0.332***	-0.345***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
N	576	576	576	576	576
Adj R Square	0.172	0.173	0.205	0.171	0.230
Log likelihood	-188.6	-188.6	-188.6	-188.6	-188.6

All tests are two tailed. p-values in parentheses. SE values available on request.
Notes: *$p < 0.05$, **$p < 0.01$, ***$p < 0.001$

Table 2.9. Summary of main difference-in-difference regression results – Change in dependent variables (three districts)

	Social return (in 000)		Financial return		Mission alignment indicator	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Entire sample	Subsample	Entire sample	Subsample	Entire sample	Subsample
Treatment X Post	1286.7**	1680.1**	-1180.3***	-1530.3***	0.290***	0.454***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Post Dummy	-902.7	-1280.7	428.2*	292.7	0.0353	0.208*
	(0.332)	(0.445)	(0.040)	(0.380)	(0.567)	(0.021)
Treatment Dummy	-237.8	-645.9	819.4***	1151.0***	-0.127	-0.372***
	(0.567)	(0.195)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.127)	(0.000)
Size	242.6***	366.8***	-20.07	-35.23	0.0159	0.0101
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.299)	(0.294)	(0.102)	(0.383)
Female-to-Total Ratio	672.3	1271.5*	-775.6***	-913.2***	-0.0496	-0.0230
	(0.098)	(0.025)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.164)	(0.505)
Bricoleur Age	-78.36*	-113.0*	-5.644	2.751	0.0128***	0.0163***
	(0.034)	(0.031)	(0.384)	(0.759)	(0.000)	(0.000)
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	885.2	1295.3	945.6***	787.5*	-0.234**	-0.345***
	(0.348)	(0.289)	(0.000)	(0.020)	(0.003)	(0.000)
N	1194	838	865	576	865	576
Adj R Square	0.0395	0.0358	0.231	0.212	0.0964	0.230
Log likelihood	-12171.5	-8673.3	-7375.5	-4990.7	-287.1	-188.6

All tests are two tailed. p-values in parentheses. SE values available on request.
Notes: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001

Table 2.10. Summary of main difference-in-difference regression results - – Change in dependent variables (six districts)

	Social return(in 000)		Financial return		Mission alignment indicator	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Entire sample	Subsample	Entire sample	Subsample	Entire sample	Subsample
Treatment X Post	1004.1**	1329.7**	-446.2*	-719.4**	0.273***	0.439***
	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.032)	(0.002)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Post Dummy	-459.4	-545.0	-310.4	-447.1	0.0395	0.174*
	(0.497)	(0.653)	(0.089)	(0.133)	(0.344)	(0.012)
Treatment Dummy	71.77	-280.1	162.1	413.7	-0.113	-0.357***
	(0.807)	(0.462)	(0.455)	(0.097)	(0.117)	(0.000)
Size	176.9**	264.3**	-38.75*	-61.72*	0.0224**	0.0183
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.047)	(0.045)	(0.009)	(0.063)
Female-to-Total						
Ratio	532.1	1117.0*	-801.9***	-882.8***	-0.0415	-0.0178
	(0.153)	(0.034)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.225)	(0.595)
Bricoleur Age	-79.69**	-107.5*	3.897	11.32	0.00917***	0.0122***
	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.549)	(0.193)	(0.000)	(0.000)
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	778.0	977.1	1299.7***	1251.6***	-0.162*	-0.263***
	(0.265)	(0.292)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.010)	(0.000)
N	1639	1135	1206	801	1206	801
Adj R Square	0.0484	0.0454	0.249	0.211	0.133	0.248

All tests are two tailed. p-values in parentheses. SE values available on request.

Notes: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001

Table 2.11 Differences in mean pre and post intervention

	Panchayats with only men	Panchayats with both men and women
Social Return (in 000)	Pre: 611.98 [1550.56]	Pre: 403.75 [1144.14]
	Post: 1109.98 [1886.13]	Post: 1212.75 [2304.10]
	F = 2.66 (p = 0.1039)	F = 9.51 (p = 0.0022)
Financial Return	Pre: 810.34 [368.34]	Pre: 708.84 [436.74]
	Post: 1788.60 [1690.80]	Post: 1379.8 [1605.03]
	F = 7.29 (p = 0.0075)	F = 7.24 (p = 0.0075)

Standard errors in brackets, p-values in parentheses

Figure 2.1 Graphical representation of social return, financial return and mission alignment

Note: Intervention occurred in period 3, and the initial six months after joining is the learning period that ends at period 9. An accurate visual comparison of the treatment and control group occurs starting period 10.

Chapter 3: Value Creation through Bricolage in Social Enterprises

Introduction

Resource mobilization is critical today for any enterprise, be it traditional organizations with a profit motive, or social enterprises with social objectives as their primary mission. Social enterprises have assumed a lot of importance after the health challenges inflicted by the global COVID-19 pandemic or the global challenges operationalized by the United Nation's Sustainable Development Goals (UNSDGs) and have been striving for a balance between socio-economic purposes (Browder, Seyb, Forgues, & Aldrich, 2022; George et al., 2016) with the primary focus being on generating social returns. Organizations, irrespective of their ownership structure or legal status of for-profit or non-profit, have collaborated and combined their unique resources and capabilities for social value creation (Austin et al., 2006; Brouard & Larivet, 2010). This dynamic process has often witnessed various resources, which have been used to create value through both traditional and non-traditional Ricardian and entrepreneurial rents in enterprises (Chadwick & Dabu, 2009).

The Resource-Based View (RBV) of the firm concentrates on internal sources for sustaining a competitive advantage, emphasizing value, rareness, inimitability, and non-substitutability (VRIN) (Barney, 1991; Barney & Clark, 2007). A firm's resources yield various economic rents, including traditional Ricardian rents, non-traditional Ricardian rents, and entrepreneurial rents (Chadwick & Dabu, 2009). Traditional Ricardian rents stem from the scarcity of economically valuable resources in factor markets (Barney, 1991). Physical capital, for instance, can be a source of conventional Ricardian rents when firms invest in asset specificity (Barney, 1986; Williamson, 1981). For example, a firm investing in

specialized machinery to improve production rates gains an efficiency edge over competitors lacking such machinery. Human capital also contributes to Ricardian rents when scarce and non-replicable through training (Teece et al., 1997; Kirzner, 1973; Rumelt, 1987). However, human capital primarily generates non-traditional Ricardian rents, tied to specialized knowledge and skills acquired through firm-specific organizational capability and evolutionary learning (Chadwick & Dabu, 2009; Itami & Roehl, 1987; Nelson & Winter, 1982). Social capital, or relationships with resourceful individuals fostering a firm's growth, is another recognized form of capital (Gedajlovic et al., 2013; Putnam, 1993; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). Due to its inherent idiosyncrasy and inimitability, social capital can create non-traditional Ricardian rents. Finally, entrepreneurial rents emerge when human and social capital empower an organization to seize new opportunities through innovations (Colbert, 2004). Firms need to mobilize resources for creating value and generate different types of rents for gaining competitive advantage.

While resource mobilization has been studied extensively in traditional for-profit firms, a lesser-studied context is that of social enterprises, where it differs from the former (Austin et al., 2006; Desa & Basu, 2013). Resource allocation challenges multiply in such enterprises due to the scarcity of quality resources (Collier, 2007; Seelos & Mair, 2005; Zahra et al., 2008) and the lack of well-established financing mechanisms (Kistruck et al., 2011; Mair & Marti, 2009). Social entrepreneurs have resorted to non-traditional behaviors like bricolage to meet their goals amidst resource scarcity (Fisher, 2012; Scazziota et al., 2023; Scuotto, 2023). Bricolage is "recombining elements at hand for new purposes" in a resource-scarce environment (Baker & Nelson, 2005, p. 329). *The research question the current paper examines is how social enterprises use varying degrees of bricolage to mobilize physical, human, and social capital for value creation.*

Social entrepreneurship is any novel, value-creating social project at the intersection of non-profits, for-profits, and the government (Austin et al., 2006). As in any form of entrepreneurship, resource mobilization plays a vital role in social entrepreneurship (Baumol, 2010; Shane & Venkataraman, 2000; Zahra et al., 2009). Many social enterprises typically lack sufficient financial resources for which they rely on investors, donors, and their immediate environment to access other resources. Social enterprises mobilize resources through two broad methods of *optimization* and *bricolage* to create value for their beneficiaries (Desa & Basu, 2013). While the former refers to acquiring standard, off-the-shelf resources with proven efficiencies (Garud & Karnoe, 2003; Oliver, 1997), the latter refers to using resources available at hand, often with idle or slack resources that are available at a lower cost (Baker & Nelson, 2005; Zahra et al., 2009). Since these are complementary processes, social enterprises may deploy both to mobilize different resources. For example, "a social venture may buy sophisticated machinery to optimize production of high-quality products, yet bricolage human resources by soliciting volunteers to help deliver these products to beneficiaries" (Desa & Basu, 2013, p. 29). Social enterprises may even employ different degrees of bricolage to acquire the same resource. e.g., For an enterprise focusing on imparting digital literacy in the neighborhood, laptops and computers are crucial physical resources. It might choose to buy them off the shelf (optimization or non-bricolaged) or repair and refurbish them from second-hand computers (partially bricolaged) or depend on donated computers in good working condition (entirely bricolaged). For its human capital, a social enterprise can opt for varying degrees of bricolage, like hiring local people, and use vicarious learning (entirely bricolaged) to recruit a trained workforce from the labor market (non-bricolaged). Social capital, which is another critical relational resource for any social enterprise (Austen et al., 2006; Baron & Markman, 2000; Campbell et al., 1986; Manev et al., 2005) is usually entirely bricolaged as it is inherently embedded in the indigenous

environment and cannot be procured from the market in any standardized form. While the

level of competition among social enterprises may not be as high as that of for-profit

organizations, often, they have to compete with one another for funds, sending the right

signals to potential funders (Vanacker et al., 2020). One such signal can be if the social

enterprise can create more value for its customers than competitors (Barney & Clark, 2007).

In this research, I focus on how resource mobilization techniques through different degrees of

bricolage can help create value.

      Optimization or non-bricolaged is a commonly deployed method of resource

acquiring (Garud & Karnoe, 2003; Oliver, 1997); it is more standardized and efficient, can be

rare at times, but is not inimitable or non-substitutable. For example, off-the-shelf physical

assets have standard usage and may be specialized, but such resources provide temporary

competitive advantages since they are not difficult to imitate. Efficient use of such resources

improves the value maximization of customers (Barney, Wright, & Ketchen, 2001; Helfat &

Peteraf, 2003; Mahoney & Pandian, 1992). However, such resources may not have any

novelty factor since any social enterprise using them is likely to put them to similar use. Thus,

optimization can create Ricardian rents until competition does not emulate them. On the other

hand, bricolage utilizes resources available at hand that may be "common, transferrable and

substitutable" (Zeyen et al., 2013, p. 11). Recruiting local people as human capital and

utilizing their network as social capital are examples of mobilizing resources through

bricolage. Bricolage can be *necessity-based* and satisfying in nature (Simon, 1957) or

ideational and driven by recognizing unique opportunities (Janssen et al., 2018; Mair &

Marti, 2009). In both these forms, bricolage can create non-traditional Ricardian rents

through causal ambiguity, path dependence, and social complexity, as well as entrepreneurial

rents through "exceptional foresight and incremental learning, both individually and among

aggregations of individuals" (Garud & Karnoe, 2003, p. 255). Bricolage has an innate

element of innovation and creativity involving experimentation with and novel use of resources (Welter et al., 2016). With an end objective in mind, bricoleurs tend to engage more in resource recombination, which depends on their specialized knowledge repertoire and deep contextual wisdom of socially constructed resource environments to facilitate the creation of something from nothing (Baker & Nelson, 2005; Fisher, 2012) or making do with whatever is at hand (Levi-Strauss, 1966). Further, they use their expertise to persuade others to accept their ideas, leveraging both human and social capital (Scazziota et al., 2023), making bricolage a legitimating mechanism for institutional change (Desa, 2012).

Social enterprises can have varying degrees of bricolage for the same resource since it is an ongoing combination of material, labor, and skill in response to resource scarcity and unprecedented usage (Desa, 2012; Di Domenico et al., 2010). For example, while a pure form of material bricolage can involve using forgotten and discarded material only (entirely bricolaged), it can also be combined with standard products to create value (partially bricolaged). An example is the furniture refurbishing industry which uses old furniture with standardized upholstery. Labor bricolage can involve hiring indigenous human capital and using their self-taught skill on the job (entirely bricolaged) to recruiting local people with prior training suitable for a job (partially bricolaged). Recruiting the best-suited human resource from the international labor market would be an example of optimizing (non-bricolaged). Bricolage can have varying effect on tangible and intangible resources.

Physical capital (a form of tangible resource) bought off the shelf through optimization is imitable and therefore may be a necessary but not sufficient condition for value creation. However, bricolaged physical capital (e.g., refurbished equipment) may have a negative impact due to wear and tear or downtime. On the other hand, bricolaged human and social capital may come with unique repertoire of indigenous knowledge and ideas of value creation. Being embedded in the local context, it depends on the social enterprise how

61

creatively it can use these intangible resources, that too with a lesser risk of being imitated. Owing to these differences of resources mobilized through bricolage, I hypothesize that bricolaged intangible resources have more influence in helping social enterprises create value than those acquired through optimization or non-bricolage. Even the degree of bricolage is important: entirely bricolaged intangible resources create more value than partially bricolaged ones. The effect reverses in case of tangible resources, with higher bricolage having reduced impact on value creation.

I test my hypotheses in for-profit social enterprises that belong to a public-private partnership (PPP). They aim to increase earnings through employment and entrepreneurship among underprivileged youth of India through vocational training. My data pertains to a government program called PMKVY 2.0, which ran from August 2016-December 2017. It comprises 1400 training centers across multiple states in India, running 4616 cohorts of vocational training programs. After the training, the participants are recruited by organizations and become salaried employees. Some may become entrepreneurs and start earning by setting up their ventures. The training centers get funding from the government depending on how employable they can make their trainees. By treating investment in training infrastructure by the training centers as a form of physical capital (non bricolaged to partially bricolaged), the trainers as human capital (partially bricolaged), and alumni of the centers as social capital (entirely bricolaged), I study how the different types of resources influence overall earnings, wages from salary, and discretionary income through entrepreneurial ventures.

The paper has two main contributions. First, addressing the need for nuanced empirical research in social entrepreneurship (Dacin et al., 2010; Short et al., 2009), it adds to the social entrepreneurship and RBV literature by showing how various non-financial resources like physical, human, and social capital can affect traditional and non-traditional

Ricardian rents and entrepreneurial rents. Second, it further contributes to the literature on resource mobilization in social enterprises by studying the advantages and disadvantages of the two methods of *optimization* and *bricolage*. Prior studies have explained the bricolage phenomenon by adding new constructs to social bricolage (Di Domenico et al., 2010) or how bricolage can act as a legitimating mechanism for institutional change in social enterprises (Desa, 2012; Mair & Marti, 2009). I contribute to this literature by showing how the degree of bricolage can help enhance value creation. Regarding managerial implications, it shows managers of social enterprises and social entrepreneurs how resources acquired through optimization are necessary but not sufficient for value creation. Some intangible resources obtained through bricolage, however, can be used innovatively to create value.

RBV and Economic rent theories

Penrose's (1959) seminal contribution to a firm's growth laid the foundation for theories such as the resource-based view (RBV) and dynamic capabilities (Mahoney, 2004; Mahoney & Pandian, 1992; Teece et al., 1997). The Penrose effect treats growth as a dynamic interaction between management and resources, limited by managerial capability. The domain of RBV further envisions the firm as a bundle of complementary resources and capabilities (Barney, 1988; Penrose, 1959; Rumelt, 1984; Wernerfelt, 1984) that can become a source of sustained competitive advantage (Bamberger & Meshoulam, 2000; Barney & Wright, 1998). The competitive advantage comes from these resources driving different economic rents: traditional Ricardian rents, non-traditional Ricardian rents and entrepreneurial rents (Chadwick & Dabu, 2009). Traditional Ricardian rents are driven by firm heterogeneity based on the scarcity of economically valuable resources with inelastic supply (Teece et al., 1997). Resources having rareness, inimitability, and non-substitutability can generate such rents, while firms use these resources to market products and services that create value for their customers (Barney, 1991). Physical capital, like land in a critical

location or a special-purpose machine, are examples of resources that can generate such rent and create a competitive advantage until competition does not imitate them. Once replicated, it ceases to be a source of sustainable competitive advantage. Human resources can also sometimes be a source of traditional Ricardian rents when specialized workers are not portable across firms or cannot be trained elsewhere (Coff, 1997). However, such cases are rare and transitory since human resources are mobile and people changing organizations for better remuneration and incentives is frequent (Bidwell, 2011).

Non-traditional Ricardian rent comes from evolving heterogeneity in firms. The source can be the synchronization of organizational resources like physical, human, social, reputational, and technological capital with organizational capability (Colbert, 2004; Grant, 1996). It is caused by factors like path dependence, complexity, and causal ambiguity, thereby making the increasing heterogeneity difficult for others to emulate (Barney 1991, Colbert, 2004; Itami & Roehl 1987; Nelson & Winter 1982). Non-traditional Ricardian rents emerge from distinctive evolutionary processes within organizations, unlike traditional rents driven by access to scarce resources in factor markets. Heterogeneity can also be caused by human agency in the event of uncertainty (Rumelt, 1984). Resources, typically human capital, can become the source of technological and managerial innovations and create disequilibria by generating opportunities to market new products or services, thereby driving entrepreneurial rents. This can be conducted individually or in groups, and social connections with the surroundings (the firm's social capital) augment the process (Haugh, 2007). Entrepreneurial knowledge becomes a distinct form of resource that can increase the heterogeneity of other forms of resources (Alvarez & Busenitz 2001). These different economic rents are intricately linked to one another in providing a firm with a competitive advantage through its resources.

Bricolage in Social Enterprises

The importance of resource mobilization for social enterprises comes across in the definition of social entrepreneurship coined by Mair and Marti (2006, p. 37) as "a process involving the innovative use and combination of resources to pursue opportunities to catalyze social change and/or address social needs." Social enterprises face a scarcity of quality resources (Seelos & Mair, 2005; Collier, 2007; Zahra et al., 2008) and a dearth of institutional financing mechanisms (Kistruck et al., 2011; Mair & Marti, 2009). This scarcity is faced both locally and internationally in terms of vastly differing institutional environments and other resources like labor (Desa, 2012; Zahra et al., 2008; Seelos & Mair, 2005). For social enterprises, the primary mission of social returns and a supplementary mission of financial returns constrain resources (Desa & Basu, 2013). The authors have analyzed how social entrepreneurs mobilize critical resources and factors that influence their choice among the predominant methods of *optimization* and *bricolage*. While optimization, synonymous with non-bricolage, refers to purchasing conventional, off-the-shelf resources with established efficiencies (Garud & Karnoe 2003; Oliver, 1997), bricolage refers to utilizing inexpensive and readily available resources (Baker & Nelson, 2005). Bricolage, or "overcoming environmental limits or resource scarcity by making do with whatever is available" (Levi-Strauss, 1966, p. 17), has developed as a critical resource mobilization strategy for social entrepreneurs (Zollo et al., 2018). Both methods are complementary and frequently used by social businesses to mobilize diverse resources.

A social enterprise can buy high-quality inputs at a high price or recruit people with niche capabilities, resorting to optimization and value maximization for its customers. Such non-bricolaged resources may be rare but not inimitable. Another firm can procure the same inputs or recruit the same people if it has the financial capability. A firm can also bricolage its physical resources by gathering used equipment for free or at a cheaper rate and refurbishing

them. The social enterprise can resort to bricolage by aggregating local resources with the objective of cost minimization. For example, human capital in social enterprises is often recruited from local sources. Firms can vary the extent of bricolage from entirely bricolaged to partially bricolaged. e.g., They can recruit local people and utilize their self-learned skills or train them for a specific role (entirely bricolaged) or recruit people from the local job market who have prior training and experience for a position (partially bricolaged).

Social complexities may raise barriers to imitation and help achieve sustainable competitive advantage. One way to gain sustained competitive advantage is through building unique firm-specific human capital (Chadwick & Dabu, 2009; Raffiee & Byun, 2020), which is integrally linked to 'social capital'. Social capital thereby becomes a vital resource for these enterprises to take advantage of local opportunities through resource mobilization, and progression through stakeholder participation (Austin et al., 2006; Haugh, 2007; Putnam, 1993; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; Woolcock & Narayan, 2000). Besides, social capital can be used for capability development and community empowerment for the underserved (Ansari et al., 2012) through bonding and bridging. While bonding social capital is within similar groups, has strong ties, and is high on trust, closure, and shared norms, bridging social capital is between social groups having similar or different demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, is high in access to resources and information and tends to stem from more peripheral or weak ties (Burt, 2001; Davidsson & Honig, 2003; Granovetter, 1973). Linking social capital refers to connections with external institutions, organizations and other formal entities. It uses social relationships that play a key role in shaping welfare and well-being (Szreter & Woolcock, 2004). Social capital is often embedded in the local environment and mobilized through bricolage.

Bricolage involves using resources on hand to solve the problem in a new way (necessity-based) or reusing available resources to discover a new source of value (ideational bricolage).

66

The value generated from such resource experimentation may come from individuals or groups (Garud & Karnøe, 2003; Welter et al., 2016). The importance of social capital is acknowledged in bricolage literature. Because resource settings are socially built, certain social and organizational methods can help people create something out of nothing (Fisher, 2012). To mobilize resources and advance projects, formal and informal support networks play a crucial role (Haugh, 2007). Bricoleurs own specific and indigenous knowledge repertoire, often needed to combine resources for creating value. Bricoleurs rely on their in-depth understanding of the context they belong to when doing bricolage, a local phenomenon. In order to find additional resources and learn more about them, bricoleurs rely on their social connections. Bricoleurs have a specific objective in mind, and when it comes to establishing legitimacy, they leverage both human and social capital by using their knowledge to persuade others to adopt their ideas (Scazziota et al., 2023). Due to the distinct benefits of bricolage in generating sustained competitive advantage through barriers to imitation, I propose that intangible resources mobilized through bricolage have a more significant impact on helping social enterprises build value than resources obtained through optimization or non-bricolage. Even the level of bricolage matters: intangible resources that have been fully bricolaged add more value than those that have been partially bricolaged. If tangible or physical resources are available as standard, off the shelf items, optimization may be more efficient as bricolaged physical capital may have reduced performance due to wear and tear or maintenance downtime. Physical capital purchased off the shelf (optimization) is imitable, and may be necessary but not sufficient for value creation. However, the use of repurposed equipment or other bricolaged physical capital could be detrimental because of wear and tear or downtime.

Public-Private Partnership Context

Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) are created to solve societal problems that need synergies through collaboration among businesses, government, and society (Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2011). The public entity is resource-rich in financial terms but depends on the private players for other resources required to create social value to mitigate the social problems for which the PPP is set up. A country like India has a huge demographic dividend regarding its employable population. For socioeconomic reasons, many youth are uneducated and cannot be employed by mainstream corporations. Making the youth employable is a challenge the government faces; it relies on several private providers who impart vocational training to underprivileged youth. After the training, the providers help the trainees get placed in different organizations based on their skills, enabling them to earn wages. Some trainees also chose to become entrepreneurs, earning discretionary income. As part of the arrangement, the government provides financial grants. It monitors the performance of the training providers on how employable they can make the youth by measuring the percentage of trainees who start earning.

The private training providers are social enterprises since they aim to make disadvantaged youth employable (social mission), over and above their financial targets. Social enterprises have resource challenges mitigated through various cross-sector partnerships like PPPs (Bayliss & Van Waeyenberge, 2018; Berezin, Sergi, & Gorodnova, 2018; Linder, 1999; Selsky & Parker, 2005). The social enterprise must create value for its customers to garner financial resources from the public partner. In the case of the training providers, those employing more youth are likely to get more funds. A firm that cannot create social value can have its funding stopped. Thus, it needs to optimally use its limited financial resources to mobilize non-financial value-creating resources.

Hypotheses

The training centers need diverse types of resources for providing training and employment. Physical assets or training equipment like sewing machines, farming equipment, or computers are required to give hands-on experience to the participants. These are standard, off-the-shelf products and are acquired through optimization if sufficient funding is available, or through bricolage if the training centers feel they can be reused without compromising the quality of training provided. Physical resources have standard usage and rarely can be put to innovative use in the context of skill enablement. Creative examples like churning milk using a washing machine in a state in India are uncommon (Singh & Singh, 2012) and can become replicable after some time.

Human capital and social capital are examples of resources acquired by bricolage. In the skill development context, they can be trainers and alumni, respectively, likely to be sourced from the local environment. The primary human capital in the training centers is the trainers. They have an essential role in imparting knowledge and skills to make the trainees employable, mentoring, and influencing their career choices (George et al., 2022). Their worth increases as they handle more batches, and they can exemplify non-traditional Ricardian rents. The more experienced ones can add to a training center's reputation and raise its barrier to imitation. In the current context, the trainers are partially bricolaged. They are primarily local to the area and have some prior knowledge and skills acquired through education and experience. The centers further train them to develop specific soft skills and firm-specific processes.

In any training classroom context, while bonding social capital can exist among batch mates, bridging social capital will exist between trainees and their seniors who have passed out from the same training center and may be ready to help. The alumni of the training centers thus act as social capital whose networks can be suitably utilized for employment

generation and earnings of the trainees. In particular, the alumni who are already placed in some organizations, enhance linking social capital through their connections to other institutions. Alumni who are not placed can have a negative impact though, since they become competitors in the job market. The trainers' networks can also help in this regard. The percentage of students placed is monitored; thus, the training centers will dedicate their efforts to securing the numbers. The average earnings are not monitored, which becomes an interesting measure to observe in our research.

Human and social capital can influence the earnings of the trainees, post their employment. Oversupply of talent can have a negative impact. If the supply of skilled trainees exceeds the demand, it can lead to a reduction in wages. On the other hand, a training center can build its reputation for producing exceptionally skilled trainees or trainees with very specialized skills. Such alumni in different organizations can pave the way for their juniors from the same centers to earn more. Likewise, some trainers can make a name for themselves in the market by creating trainees of decent quality, increasing the reputation of the training centers they are associated with. Trainees coming out from such centers are likely to get higher wages. Strong recommendations from trainers can help trainees earn more. Bonding social capital (strong ties) within a batch can also impact discretionary income and wages. In an example of ideational bricolage, entrepreneurial trainees can find like-minded people within their cohort and set up entrepreneurial ventures, thereby increasing the potential to earn discretionary income.

Social enterprises are deeply rooted in their local context (Austin et al., 2006; Garud & Karnoe, 2003; Scazziota et al., 2023). The demand for skilled trainees is limited, and trainees from several training centers are available to cater to their needs. The training centers can establish exclusivity through more bricolaged resources than optimized ones. Partially-bricolaged human capital and inherently bricolaged social capital can act as real

differentiators. As explained earlier, of the two types of social capital, linking social capital will have the most effect on value creation. Non-linking social capital, which add to the labor force on the supply side, is likely to have a negative impact. Even trainers (human capital) who may be similar in terms of their education and experience can be a source of heterogeneity when they are indigenous and bring in a wealth of local knowledge and contacts. The more embedded a training center is in its local environment (due to bricolage), the more it can help its trainees earn, thereby increasing value for them. Thus, I hypothesize:

Hypothesis (H1a). *Linking social capital, a bricolaged intangible resource, has a positive effect in increasing value through enhanced earnings.*

Hypothesis (H1b). *Non-linking social capital, a bricolaged intangible resource, has a negative effect in increasing value through enhanced earnings.*

Hypothesis (H1c). *Human capital, a partially bricolaged intangible resource, has a positive effect in increasing value through enhanced earnings.*

While physical capital is necessary, it may not be sufficient to differentiate the training centers from one another. Physical capital or training equipment are readily available resources that may be bought off the shelf. Some of the training equipment like trucks or forklift or mining equipment are capital intensive and may be very expensive to buy firsthand. Some training may require moderate capital expenditure like computers or sewing machines but in higher numbers since each trainee has to have access to a computer or sewing machine. To judiciously use financial resources (since money is needed for procuring other resources as well as for running the operations), the training centers may bricolage physical capital. Bricolaged physical capital may not work at the same level of efficiency as optimized ones due to reasons like wear and tear or maintenance downtime. Further, bricolaged assets like computers may not be the most technologically advanced and may not be the latest models available in the market. Sometimes getting spare parts for their repair or

maintenance may be time taking due to product obsolescence. Though optimized physical assets are hygiene factors, and all training centers are expected to have them, they may have some positive impact on the trainees' earnings. -. However, bricolaged physical assets will have a negative impact. Therefore, my second hypothesis states:

Hypothesis (H2a). *Less a tangible resource is bricolaged, more its effect in increasing value through enhanced earnings*

Hypothesis (H2b). *More a tangible resource is bricolaged, less its effect in increasing value through enhanced earnings.*

Internal bricolage refers to employing resources that exist inside the organization and is known to promote growth in social enterprises (Kwong et al., 2019; Tasavori et al., 2020). The training centers have a scope of practising internal bricolage and utilize same resources across multiple training. e.g., If a training center has acquired computers, it can use the same for training different roles like IT Helpdesk Assistant, Data Entry Operator, Biometric Operator or Junior Software Developer. Likewise, equipment acquired for training beauticians can be used for training several other specialized roles like Hair Stylist, Pedicure and Manicure Specialist, Nail Technicians, etc. Human capital may also be reused across training of multiple job roles. Not only is internal bricolage beneficial in terms of economic efficiency and better utilization of resources, it can also create more value for the trainees. Diversity of roles is likely to increase employability due to market demand and specialization can lead to higher earning potential due to specific skillsets needed for these roles. An institutional recruiter may have requirements for several roles and would like to recruit from the same center due to ease of operations. Due to better understanding with such recruiters, the training centers may be able to negotiate higher wages for their trainees. Thus, I hypothesize:

Hypothesis (H3). *Internal bricolage of both tangible and intangible resources, increases value through enhanced earnings.*

Empirical Setting

The empirical context of this study is a government program called PMKVY, which was started to reap the advantage of India's huge demographic dividend in terms of the working-age population. Chapter 1 describes the context in detail. There are several phases of the program: PMKVY (2015-16), PMKVY 2.0 (2016-2020), and the pilot of PMKVY 3.0 (2020-21), which have been implemented or are ongoing. The data set of the present paper pertains to PMKVY 2.0 from August 2016-December 2017.

Data, Sample and Econometric Models

I use a proprietary dataset received from NSDC, which runs the PMKVY program. This data comprised 65,656 records of participants who had completed the skill development program and were placed in either wage or self-employment between August 2016-December 2017. Since the dataset comprised only placed trainees, to avoid self-selection bias, it was combined with a larger dataset downloaded from the PMKVY website, which also had data of non-placed trainees. This made the combined dataset stand at 1.04 million records. The merged dataset contained detailed information on participants, trainers, and placements. Data are available from all states of India; however, I discard those states with less than 1000 rows of individual data.

Empirical Strategy

The individual-level data can be rolled up to batch or cohort level at each training center, which I consider at firm-level. I have data for 1400 training centers across states and 4616 batches. I have information about the number of job roles and sub-sectors each training center specializes in, and can arrive at data about resources (physical, human and social capital)

at the training center level. For human capital, I calculate the number of trainers the center has. For social capital, I calculate the alumni of each training center. I further divide them into linking social capital (alumni who are working) and non-linking social capital (alumni who are not working). For physical capital, based on the job role being trained for, I estimate the approximate capital investment needed for the training infrastructure and classify them under distinct categories (low = 1, medium = 2 and high = 3). The estimation is based on details of training equipment required for each role, available on NSDC's website. The following example illustrates this process:

Suppose a training center A specializes in training for the following job roles: sewing machine operator, retail sales associate, and unarmed security guard. I assume a retail sales associate and an unarmed security guard will need low physical capital expenditure requirements and assign a value of 1 for each of those categories. A sewing machine operator will require medium physical capital investment, and I assign a value of 2. The total physical capital requirement for that training center thus becomes 1+1+2 = 4. In comparison, suppose another training center B specializes in training for the following job roles: CNC operator turning, mine electrician and tractor operator. These are capex-heavy job roles for engineering or manufacturing sectors, and each would require a high physical capital investment with a value of 3. The total physical capital requirement for training center B thus becomes 3+3+3 = 9. A similar analysis for all training centers estimates the total physical capital investment required by the center on an ordinal scale. I get values ranging from 1 to 14 from the dataset. The degree of bricolage for the physical capital can vary from low to high. Training involving heavy equipment like lathe machines, CNC machines, tractors or multiple units like computers and sewing machines are likely to be obtained through bricolage than optimization. Bricolage involved in acquiring physical capital for roles like clerk, documentation assistant, mutual fund agent, etc. may be low. I further categorize the physical capital into low-bricolage and high-

bricolage physical capital. In the earlier example of training center A, the physical infrastructure for training sewing machine operators is likely to be high bricolaged, while that for retail sales associate and an unarmed security guard low bricolaged. The total physical capital requirement (4) in training center A can be divided into high-bricolage physical capital (2) and low-bricolage physical capital (2). In training center B, the equipment for all job roles is likely to be highly bricolaged, hence the total physical capital requirement (9) can be divided into high-bricolage physical capital (9) and no low-bricolage physical capital (0). The allocation of the ordinal scale for physical infrastructure and its categorization of the degree of bricolage is ratified with a mentor and subject matter expert. In the initial run, there was 100% convergence on the ordinal scale and 80% convergence on the degree of bricolage, which was finalized after a discussion. The same is also validated through conversations with senior people associated with the training centers. Human capital and social capital are acquired through bricolage, the degree of bricolage being higher for social capital than human capital. The trainers are people recruited from the local job market with some prior training and experience (partially bricolaged), which social capital by virtue of the local nature of students in the training centers is entirely bricolaged.

Measures of Variables

Dependent variables: I use three dependent variables for testing my hypotheses. ***Earning*** is the total monetary amount earned by students from a batch. It is further split into ***Wage-earning,*** denoting the amount earned from employment, and ***Self-earning,*** which is the amount made from entrepreneurship or self employment**.** The variables are log-transformed (i.e., $\ln^{X+1}$) to take account of outliers (Fafchamps & Owens, 2009; Lall & Park, 2020; Suárez & Gugerty, 2016).

Independent Variables: My independent variables are the diverse types of tangible and intangible resources a training center has: (i) ***Human capital*** is measured as the number

of trainers in a training center. I also use its squared term ***Human capital Sq*** for studying its potential non-linear relationship with the dependent variable (ii) social capital is measured as the alumni of the training center. ***Linking social capital*** measures all students other than the current batch enrolled in the training center who are already placed. ***Non-linking social capital*** measures those who are not placed. For robustness checks, I create another variable called ***Proportion of linking social capital*** as the ratio of Linking social capital to total (linking plus non-linking) social capital. These comprise intangible resources. (iii) ***Low bricolage physical capital*** and ***High bricolage physical capital*** denote capital investment made on training infrastructure or tangible resources, measured as an ordinal scale variable, calculated and categorized as explained earlier. In addition, I use the number of job roles in each training center to denote the level of ***Internal bricolage***; more number of job roles trained by a training center denoting a higher level of internal bricolage. For robustness checks, I create two other variables: ***Degree of Bricolage*** as the ratio of *High Bricolage Physical capital* to *Low Bricolage Physical capital and* ***Physical capital*** *which* is the sum of *High Bricolage Physical capital* and *Low Bricolage Physical capital.*

Control Variables: I include several control variables in my analyses. Due to the role played by trainers as explained earlier, I include the cumulative experience of the trainers in terms of the number of batches handled and the number of students in the current batch (batch size), as control variables. Batch duration is an important factor: while longer batch duration is likely to have a positive effect, too much increase in duration may be detrimental in terms of both cost as well as a learning experience. I include batch duration (in days) and the percentage of students placed as control variables. Gender affects employability (Kabeer, 2002; Smith, 2005); hence I have the percentage of female students as a control. I control for the number of industry subsectors and job roles in the training centers and district-level literacy. I add two other control variables, one to indicate whether the physical capital

required for the batch is capital intensive or not, and the other to indicate unrelatedness of internal bricolage. If the job roles belong to the same industry sub-sector, then the internal bricolage is related (unrelatedness = 0). If they belong to multiple sub-sectors, then I denote that by using a binary variable called unrelatedness and assign it a value of one. I include fixed effects at industry subsector and state levels to control for time-invariant factors. I do not add the number of students assessed and certified as control variables as they are highly correlated with the batch size, indicating almost all students who enroll in a batch get assessed and certified, though all are not employed. Table 3.1 shows the relation between my hypotheses and variables.

Insert Table 3.1 Here

Regression Analyses

To test the hypotheses, I run OLS regressions on the dependent variables, using Huber-White (robust) standard errors in the regression models to account for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. I also do a Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) calculation for checking multicollinearity and the values are within acceptable limit. Batch-level data is more granular and allows me to split data into large and small batches to study whether batch size has any impact; hence I run the analysis at the batch level. I have not considered very small batch sizes (< 5). Since physical capital is measured as an ordinal scale and does not have the actual cost figures, it may lead to endogeneity. The Hausman-Durbin test is used to determine endogeneity (Nakamura & Nakamura, 1981). The null hypothesis for the test is that endogeneity among regressors does not affect OLS regression estimators[2]. As a

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[2] As a robustness check (not shown), I test the alternative hypothesis using two-stage least squares regression with instrumental variables that can impact trainee earnings, pertaining to constituency

robustness checks, I run two models: (i) using *Proportion of linking social capital* and *Social capital* as alternate variables to *Linking social capital* and *Non-linking social capital* and (ii) *Degree of Bricolage* and *Physical capital* as alternate variables to *High bricolage physical capital* and *Low bricolage physical capital* in my regression models. Further, I run the analyses on the entire sample and two subsamples after splitting the batches into small (5 to 14) and large (greater than 15), based on the median batch size of 14.

Results

Table 3.2 reports descriptive statistics and correlations among variables. Of the total number of batches (n = 4616), the number of batches reporting discretionary income (n = 1163) is lesser than those with wages (n = 4035), indicating more students take up jobs than venture into entrepreneurship or self employment (not shown in the table). The average of self-earning is lower than the average earning from wages. A good 83.5% of students get placed on average, which is higher than the required value of 70%, as agreed between NSDC and the training centers. The average batch size is 16, with around 50% of students being women. The average number of trainers in a training center are five, with each trainer having an experience of close to thirteen batches (cumulative experience); each training center specializes in training for slightly more than two job roles on average. Earning has a strong correlation with the percentage of students placed, wage-earning and self-earning. There is a moderate correlation between earning and linking social capital as well as between earning and low bricolage physical capital, in line with our hypotheses.

Insert Table 3.2 Here
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level socio-economic indicators that would impact the acquisition of resources for the PPP, but not the dependent variables directly. I find no evidence to reject the null hypothesis.

Table 3.3a shows the results of the OLS regressions on the entire dataset. Hypothesis 1a predicted more linking social capital, a bricolaged intangible resources, affects earnings positively. Model 1 shows the coefficient of linking social capital is positive and significant ($\beta = 0.00286$, p = 0.003). This indicates an increase of one placed alumnus (linking social capital) increases earning by 0.00286% ($=e^{0.00286}$ -1). It also has a positive and significant impact on wage earning ($\beta = 0.00380$, p = 0.000) but marginally significant impact on self-earning ($\beta = 0.00491$, p = 0.071) as seen in Models 2 and 3, respectively. Non-linking social capital does not impact earning but has a significant and negative impact on wage earning ($\beta = -0.00249$, p = 0.036), as predicted by Hypothesis 1b. These results indicate that linking social capital, through its connections with institutions (other organizations where the alumni may have been placed, or if they have set up entrepreneurial ventures on their own) help in increasing earning for the trainees. Non-linking social capital increase competition in the job market and hence have a negative impact on wage earning.

Hypothesis 1c predicted a positive impact of human capital, partially bricolaged intangible resource, on earnings. The effect of human capital (number of trainers) is seen to have a U-shaped relation with earning. The coefficient of human capital is negative and significant in Model 1 ($\beta = -0.3124$, p = 0.000), and its squared term is positive and significant ($\beta = 0.0139$, p = 0.000). As a confirmatory test, I run the *utest* command in Stata to test the overall presence of an inverse U shape. The turning point is 11.22 within an interval of 9.62 and 12.71, well within the X range of 1 (minimum value) and 24 (maximum value), further supporting the presence of a U-curve (Haans et al., 2015). The same pattern is seen for wage earning in Model 2.

Hypothesis 2a predicted degree of bricolage in case of tangible assets or physical capital has an inverse relation with earning, i.e., more the degree of bricolage, less is the

earning and vice versa. Model 1 shows the coefficient of low bricolage physical capital is

negative but not significant and that of high bricolage physical capital is negative and

significant (β = - 0.1818, p = 0.001). These results do not support Hypothesis 2a but support

hypothesis 2b, showing that imitable physical capital is a necessary but not a sufficient

condition for value creation, but its bricolage impacts value creation negatively. Since

physical capital is measured in an ordinal scale, the results indicate that an increase in

bricolage by one unit (of the ordinal scale), results in a 0.2 percent ($=e^{0.1818}$ -1) decrease in the

absolute value of earnings. The results are similar for wage-earning and self-earning as seen

in Models 2 and 3, respectively. Hypothesis 3 predicted that level of internal bricolage helps

in value creation. As seen in Model 1, internal bricolage does have a positive and significant

impact on earning (β = 0.3176, p = 0.001). This means increasing one job role through

internal bricolage increases earning by a 0.37 percent ($=e^{0.3176}$ -1). It also has a positive

impact on wage earning (β = 0.396, p = 0.000) as seen in Model 2, but not on self earning.

The results generally support my hypotheses, except in the case of human capital where the

relation in non-linear (U shaped) instead of linear. Table 3.3b shows the results of the

analysis after using degree of bricolage as independent variable (in place of High bricolage

physical capital and Low bricolage physical capital) and controlling for physical capital. The

results remain consistent with the earlier findings with Degree of bricolage having negative

and significant coefficient on both earning (β = 0.0845, p = 0.001) and wage-earning (β =

0.0831, p = 0.006). Robustness tests done by splitting the batches into small (less than 15

participants) and large (15 or more participants) batches also support the hypotheses, being

more prominent for larger batches that smaller ones. These results are shown in Tables 3.4 a

& b and 3.5 a & b respectively. The U-shaped relation between human capital and earning is

not very prominent in smaller batches but is prominently seen in larger batches. I try to

explain this relationship by running a further set of analyses.

Table 3.6 a & b shows the results of models run with *Proportion of linking social capital* and *Social capital* as independent variables instead of Linking social capital and non-linking social capital. Coefficient of Social capital is positive and significant in all cases. While the coefficient of *Prop of linking social capital* is not significant in case of earning and self earning, for wage earning it is positive and significant (β = 1.722, p = 0.004). This indicates an increase in proportion of linking social capital by 1 unit (i.e., 0 to 1) results in 4.6% (=$e^{-1.72}$ -1) increase in the wage earning. This model reiterates the importance of linking social capital on wage earning.

Organizations reuse resources that exist within, through the process of internal bricolage. e.g., If a training center has already invested in buying sewing machines, it will try to train more than one role that uses the physical infrastructure like tailor and sewing machine operator. Both these roles belong to the same industry subsector (Apparel, Made-Ups & Home Furnishing) and can potentially be trained by trainers with similar credentials. On the other hand, physical assets like computers can be used for training across multiple roles like data entry operator, call center operator and field technician, spanning subsectors like IT/ITES, Service Provider, Electronics and Hardware, respectively. These roles are likely to need different trainers across multiple industry subsectors as well. While the former can be called related internal bricolage, the latter is unrelated internal bricolage.

Diversity of human capital leads to enhanced social capital as diverse networks are formed. Related internal bricolage can result in recruiting the same type of human capital, more of whom may not be able to increase employment potential. Unrelated internal bricolage, on the other hand, increases bridging social capital and associated resources that can lead to more employment (Burt, 2001; Davidsson & Honig, 2003; Granovetter, 1973).

When a training center expands through internal bricolage, it is likely to first expand in the same industry subsector before venturing into unrelated subsectors. Initial increase of human capital with similar networks (strong ties) followed by increase in human capital with weak ties can potentially explain the non-linear (U-shaped) relationship. I regress earning and wage earning on internal bricolage separately for related (unrelatedness = 0 in Models 1, 2) and unrelated internal bricolage (unrelatedness = 1 in Models 3, 4) in Table 3.7. The results show that the former has no impact while the coefficients are positive and significant in case of unrelated internal bricolage. Figure 3.1 shows the effect of tangible and intangible resources on earning.

Insert Table 3.7, Figure 3.1 Here

To summarize, social capital (entirely bricolaged) has a significant positive effect on all types of earnings of the trainees, whereas the impact of human capital (partially bricolaged) initially decreases and then increases. While the effect of physical capital (optimized) is not significant, bricolaged physical capital has a negative impact. These findings generally support the hypotheses that a higher degree of bricolage of intangible resources has a positive impact on earnings, while the impact of bricolage of tangible resources is negative. Internal bricolage has a positive impact on earnings; when unrelated, the impact increases through differentiated human capital as well.

Discussion

The study aimed to see how social enterprises can mobilize tangible and intangible resources like physical, human, and social capital for value creation in a resource-scarce environment. Of the two frequently used resource mobilization techniques of optimization and bricolage, I theorized that while the optimization method of acquiring physical resources

can generate traditional Ricardian rents (with limited competitive advantage), it is the bricolage of human and social capital that generate non-traditional Ricardian rents and entrepreneurial rents for competitive advantage. Bricolaging physical resources can be detrimental for value creation. I tested my hypotheses in for-profit, socially motivated training centers where I used an ordinal scale to measure investment on physical capital which was further classified based on degree of bricolage. Human and social capital were bricolaged, with human capital being partially bricolaged; social capital, due to its embedded nature, was entirely bricolaged. I found evidence of bricolage of intangible resources contributing to value creation through increased earnings of trainees. I theorized that the extent of bricolage can also influence value creation: the more an intangible resource is bricolaged, the more unique and inimitable it becomes. I found evidence of social capital, an entirely bricolaged resource, positively impacting social returns, more than human capital, a partially bricolaged resource. I further found that investment in tangible resources or physical capital is a necessary but not sufficient condition for creating value; and bricolaging such resources has a negative impact. These findings can influence resource mobilization practices of social enterprises and improve the effectiveness of their social mission.

Resource Mobilization in Social Enterprises

With increasing global challenges (Eisenhardt et al., 2016; George et al., 2016), many social enterprises are stepping up to create social value. These firms are likely to face a resource crunch in a resource-scarce world, where philanthropy is being replaced with venture philanthropy, a practice that applies venture capital financing principles to achieve philanthropic goals (Frumpkin, 2003; Mair & Hehenberger, 2014). Not all social enterprises are non-profits; many are for-profit or hybrid organizations with social and financial missions. Even non-profits are expected to have economic sustainability sooner than later. It is thus imperative that social enterprises utilize their resources pragmatically.

This study builds on existing literature on resource mobilization in general (Clough et al., 2019) and mobilization in social enterprises in particular (Bacq & Eddleston, 2018; Bloom & Chatterji, 2009; Day & Jean-Denis, 2016). While prior literature has examined the antecedents of the two main resource mobilization choices: optimization and bricolage (Desa & Basu, 2013), I study their consequences. The former deals with acquiring standard resources with established features; the latter can start as necessity-based bricolage to make use of resources available locally and at a low cost. Through causal ambiguity, path dependence, and social complexity, it can raise barriers to imitation, generate non-traditional Ricardian rents and culminate in ideational bricolage leading to entrepreneurial rents.

Research on entrepreneurial bricolage has shown it to play several roles like helping displaced entrepreneurs (Kwong et al., 2019), scaling social enterprises (Busch & Barkema, 2021), legitimizing self-constructed accounts of social impact measurement (Molecke & Pinkse, 2017), filling institutional voids (Desa, 2012; Mair & Marti, 2009) and increasing social impact (Kwong et al., 2017). The present research adds to this evolving body of literature by investigating how bricolage can generate non-traditional Ricardian rents and entrepreneurial rents and how the degree of bricolage influences social value creation (Di Domenico et al., 2010), thereby being a source of sustained competitive advantage for social enterprises. It also shows how the effect of bricolage can be different for tangible and intangible resources.

Managerial implications

Fund allocation for non-profits has started focusing on results-based audit contracts that improve funding efficiency (Privett & Erhun, 2011; Devalkar et al., 2016). Results focus is becoming increasingly crucial for funding in social sectors. The findings from this research can have significant managerial implications for managers of social enterprises and social entrepreneurs who need to start looking at competitive advantage to stay ahead of the

competition in a resource-poor world. Resources mobilized through bricolage can be used for value creation, and secure more funding which can be used to mobilize resources using optimization, the focus of which is to improve efficiency. This optimal balance between the two forms of resource mobilization can enhance the sustenance of social enterprises in the long run, securing funding from donors, venture philanthropists, and impact investors while improving societal value creation simultaneously.

Conclusion and Limitations

One of the areas of improvement of the paper is getting indicative figures for the capital expenditure investment by the training centers instead of the derived ordinal scale currently used. That will enable us to see how an additional unit of investment in physical capital impacts value creation. There can be a possibility of finding natural experiments or conducting field experiments on deploying resources acquired through different methods, which can be studied to attribute their role to competitive advantage in social enterprises.

Resource dependence theory (RDT) is another framework that organizational theorists consider while studying resource allocation and mobilization. RDT focuses on the dependence of the focal firm on its external environment, including other firms who sometimes, under their power position, can take advantage of the focal firm (Hillman et al., 2009; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). It can sometimes lead to partnership agreements like M&As, alliances, or other mechanisms that can change the dynamics between firms (Santos & Eisenhardt, 2005). How optimization and bricolage perform under those boundary conditions can be an area of future research.

Finally, a PPP gives a novel context for integrating RBV and RDT. On the one hand, the public entity, typically owned and controlled by the government, is resource-rich in financial terms and has power over the private players. On the other hand, it depends on the private players for the resources required to mitigate social problems. Seen from the private

organization's point of view, it is subject to financial resource crunch, for which it is dependent on the public partner. It faces environmental uncertainties due to competition and market conditions (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). For it to garner financial resources from the public partner, in the presence of competition, it has to have some competitive advantage which it can do by suitable usage of its internal resources, which lies in the domain of RBV. Future research can aim at making theoretical and empirical contributions to this area. The public and private sectors have complementary strengths, combining which can broaden the financial base for social services. It is crucial to understand how to capitalize on both sectors' strengths and capabilities and synergize their objectives and strategies to solve global challenges like poverty reduction.

Table 3.1. Relation between hypotheses and variables

Hypothesis	Dependent Variable	Independent Variables	Expected result
H1a: Linking social capital, a bricolaged intangible resource, has a positive effect in increasing value through enhanced earnings.	Earning	Linking social capital	Positive
Hypothesis (H1b). Non-linking social capital, a bricolaged intangible resource, has a negative effect in increasing value through enhanced earnings.	Earning	Non-linking social capital	Either negative or not significant
Hypothesis (H1c). Human capital, a partially bricolaged intangible resource, has a positive effect in increasing value through enhanced earnings.	Earning	Human capital	Positive
H2: More a tangible resource is bricolaged, less its effect in increasing value through enhanced earnings.	Earning	High Bricolage Physical capital Low Bricolage Physical capital	Negative Not significant
H3: More resources are internally bricolaged, more its effect in increasing value through enhanced earnings.	Earning	Internal bricolage	Positive

Table 3.2 Descriptive statistics and correlation among variables

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)
(1) Earning	70956.26	53387.13													
(2) Wage-earning	68715.7	49445.83	0.8452												
(3) Self-earning	43260.02	48061.71	0.5147	-0.0231											
(4) Linking social capital	114.0667	129.4499	0.3601	0.2928	0.2039										
(5) Non-linking social capital	37.26646	78.4286	-0.2565	-0.1551	-0.2311	0.1096									
(6) Human capital	5.40208	3.889028	0.1005	0.2474	-0.2090	0.4761	-0.1052								
(7) High bricolage physical capital	3.595588	2.403655	0.1016	0.2108	-0.1481	0.7126	0.1693	0.4877							
(8) Low bricolage physical capital	1.478011	.7387218	0.3527	0.2098	0.3232	0.1134	-0.1364	0.0405	-0.0932						
(9) Internal bricolage	2.606153	1.695318	0.0799	0.1927	-0.1597	0.6643	0.1373	0.5662	0.9096	0.0766					
(10) Cumulative experience	12.73505	9.595672	0.0570	0.1259	-0.0952	0.7503	0.0350	0.7443	0.7011	-0.0001	0.8113				
(11) Batch size	15.83319	9.219292	0.2444	0.2196	0.1050	0.1755	0.5820	-0.2198	0.0842	0.0837	0.0090	-0.1374			
(12) Batch duration	77.91958	24.20206	-0.1008	-0.1425	0.0399	0.1279	0.1395	0.0550	0.0138	-0.1295	-0.0402	0.1361	0.0522		
(13) Pct of students placed	83.57317	29.58543	0.4641	0.3663	0.2805	0.1981	-0.7471	0.1768	0.0614	0.1435	0.0449	0.1237	-0.5318	-0.1344	
(14) Pct female students	49.53534	36.57008	0.1695	0.0020	0.3139	0.2845	-0.2947	-0.0714	0.0509	0.2417	0.0207	0.0954	0.0332	-0.0791	0.3008

n = 4616 batches

Table 3.3a Effect of social, human and physical capital (entire dataset)

	Model 1 Earning	Model 2 Wage-earning	Model 3 Self-earning
Linking social capital	.00286**	0.00380***	0.00491+
	(0.003)	(0.000)	(0.071)
Non-linking social capital	.00025	-0.00249*	0.0140
	(0.827)	(0.036)	(0.103)
Human capital	-0.3124***	-0.251***	-0.201
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.447)
Human capital Sq	0.0139***	0.0114***	0.00902
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.370)
High bricolage physical capital	-0.1818***	-0.238***	-0.430**
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.004)
Low bricolage physical capital	-0.0135	-0.0950	-0.315
	(0.661)	(0.151)	(0.206)
Internal bricolage	0.3176***	0.396***	0.270
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.329)
Cumulative experience	-0.0131	-0.0223	0.00112
	(0.435)	(0.167)	(0.981)
Batch size	0.0495***	0.0265*	0.0704***
	(0.000)	(0.011)	(0.000)
Batch duration	-0.0026	-0.00218	0.0122
	(0.191)	(0.387)	(0.218)
Pct of students placed	.0389***	0.0259***	-0.0119
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.466)
Pct female students	-0.0015	0.00136	0.00250
	(0.500)	(0.513)	(0.704)
No. of subsectors	.0256	0.0485	-0.0801
	(0.766)	(0.577)	(0.761)
Capital intensive	0.2287	0.0753	-0.180
	(0.119)	(0.539)	(0.624)
Unrelatedness	-0.2332	-0.366	-0.380
	(0.165)	(0.076)	(0.499)
District literacy	-0.0021	-0.00342	0.0633
	(0.778)	(0.675)	(0.132)
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Subsector FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	7.617***	9.064***	0.0933
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.983)
Sample size	1248	1172	308
Adjusted R^2	0.561	0.446	0.484
Log Likelihood	-2634.1	-2360.4	-731.8

All tests are two tailed. p-values in parentheses. SE values available on request.
Notes: +$p < 0.1$, *$p < 0.05$, **$p < 0.01$, ***$p < 0.001$

Table 3.3b Effect of social, human and physical capital (robustness check)

	Model 1 Earning	Model 2 Wage-earning	Model 3 Self-earning
Linking social capital	0.00294**	0.00389***	0.00469+
	(0.003)	(0.000)	(0.087)
Non-linking social capital	0.0000142	-0.00282*	0.0140
	(0.991)	(0.023)	(0.103)
Human capital	-0.271***	-0.208***	-0.248
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.334)
Human capital Sq	0.0115***	0.00878***	0.0119
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.230)
Degree of bricolage	-0.0845**	-0.0831**	0.0639
	(0.001)	(0.006)	(0.571)
Physical capital	-0.101*	-0.159***	-0.477**
	(0.037)	(0.000)	(0.005)
Internal bricolage	0.269**	0.344***	0.276
	(0.003)	(0.000)	(0.275)
Cumulative experience	-0.0118	-0.0207	0.00112
	(0.485)	(0.205)	(0.981)
Batch size	0.0490***	0.0259*	0.0713***
	(0.000)	(0.013)	(0.000)
Batch duration	-0.00214	-0.00176	0.0102
	(0.297)	(0.486)	(0.291)
Pct of students placed	0.0386***	0.0255***	-0.0109
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.508)
Pct female students	-0.00138	0.00150	0.00104
	(0.538)	(0.468)	(0.873)
No. of subsectors	0.0359	0.0586	-0.0523
	(0.680)	(0.507)	(0.841)
Capital intensive	0.230	0.0774	-0.129
	(0.119)	(0.535)	(0.723)
Unrelatedness	-0.253	-0.400	-0.493
	(0.140)	(0.063)	(0.373)
District literacy	-0.00178	-0.00266	0.0632
	(0.817)	(0.740)	(0.134)
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Subsector FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	7.655***	9.082***	0.676
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.874)
Sample size	1248	1172	308
Adjusted R^2	0.562	0.448	0.485
Log Likelihood	-2634.1	-2360.4	-731.8

All tests are two tailed. p-values in parentheses. SE values available on request.
Notes: $+p < 0.1$, $*p < 0.05$, $**p < 0.01$, $***p < 0.001$

Table 3.4a Effect of social, human and physical capital (smaller batches)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	Earning	Wage-earning	Self-earning
Linking social capital	0.000543	0.00154*	0.00215
	(0.437)	(0.037)	(0.657)
Non-linking social capital	-0.00336	-0.00931+	0.0138
	(0.419)	(0.070)	(0.063)
Human capital	-0.0864	-0.0681	-0.381
	(0.190)	(0.179)	(0.199)
Human capital Sq	0.00407+	0.00424*	0.0194+
	(0.098)	(0.049)	(0.069)
High bricolage physical capital	-0.107+	-0.189*	-0.118
	(0.066)	(0.015)	(0.505)
Low bricolage physical capital	-0.0249	-0.160*	-0.510
	(0.689)	(0.012)	(0.325)
Internal bricolage	0.0214	0.251**	0.494
	(0.799)	(0.002)	(0.125)
Cumulative experience	0.00222	-0.0161	-0.0491
	(0.895)	(0.292)	(0.590)
Batch size	0.154***	0.140***	-0.00446
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.945)
Batch duration	-0.00104	0.00237	0.0132
	(0.697)	(0.154)	(0.142)
Pct of students placed	-0.000416	-0.00231+	-0.00536
	(0.839)	(0.051)	(0.278)
Pct female students	-0.000416	-0.00231	-0.00536
	(0.839)	(0.051)	(0.278)
No. of subsectors	0.142*	0.109	-0.440
	(0.048)	(0.217)	(0.177)
Capital intensive	-0.298	-0.485*	0.646
	(0.087)	(0.024)	(0.168)
Unrelatedness	-0.290	-0.182	0.571
	(0.086)	(0.380)	(0.396)
District literacy	0.00320	-0.0124*	-0.0184
	(0.634)	(0.042)	(0.481)
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Subsector FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	1.604	8.817***	-20.16*
	(0.342)	(0.000)	(0.030)
Sample size	438	410	92
Adjusted R^2	0.690	0.524	0.691
Log Likelihood	-876.9	-623.0	-178.9

All tests are two tailed. p-values in parentheses. SE values available on request.
Notes: $+p < 0.1$, $*p < 0.05$, $**p < 0.01$, $***p < 0.001$

Table 3.4b Effect of social, human and physical capital in smaller batches (robustness check)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	Earning	Wage-earning	Self-earning
Linking social capital	0.000642	0.00155*	0.00100
	(0.338)	(0.031)	(0.809)
Non-linking social capital	-0.00335	-0.00958+	0.0131
	(0.440)	(0.076)	(0.112)
Human capital	-0.0666	-0.0554	-0.429
	(0.265)	(0.185)	(0.123)
Human capital Sq	0.00312	0.00348+	0.0216*
	(0.178)	(0.072)	(0.033)
Degree of bricolage	-0.0300	-0.0241	0.125
	(0.331)	(0.540)	(0.412)
Physical capital	-0.0768	-0.170**	-0.190
	(0.104)	(0.003)	(0.397)
Internal bricolage	-0.00371	0.234**	0.572
	(0.967)	(0.005)	(0.154)
Cumulative experience	0.00000540	-0.0159	-0.0333
	(1.000)	(0.276)	(0.669)
Batch size	0.155***	0.140***	-0.00186
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.976)
Batch duration	-0.000899	0.00217	0.0150
	(0.735)	(0.182)	(0.136)
Pct of students placed	0.106***	0.0244	0.338***
	(0.000)	(0.130)	(0.000)
Pct female students	-0.000532	-0.00231*	-0.00540
	(0.796)	(0.049)	(0.275)
No. of subsectors	0.164	0.123	-0.575
	(0.054)	(0.239)	(0.112)
Capital intensive	-0.292	-0.484*	0.545
	(0.090)	(0.023)	(0.247)
Unrelatedness	-0.300	-0.195	0.705
	(0.077)	(0.358)	(0.284)
District literacy	0.00261	-0.0116*	-0.0160
	(0.692)	(0.046)	(0.538)
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Subsector FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	1.664	8.832***	-21.42*
	(0.326)	(0.000)	(0.012)
Sample size	438	410	92
Adjusted R^2	0.689	0.524	0.688
Log Likelihood	-876.9	-623.0	-178.9

All tests are two tailed. p-values in parentheses. SE values available on request.
Notes: $+p < 0.1$, $*p < 0.05$, $**p < 0.01$, $***p < 0.001$

Table 3.5a Effect of social, human and physical capital (larger batches)

	Model 1 Earning	Model 2 Wage-earning	Model 3 Self-earning
Linking social capital	0.00348*	0.00266+	-0.000257
	(0.015)	(0.095)	(0.954)
Non-linking social capital	0.000318	-0.00205	0.0163
	(0.796)	(0.138)	(0.152)
Human capital	-0.406***	-0.383***	-0.0984
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.814)
Human capital Sq	0.0175***	0.0146***	-0.000610
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.972)
High bricolage physical capital	-0.176*	-0.187*	-0.364
	(0.027)	(0.017)	(0.161)
Low bricolage physical capital	-0.0656	-0.0560	0.187
	(0.553)	(0.657)	(0.471)
Internal bricolage	0.506***	0.424**	0.408
	(0.000)	(0.008)	(0.482)
Cumulative experience	-0.0240	0.00862	0.132
	(0.337)	(0.737)	(0.166)
Batch size	0.0254	-0.000205	0.0777†
	(0.202)	(0.992)	(0.084)
Batch duration	-0.00346	-0.00308	0.00404
	(0.195)	(0.427)	(0.829)
Pct of students placed	0.0300***	0.0283***	-0.00996
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.528)
Pct female students	0.0000868	0.00259	0.0210
	(0.977)	(0.420)	(0.176)
No. of subsectors	-0.0996	-0.0118	-0.522
	(0.412)	(0.928)	(0.277)
Capital intensive	0.191	0.108	-0.114
	(0.168)	(0.533)	(0.867)
Unrelatedness	-0.0755	-0.410	-0.455
	(0.797)	(0.209)	(0.639)
District literacy	0.0166+	0.0119	0.0495
	(0.095)	(0.426)	(0.465)
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Subsector FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	7.928***	8.922***	-2.040
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.743)
Sample size	810	762	216
Adjusted R^2	0.653	0.527	0.519
Log Likelihood	-1749.1	-1645.6	-536.9

All tests are two tailed. p-values in parentheses. SE values available on request.
Notes: $+p < 0.1$, $*p < 0.05$, $**p < 0.01$, $***p < 0.001$

Table 3.5b Effect of social, human and physical capital in larger batches (robustness check)

	Model 1 Earning	Model 2 Wage-earning	Model 3 Self-earning
Linking social capital	0.00347*	0.00270+	0.000789
	(0.016)	(0.094)	(0.862)
Non-linking social capital	-0.000283	-0.00295+	0.0168
	(0.829)	(0.056)	(0.146)
Human capital	-0.345***	-0.300***	-0.173
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.686)
Human capital Sq	0.0138***	0.00943*	0.00364
	(0.000)	(0.018)	(0.841)
Degree of bricolage	-0.0910*	-0.123*	-0.0157
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.904)
Physical capital	-0.0650	-0.0343	-0.324
	(0.424)	(0.681)	(0.209)
Internal bricolage	0.398**	0.272	0.0695
	(0.003)	(0.089)	(0.886)
Cumulative experience	-0.0170	0.0181	0.120
	(0.495)	(0.478)	(0.212)
Batch size	0.0245	-0.00102	0.0881*
	(0.214)	(0.961)	(0.049)
Batch duration	-0.00256	-0.00184	0.00103
	(0.359)	(0.657)	(0.956)
Pct of students placed	0.0291***	0.0270***	-0.00933
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.562)
Pct female students	0.000385	0.00289	0.0182
	(0.899)	(0.362)	(0.256)
No. of subsectors	-0.102	-0.0149	-0.188
	(0.396)	(0.908)	(0.688)
Capital intensive	0.160	0.0646	-0.0130
	(0.257)	(0.716)	(0.985)
Unrelatedness	-0.0757	-0.413	-0.879
	(0.799)	(0.221)	(0.363)
District literacy	0.0161	0.0111	0.0506
	(0.112)	(0.460)	(0.459)
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Subsector FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	7.967***	8.971***	-0.878
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.887)
Sample size	810	762	216
Adjusted R^2	0.655	0.532	0.511
Log Likelihood	-1749.1	-1645.6	-536.9

All tests are two tailed. p-values in parentheses. SE values available on request.
Notes: $+p < 0.1$, $*p < 0.05$, $**p < 0.01$, $***p < 0.001$

Table 3.6a Effect of Proportion of Linking Social Capital (entire dataset)

	Model 1 Earning	Model 2 Wage-earning	Model 3 Self-earning
Prop of linking social capital	0.730	1.722**	0.279
	(0.199)	(0.004)	(0.829)
Social capital	0.00193**	0.00153*	0.00668*
	(0.002)	(0.022)	(0.033)
Human capital	-0.309***	-0.246***	-0.162
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.552)
Human capital Sq	0.0138***	0.0114***	0.00690
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.505)
High bricolage physical capital	-0.172***	-0.219***	-0.539***
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Low bricolage physical capital	-0.0204	-0.118	-0.413
	(0.777)	(0.089)	(0.101)
Internal bricolage	0.309***	0.380***	0.337
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.227)
Cumulative experience	-0.00520	-0.00284	-0.00417
	(0.713)	(0.832)	(0.936)
Batch size	0.0519***	0.0325**	0.0643**
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Batch duration	-0.00295	-0.00280	0.0118
	(0.138)	(0.261)	(0.245)
Pct of students placed	0.0382***	0.0246***	-0.0170
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.350)
Pct female students	-0.00185	0.000468	0.00255
	(0.426)	(0.830)	(0.698)
No. of subsectors	0.00432	-0.00154	0.0181
	(0.957)	(0.984)	(0.950)
Capital intensive	0.197	-0.0273	-0.169
	(0.185)	(0.835)	(0.659)
Unrelatedness	-0.128	-0.0813	-0.772
	(0.411)	(0.650)	(0.181)
District literacy	-0.00220	-0.00356	0.0588
	(0.776)	(0.672)	(0.163)
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Subsector FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	7.070***	7.775***	2.134
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.567)
Sample size	1248	1172	308
Adjusted R^2	0.561	0.443	0.479
Log Likelihood	-2634.1	-2360.4	-731.8

All tests are two tailed. p-values in parentheses. SE values available on request.
Notes: $+p < 0.1$, $*p < 0.05$, $**p < 0.01$, $***p < 0.001$

Table 3.6b Effect of Proportion of Linking Social Capital (robustness check)

	Model 1 Earning	Model 2 Wage-earning	Model 3 Self-earning
Prop of linking social capital	0.762	1.744**	0.160
	(0.183)	(0.004)	(0.902)
Social capital	0.00191**	0.00151*	0.00666*
	(0.002)	(0.023)	(0.038)
Human capital	-0.272***	-0.217***	-0.203
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.439)
Human capital Sq	0.0116***	0.00965***	0.00948
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.350)
Degree of bricolage	-0.0742**	-0.0568*	0.0528
	(0.002)	(0.030)	(0.647)
Physical capital	-0.0990*	-0.162***	-0.577***
	(0.041)	(0.000)	(0.001)
Internal bricolage	0.264**	0.341***	0.331
	(0.003)	(0.000)	(0.185)
Cumulative experience	-0.00343	-0.00107	-0.00625
	(0.812)	(0.938)	(0.903)
Batch size	0.0517***	0.0323**	0.0650**
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Batch duration	-0.00252	-0.00253	0.0100
	(0.208)	(0.306)	(0.312)
Pct of students placed	0.0380***	0.0244***	-0.0159
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.383)
Pct female students	-0.00173	0.000562	0.00124
	(0.454)	(0.795)	(0.847)
No. of subsectors	0.0118	0.00393	0.0553
	(0.884)	(0.961)	(0.844)
Capital intensive	0.197	-0.0273	-0.121
	(0.187)	(0.836)	(0.749)
Unrelatedness	-0.136	-0.0944	-0.884
	(0.386)	(0.605)	(0.111)
District literacy	-0.00194	-0.00306	0.0588
	(0.802)	(0.710)	(0.164)
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Subsector FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	7.059***	7.741***	2.742
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.451)
Sample size	1248	1172	308
Adjusted R^2	0.562	0.444	0.479
Log Likelihood	-2634.1	-2360.4	-731.8

All tests are two tailed. p-values in parentheses. SE values available on request.
Notes: $+p < 0.1$, $*p < 0.05$, $**p < 0.01$, $***p < 0.001$

Table 3.7 Effect of related and unrelated internal bricolage

	Unrelatedness =0		Unrelatedness =1	
	Model 1 Earning	Model 2 Wage-earning	Model 3 Earning	Model 4 Wage-earning
Internal bricolage	-0.131	-0.0316	0.0409*	0.0425**
	(0.123)	(0.598)	(0.014)	(0.006)
Batch size	0.0485***	0.0519***	0.0722***	0.0542***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Batch duration	-0.00194	0.00292*	-0.00310*	-0.00257†
	(0.287)	(0.019)	(0.025)	(0.080)
Pct of students placed	0.0587***	0.0110**	0.0462***	0.0188***
	(0.000)	(0.008)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Pct female students	0.00284*	-0.00152†	-0.000163	-0.000859
	(0.032)	(0.093)	(0.903)	(0.460)
Capital intensive	-0.254	-0.0720	0.382*	0.0232
	(0.446)	(0.514)	(0.029)	(0.928)
District literacy	0.000626	0.0144**	0.00276	0.00210
	(0.926)	(0.002)	(0.503)	(0.564)
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Subsector FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	6.188***	7.341***	4.803***	7.242***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Sample size	1667	1381	2877	2615
Adjusted R^2	0.785	0.621	0.586	0.387
Log Likelihood	-4316.8	-2495.8	-6390.3	-5102.3

All tests are two tailed. p-values in parentheses. SE values available on request.
Notes: $+p < 0.1$, $*p < 0.05$, $**p < 0.01$, $***p < 0.001$

Figure 3.1 Effect of tangible and intangible resources on earning

Chapter 4: Effect of Ethnicity-based Homophily and Relative Social Status on Poverty Reduction

Introduction

"Poverty is not an accident. Like slavery and apartheid, it is man-made, and can be removed by the actions of human beings." - Nelson Mandela

Management research has been studying poverty reduction in developing nations (Eisenhardt et al., 2016; George et al., 2016). Poverty reduction is a global challenge and the first goal (SDG1) of the United Nations' 2030 agenda for sustainable development. Poverty is caused by an imbalance in "access to resources and opportunities that are differentially distributed" among people (Amis et al., 2021: 431). Such systemic inequality is often caused by socially identifiable characteristics based on ethnicity, race, or other demographic differences (Amis et al., 2020; Markus, 2017). The impact of social dynamics based on demographic similarity or differences can become crucial in mitigating poverty. In many such poverty reduction initiatives, officially appointed agents are supposed to reduce resource asymmetry through equitable distribution of allocated (monetary) resources, but often such initiatives fall short of the intended expectations.

Subtle but powerful forces can come into play during the entire agent-beneficiary disbursement process due to collaboration among similar people as well as alienation among diverse groups. First, in a well-known phenomenon known as homophily, defined as similar individuals typically preferring one another (McPherson et al., 2001), and this affinity can significantly impact business and economic transactions (Greenberg & Mollick, 2017; Lawrence & Shah, 2020; Rivera et al., 2010).

Second, and arguably more important, what happens if homophily is not present? If the actor and beneficiary are not similar (non-homophily), a hierarchical force comes into

play due to social status[3]. For example, in the caste system, a natural hierarchy becomes relevant when the actor and beneficiary are not from the same caste. While two people of the same caste will trust one another even if they do not know each other well, the same does not apply when they belong to different castes. An individual belonging to a lower caste may be reluctant to trust someone from a higher caste due to the age-old atrocities that the latter have inflicted on the former. The individual of a relatively higher caste may ignore or denigrate the lower caste person due to historical perception and embeddedness of self-superiority. Failure to understand the dynamics of homophily and its effect on non-homophily and social status can negatively affect the optimal disbursement of allocated resources.

In addition, these dynamics are also intertwined in a powerplay context of the high-power distance culture of some emerging nations. Ceteris paribus, an individual of a higher caste, hence higher social status, also has more power. Power plays an essential role in all types of relationships and has a wide-ranging impact, like the ability to direct or influence the behavior of others or the course of events (Daniels & Greguras, 2014). Agents can use or misuse their power in the welfare disbursement process or take necessary actions to retain control. A nuanced understanding of these three forces (homophily, non-homophily induced social status, and the associated powerplay in a high power-distance context) can help improve the efficacy of the initiatives (Banerjee & Duflo, 2013; Belliveau et al, 1996; Ertug et al., 2018; Pearce & Xu, 2012). By considering ethnicity as a source of both cooperation and alienation, this paper addresses the following research questions:

(i)   Does ethnicity-based homophily play a role in welfare disbursement?

(ii)   How does ethnic dissimilarity (and social status) affect disbursement?

(iii)   How does ethnicity-based homophily change the nature of transactions over time?

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[3] Note that social status does not come into the picture if homophily is already present.

Two sets of underlying mechanisms can affect the consequences: homophily, on the one hand, contributes to improved affinity among similar people; on the other hand, it divides dissimilar people and limits the range of knowledge, viewpoints, and other resources available to an actor through their connections. As a result, which of these two sets of mechanisms is more prevalent in a given setting may influence the link between homophily and other outcomes, making the context relevant (Ertug et al., 2022). Ethnicity-based homophily creates the most potent divide (McPherson et al., 2001). It can affect people and businesses like individuals, dyads, teams, organizations, and society, where the coalition effect of homophily is visible (Dimmock et al., 2018; Freeman & Huang, 2015; Gompers et al., 2016; Hegde & Tumlinson, 2014). Other studies have shown that benefits or drawbacks associated with interpersonal similarity or dissimilarity are not the only factors determining the undercurrents; the difference in the actors' ethnicity status can be an additional driving force (Belliveau et al., 1996; Ertug et al, 2018; Pearce & Xu, 2012).

I study a particular form of ethnicity-based homophily, called caste-based homophily (CBH), in the context of rural India with a high-power distance culture, where an ethnicity-induced caste system dominates everyday life. I also focus on the social status of the bricoleurs (relative to their beneficiaries, as imparted by the caste system) involved in welfare generation for marginalized sectors of society in rural India. The purpose of my study is threefold. The first purpose is to examine the effect of CBH on the number of dyadic transactions between bricoleurs and their beneficiaries that can lead to economic outcomes (transactions that can lead to potential welfare generation) and the associated economic value. Based on similarity attraction theory and existing evidence on CBH, I first hypothesize that CBH (i) increases the likelihood of dyadic transactions that can lead to economic outcomes and (ii) also increases the economic value associated with the transactions.

The second purpose is to investigate how performance measured as the number of registrations to the welfare programs and disbursed welfare amount (same as above two measures) differs for interethnic groups. I examine the effect of the relative social status imparted by the caste system: whether the bricoleurs having a higher status than the beneficiary and vice versa affects the above outcomes. Due to a lack of mutual trust among interethnic or intercaste individuals, I hypothesize that bricoleurs having both higher and lower relative status as their beneficiaries have a lower likelihood of economic transactions than agents with the same castes. However, the relative social status inflicted by the caste system can act as a competing influencing force for the value associated with economic transactions.

Social dynamics theory (SDT) suggests those with lower social status tend to be submissive, loyal, obedient, and subservient to those with power (Kirkman et al., 2009; Bochner & Hesketh, 1994; Sidanius et al., 2004). If the bricoleur is lower in caste than the beneficiary, the beneficiaries may put forth their requirements like demand and feel the agent is obliged to meet them. The agent might strive harder to fulfill them either from fear or to look good in the eyes of the higher caste beneficiaries, leading to an overall positive effect. On the other hand, status characteristics theory (SCT) would suggest due to status hierarchy among the different castes, those of higher caste or status are also expected to be more competent. To avoid status loss (Cohen and Silver, 1989), a higher caste bricoleur will try to garner more resources (Bodemann, 1988), demonstrating efficiency, generating more welfare for their beneficiaries, and retaining a higher status. People with higher social status have a lot of privileges like power, authority, and control (Hofstede, 1980) and would strive hard not to lose their status (Pearce and Xu, 2012); hence the latter effect is likely to be more prominent than the former. I hypothesize that agents will mobilize more resources when they have a higher relative social status than their beneficiaries. i.e., The average welfare

102

generated by agents having higher caste than their beneficiaries will be more than that produced by agents having lower caste than their beneficiaries and may even be the same as the effect of CBH. I finally study how CBH affects the nature of transactions over time. I predict an initial increase in the number of beneficiaries to broaden networks with similar ethnicity. At the same time, there will be a deepening effect where the bricoleurs seek to deepen existing relationships by increasing the amount associated with the transactions. After some time, however, CBH has a decreasing effect on both these parameters.

I test the hypotheses in the context of an Indian social enterprise, the Digital Empowerment Foundation (DEF). DEF was created in 2002 to bring about a digital revolution to eradicate information poverty and social backwardness (Chapter 1 discusses the context in detail). DEF recruits and trains locally available individuals or bricoleurs, gives them digital equipment like laptops, mobile phones, photocopiers, etc., and encourages them to be entrepreneurial for self-sustenance. It does this to further its mission of eradicating poverty by disseminating information and disbursing monetary amounts from government welfare programs in marginalized communities through its entrepreneurial agents or bricoleurs. These bricoleurs need to make their fellow villagers aware of existing welfare programs, enroll them in suitable programs by submitting their applications in government-designated offices, and follow up until the welfare amount gets disbursed to the beneficiaries. The bricoleurs and their beneficiaries belong to seven backward districts in rural India, where the caste system is predominant. Analysis is done at two levels: (i) Dyadic level interaction data between the bricoleur and the potential beneficiary is available from 2017 to 2019 for 36 months, resulting in 207885 rows of transactions. I analyze the data based on the actors' demographic details, resulting in 91,273 observations where caste homophily exists and 111,173 observations where it does not (5,439 observations do not have caste information). (ii) I also analyze the data at the bricoleur level and have monthly observations for 345

unique bricoleurs spread across 36 months. The results of my analyses provide support to the hypotheses in general.

My study contributes to homophily and status literature by showing how ethnicity-based homophily and social status inherited through the caste system influence economic transactions and resource mobilization. My findings provide evidence of the caste system's considerable influence at various levels in the Indian context (Chen et al., 2015; Damaraju & Makhija, 2018) and enhance literature on ethnicity-based homophily (Freeman & Huang, 2015; Hegde & Tumlinson, 2014; Ruef, 2014). Given the importance of context in research on homophily (Ertug et al., 2022), the backdrop of a rural setting adds novelty to the context since most prior research has been done in an urban environment where evidence has not always supported the influence of CBH (Claes & Vissa, 2020). My research has managerial and policy level implications as well: I discuss how my research can aid the government and social enterprises appoint agents of a suitable caste, based on the region's demographic composition, for the success of their welfare programs.

The Caste System in India

The caste system is unique to India, and one of the theories on the origin of the caste system states that it started with '*Varnashrama*,' as mentioned in ancient Hindu philosophy ("Sanatana Dharma," 1916). The Hindu philosophy, with belief in rebirth, defines stages called *Varnas* or castes between multiple births and deaths, which the self should travel in different lives. The four main *varnas* denote service orientation (born as *Shudras*), wealth gaining and administration of accumulated possessions (born as *Vaishyas*), higher responsibility, working selflessly for the state (born as *Kshatriyas*), and counseling youngers through acquired knowledge (born as *Brahmanas*). It later got associated with a form of division of labor, dividing society into four 'varnas' or castes, viz. brahmins who were priests,

kshatriyas who were rulers, administrators and warriors, vaishyas who were in business, and shudras who were associated with labor. Another term associated with the caste system is 'jati,' which is different from 'varna' in that while there are four varnas, there are many more jatis.

While the caste system started in ancient India, it acquired tremendous rigidity during the medieval ages. The British used it as a division mechanism to give government jobs only to some castes (Nehru, 2004). The caste system led to the segmentation of society by birth or ethnicity, becoming an endogamous and hereditary subdivision of an ethnic unit with higher or lower social esteem than other subdivisions of the same ethnic unit (Velassery, 2005). The caste system in the form of jatis is not restricted to the main religion of Hinduism; it is also seen among Muslims, Christians, and tribal people (Ingold, 2002). At present, marginalized people in India are divided into Scheduled Caste (SC), Scheduled Tribes (ST), and Other Backward Caste (OBC). Marginalized Hindu communities can be grouped as SC; they are considered 'avarnas' who do not belong to the four varnas and are associated with sanitation, cleaning of excreta, disposal of dead bodies, and other such jobs. STs are classified as marginalized communities based on geographical isolation and need not be Hindus. Other historically marginalized communities that do not belong to SC or ST, are classified as OBC. All three communities continue to face oppression and social isolation, particularly in rural India, though the government has come up with many reservation policies for them.

Homophily, social status and their impact on performance

Homophily can happen based on several attributes like age, gender, education, prestige, social class, caste, creed, nationality, tenure, and occupation (Carley, 1991; Coleman, 1957, Ibarra, 1993, 1995; Laumann, 1966; Marsden, 1988, McPherson & Smith-Lovin, 1987). Some of these characteristics may be 'ascribed,' like race, gender and age,

while some are 'achieved,' like beliefs, preferences, and education (Ertug et al., 2022). "Homophily in race and ethnicity creates the strongest divides in our personal environments, with age, religion, education, occupation, and gender as other factors in approximately that order" (McPherson et al., 2001: 415). Homophily based on the caste system is a form of ethnicity-based homophily (Reddy, 2005; Velassery, 2005), where ethnicity, an ascribed characteristic, is "a subjectively felt sense of belonging based on the belief in shared culture and common ancestry" (Wimmer, 2008: 973).

Regional and caste-based homophily impacts socioeconomic actions (Bapuji et al., 2023; Chrispal et al., 2021), like deal evaluation, downside risk protection, and financial returns of entrepreneurs in India (Claes & Vissa, 2020). It also affects performance and decision-making at the top management level. It influences CEO selection (Damaraju & Makhija 2018), financial results forecasting and gaining access to material privileged information (Chen et al. 2015); composition of the board of directors in public firms (Bhagavatula et al. 2022), and decisions on mergers and acquisitions (Bhalla et al. 2022). The caste system is hierarchical and results in unequal power concentration among some groups due to social status differences (Arora & Sanditov, 2015; Bapuji & Chrispal, 2018; Chaudhry, 2013). Some studies on homophily suggest that the influence of status can outweigh the effects of homophily (Belliveau et al., 1996; Ertug et al., 2018; Pearce & Xu, 2012). This indicates a puzzle as to whose influence is higher: caste-based similarity or the differences in social status caused by the caste system and where? The following section explains the causal mechanisms of these competing forces and if one might override the other.

Theory and Hypotheses

Effect of caste-based similarity at the dyadic level

Similarity attraction theory (Byrne, 1971) says homophily reduces psychological

discomfort arising from cognitive or emotional inconsistency and potential conflict in a relationship (Heider, 1958; Sherif, 1958). Individuals tend to select other similar people as it facilitates ease of communication, predictability of behavior, trust, and reciprocity (Kanter, 1993; Lincoln & Miller, 1979). Homophily is known to spread the diffusion of new practices as people tend to adopt behaviors and habits of those who are similar (Peng & Mu, 2011; Wang & Soule, 2012). When new welfare programs aimed at poverty reduction are introduced, it is essential to spread awareness about such programs. Once people are made aware of the existence of such programs, they can be made to register for them. While social transactions can happen between agents and potential beneficiaries to spread awareness, an *economic transaction* leads to actual registration for a welfare program. The agents/bricoleurs deployed for this purpose find it easier to communicate and convince people from the same ethnic origin as themselves; coming from the same background, they understand these people's day-to-day challenges better and can find suitable welfare programs to recommend and enroll. The potential beneficiaries also tend to rely more on information from agents with similar ethnic backgrounds for mutual trust and understanding. They are likely to enroll in programs these agents or other people of similar caste suggest, leading to more enrolments due to caste-based similarity, leading to my first hypothesis:

> **Hypothesis (H1a).** *Caste-based similarity increases the likelihood of economic transactions*

Often bricoleurs are measured on the number of programs or beneficiaries they have registered rather than the welfare amount they can secure for their beneficiaries. Due to general awareness, it may be easier to register for popular programs of low or medium economic value rather than high-valued programs meant for specific communities. When a bricoleur is of the same caste as the beneficiary, the interest in finding more information about caste-specific welfare programs may be higher. Since the bricoleurs are more aware of

the challenges and life circumstances of people of the same caste, they can recommend

higher-value welfare programs rather than applying for low-value programs in more numbers.

The bricoleurs use this knowledge to conduct more relevant and appropriate applications,

minimizing the likelihood of rejected applications, leading to a higher value associated with

economic transactions. I derive the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis (H1b). *Caste-based similarity increases the value associated with the economic transactions*

Effect of relative social status at the dyadic level

How is this similar or different in cases of non-homophilous bricoleurs and agents? A

hierarchy exists among the castes in India (Ambedkar, 1918; Olcott, 1944). e.g., SC, ST, and

OBC are lower in the hierarchy than General or Minority (who may be people from religions

underrepresented in the Indian population like Muslims, Christians, and Sikhs). Even among

SC, ST, and OBC, hierarchy exists. OBCs are considered less marginalized than SCs, who

are less marginalized than STs (Arora & Sanditov, 2015; Bapuji & Chrispal, 2018). There are

two possibilities in the non-homophilous cases: the agents can be of a higher caste than their

beneficiaries and vice versa. Despite the financial incentives associated with enrolling

beneficiaries into welfare programs, the social interactions among non-homophilous agents

and beneficiaries leading to such outcomes may not be as spontaneous as in the case of CBH.

Due to caste stigma, caste hierarchy and associated social status (Mendonca et al.,

2024), when agents belong to a lower relative caste, they may feel a sense of apprehension in

meeting potential beneficiaries of a higher caste, who may not open up about their problems

or financial conditions. This can lead to few economic transactions, despite the lower-caste

bricoleurs' efforts for enrollment. If bricoleurs are of a higher caste, they may not even try to

go and meet people with a caste lower than themselves, again leading to fewer economic

transactions. Thus, in both the non-homophilous cases, the number of economic transactions is likely to be lower than if homophily exists, leading to the hypothesis:

Hypothesis (H2a). *Higher or lower relative status between agents and beneficiaries decreases the likelihood of economic transactions*

Several different forces come into play regarding the economic value involved with the transactions. The effect of homophily is influenced by social status (Belliveau et al., 1996; Ertug et al., 2018; Pearce & Xu, 2012; Zhang et al., 2016) and power distance (Hofstede, 1980), which indicates social acceptance of unequal power concentration among some groups. This phenomenon can occur, among many other reasons, due to caste hierarchy and the associated status difference (Farh et al., 2007; Chaudhry, 2013; Velassery, 2005). For example, just enrolling in a welfare program does not guarantee disbursement of the amount associated with the program. The application needs to be approved, after which the amount is paid. In some cases, the applications can get rejected due to a lack of proper documentation. The agents must be meticulous during the application process and persistent until the approval and disbursement processes get over. The caste system and its inherent hierarchy can play a significant role in the entire process; particularly, the difference in caste among the agent and beneficiary can influence the outcome.

Social dynamics theory (SDT) suggests people with lesser social standing are more likely to be submissive, loyal, obedient, and subservient to those in positions of power (Kirkman et al., 2009; Bochner & Hesketh, 1994; Sidanius et al., 2004). If the bricoleur belongs to a lower caste than the beneficiaries, the beneficiaries may express their demands and believe the agent is obligated to meet them. Because of fear or to appear good in the eyes of the higher caste beneficiaries, the agent may work more to fulfill them, resulting in an overall positive effect. However, the same bricoleur may behave differently if they belong to

a higher caste than the beneficiary, as suggested by status characteristics theory (SCT). Individuals belonging to a higher caste, hence higher status, are expected to be more competent than their lower caste peers. To retain their status in the eyes of the social community and avoid status loss (Cohen & Silver, 1989), an agent belonging to a higher caste relative to the beneficiary will try to garner more resources (Bodemann, 1988) and provide more welfare for their beneficiaries. The first force, suggested by SDT, would predict that if an agent has a lower relative social status (by virtue of having a lower caste than the beneficiary), they can generate more welfare. The competing force suggested by SCT would predict the other way round: i.e., if the same agent has higher relative social status (by virtue of having a higher caste than the beneficiary), they can generate more welfare.

The perception of having a higher social status impacts all kinds of relationships and has a pervasive impact (Daniels & Greguras, 2014). Social status matters to people, and as in other social contexts, behavior is often influenced by the desire to avoid status loss (Pearce & Xu, 2012). Someone already bestowed with higher social status will not want to lose it and will put in a lot of effort to ensure that the perception of being competent is retained. Thus, agents become more effective in garnering resources when they have a higher relative status than when they have a lower relative status and are trying to please higher-status beneficiaries. The outcome of higher relative status may be the same or surpass that of CBH. Thus I hypothesize:

> **Hypothesis (H2b).** *Higher relative status of agents than beneficiaries increases the value associated with the economic transactions compared to lower relative status*

Effect of caste-based similarity at the bricoleur level

How CBH affects the nature of transactions and their evolution over time can be an interesting phenomenon to study. Vissa (2012) found that networking behaviors used by bricoleurs to broaden (add more contacts) or deepen (manage existing contacts) ties are unique and often complementary. I study how CBH influences these efforts and their temporal sequencing and predict that both broadening and deepening actions will co-occur, having an initial positive impact on the number of beneficiaries as well as the welfare amount disbursed, followed by a negative effect. The tie-forming intention is a matching process; it is positively influenced by CBH (Vissa, 2011) since bricoleurs will want to set up ties with others who are socially similar, caste being one such social factor. The bricoleur will first form connections with people of the same caste. Due to strong affinity, they will further want to nurture these associations by spending more time on network deepening activities like registering them for more or higher valued welfare programs, following up with officials on the enrolled programs to get them approved, getting the welfare amount disbursed for their beneficiaries, leading to an increase in generated welfare amount. Since the market is not unlimited, people with similar caste will be exhausted after a while, leaving the bricoleur with unconnected people of a different caste and reducing tie formation. The scope for deepening the relations will also reduce gradually as applicable welfare programs get exhausted. Thus the effect of CBH on these activities will be initially positive and later negative, leading to my third and final hypothesis:

Hypothesis (H3a). *Caste-based similarity will initially increase and later decrease the broadening effect on number of beneficiaries for a bricoleur*

Hypothesis (H3b). *Caste-based similarity will initially increase and later decrease the deepening effect on generated welfare amount for a bricoleur*

Data, Sample and Econometric Models

I examine the hypotheses in the empirical setting of Digital Empowerment Foundation (DEF), which is the same as in the first essay. I had the opportunity to meet DEF's founder and conducted open-ended interviews with him and two other senior officials of DEF over two days, November 19-20, 2019, at DEF's headquarters in New Delhi, which lasted approximately 8 hours. The discussions helped me to understand the bricoleurs' day-to-day operations, business environment and certain principles followed by DEF. e.g. The bricoleurs cannot take any bribe to enable their beneficiaries to get economic benefits through the government welfare programs, a breach of which can lead to the termination of the bricoleurs. Such stringent measures often find villagers signing up with the DEF employed bricoleurs rather than government-designated agents, whose informal cost of bribery is generally high. This context allows me to control for bribery since sometimes it might so happen that agents are interested in disbursement simply because they can get a percentage of the amount. This can be further accentuated if the agent is of a higher caste where s/he can force the beneficiary to part with a certain amount due to prejudice and social fear. Bribery is a strict taboo for the DEF deployed bricoleurs, and hence one can safely conclude that the effect of bribery does not exist. A key tool in the project is an indigenously developed mobile application that aids the bricoleurs in data collection and entry while enabling DEF to monitor performance. It is a vast repository of applicant data, their demographics, and the status of their applications and is the source of data for this research. I do the analyses in two different levels. For hypotheses 1 and 2, the analysis is done at the dyadic interaction or transaction level and for hypothesis 3, the analysis is done at the level of the social bricoleur.

For testing Hypotheses 1 and 2, I have data for 2,07,885 rows of dyadic level interaction between the bricoleur and the potential beneficiary from Jan 2017 to Dec 2019 for

36 months. After removing 5,439 observations that do not have caste information, the dataset comprises 2,02,446 observations. It includes their demographic details like location (district), gender, religion, and the caste of both bricoleur and beneficiary, as well as the qualification, age, occupation, marital status, disability, sickness, whether s/he belongs to any vulnerable group, annual income for the beneficiaries, and the date of transaction. Based on the actors' demographic details, there are 91,273 observations where caste homophily exists and 1,11,173 observations where it does not. The bricoleurs belong to four main castes: General, OBC, SC, and ST. The beneficiaries have the following castes: Any, Backward Caste (BC), Dalit Tribes, Denotified Nomadic Tribes, Denotified Tribes, General, Minority, Most Backward Class (MBC), Nomadic Tribes (NT), Special Backward Classes (SBC) over and above SC, ST and OBC. Bricoleurs are Hindu, Muslim, and Christians by religion, other religions for the beneficiaries are Buddhism, Jainism, and Sikhism. The information on religion is essential since CBH occurs when both religion and caste are the same (Pandey & Varkkey, 2020). E.g., a bricoleur and their beneficiary belonging to a GENERAL or MINORITY or OBC caste will have CBH when both belong to the same religion since these caste categories can belong to more than one religion. Due to the predominance of Hinduism (1,60,963 out of 2,07,885 or 77% interactions) and the age-old prevalence of the caste system within the religion, I test my hypotheses on the full sample and a religion based subsample comprising only Hindu bricoleurs. To test hypotheses 1 and 2, I use dyadic level interaction data and probit and OLS regressions.

For the third hypothesis, my data is rolled up at the level of the bricoleur andpertains to monthly observations for 345 unique bricoleurs in seven districts or regions (68 from Alwar, 37 from Barabanki, 13 from Bargarh, 40 from Barmer, 84 from Guna, 64 from Ranchi, and 39 from West Champaran). There are 4,396 bricoleur-month observations in my final sample. My panel dataset is not a balanced sample. There are two key reasons for this:

(i) sample bricoleurs' data is missing for several months; (ii) numerous bricoleurs did not complete the entire 36-month period; some bricoleurs joined later, and others left earlier. For testing hypothesis 3, monthly measures of the number of beneficiaries and welfare amount generated become my dependent variables, and I use Poisson and OLS regressions, respectively.

Measures of Variables

Dependent variables: I use four dependent variables for testing my hypotheses. ***Economic transaction*** is a binary variable indicating whether the transaction led to the economic output of registering for a welfare scheme. It has a value of 1 if there is an occurrence of any scheme registration and 0 if not. ***Economic value*** is the welfare money associated with every transaction and calculated from the welfare program that the beneficiary enrolled for in that transaction. It is considered if the application status is approved. In some cases where the programs may not directly relate to money, it includes the monetary value saved by beneficiaries in not having to travel to block offices and lose their daily wage. The values are log-transformed (i.e., $\ln^{X+1}$) to take account of outliers (Fafchamps & Owens, 2009; Lall & Park, 2020; Suárez & Gugerty, 2016). ***Number of beneficiaries*** is the number of unique beneficiaries registered or transacted with by each bricoleur per month. ***Welfare amount*** is the monetary amount of welfare facilitated by each bricoleur per month to the beneficiaries. These values are log-transformed as well.

Independent Variables: I have two variables to measure the caste-based homophily at the dyadic and bricoleur levels. At the dyadic level, ***Same caste dyad*** is a binary variable indicating whether the transaction happened between two individuals (bricoleur and beneficiary) with the same caste and same religion or not. It has a value of 1 if the caste and religion are the same and 0 if they are not. At the bricoleur level, proportion of same caste

interaction (***PSCI)*** is measured as the ratio of interactions belonging to the same caste and religion combination divided by the total interactions made by the bricoleur in one time period (month). It is log-transformed in my regressions. At this level, I also use the square of PSCI after log transformation (***PSCISQ***) for testing the quadratic relation between caste-based homophily and the dependent variables. For testing non-linear relationships, log transforming only the dependent variable may not yield correct results (Chauradia & Somaya, 2015); hence I use a log-log model.

For testing the effect of non-homophily, the independent variable of interest is whether the bricoleur's caste-based relative social status is higher, the same, or lower than the beneficiaries. I create three binary variables to capture all possible relationships. They are ***Lower caste bricoleur***, ***Same caste bricoleur*** and ***Higher caste bricoleur***. To avoid the dummy variable trap and the associated multi-collinearity (Gujarati, 2004), I include ***Lower caste bricoleur*** and ***Higher caste bricoleur*** in my regression models, with ***Same caste bricoleur*** becoming the base or the comparison point. For this, I use the caste hierarchy in Table 4.1 created based on the reservation status of government jobs/colleges and information available in relevant articles of the Indian constitution about special provisions relating to certain classes and directive principles of state policy.

Insert Table 4.1 about here

For example, if the bricoleur's caste category is general, ***Lower caste bricoleur*** will not be 1 in any scenario; ***Same caste bricoleur*** will be one if the beneficiary belongs to the general caste and ***Higher caste bricoleur*** will be equal to one in all other cases. Suppose the bricoleur is a scheduled tribe (ST); ***Lower caste bricoleur*** will have a value of 1 if the beneficiary belongs to general, minority, Other Backward Class, Backward Class, Most Backward Class

or Scheduled Caste; *Same caste bricoleur* will have a value of one if the beneficiary also belongs to ST, and *Higher caste bricoleur* will have a value of one if the beneficiary belongs to Denotified Tribes, Nomadic Tribes, Denotified Nomadic Tribes, or Dalit Tribe, which have a lower status than ST in the Indian caste system. In other cases, the values of the variables will be zero.

It is seen that the number of castes of bricoleurs is less than the castes of the beneficiaries. This is because all castes may not have the equal probability of being chosen as a bricoleur due to information asymmetry and selection bias. First the bricoleurs have to apply, it is possible that some of the lowest caste villagers (who may not have access to the general community due to age old taboo) may not be aware. If there is interest expressed from multiple castes, DEF may select a person belonging to a specific caste that has more representation in that particular locality for ease of functioning of the bricoleur. E.g. we see the *Dalit tribes*, *Denotified tribes* or *Nomadic tribes* are not present among the bricoleurs at all. They are very small in number and do not find a representation among the bricoleurs for the above reasons.

Control Variables: I consider the following control variables in my analyses. Since the caste system leads to different power concentrations (Arora & Sanditov, 2015; Bapuji & Chrispal, 2020; Chaudhry, 2013), I control for the caste category of the bricoleurs. I include five categorical variables indicating whether the bricoleur belongs to *ST*, *SC*, *OBC*, *Minority,* or *General* caste categories. The ST category is the baseline. I control for *Same gender dyad* and *Same religion dyad.* For testing Hypotheses 1 and 2, I measure them as a binary variable indicating whether the transaction happened between the bricoleur and beneficiary of the same gender and same religion, respectively. It has a value of 1 if the gender and religion are the same and 0 if they are not. At the bricoleur level, I measure them as the ratio of interactions belonging to the same gender and religion divided by the total interactions made

by the bricoleur in one time period (month), respectively. I also control for details like *Beneficiary age*, *Annual income*, *Beneficiary gender*, *Marital status,* and *Employment status* of the beneficiary. The government can have special welfare programs for people with disability, sicknesses, or those who are vulnerable and may face societal stigma. I control for them by using the following variables: *Disability*, a binary variable with a value of 1 if the person suffers from physical and/or mental disabilities and 0 if not; *Sickness*, a binary variable with a value of 1 if the person suffers from diseases like AIDs, cancer, leprosy or others and 0 if not; *Vulnerability,* a binary variable with a value of 1 if the person is vulnerable due to conditions like dwarfism, being deserted by family, affected due to natural calamity, working as scavengers or physically incapable due to pregnancy, and 0 if not. I control for *Bricoleur age* and *Bricoleur gender; district fixed effects* to take care of time-invariant unobserved variations across districts*; year and month fixed effects* to take account of the contemporaneous correlation (Certo & Semadeni, 2006). As a robustness check, while testing Hypothesis 3, I run separate models controlling for individual fixed effects instead of the district fixed effects that take account of all time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity at the individual bricoleur level.

Regression Analyses

I run probit and OLS regressions to test my hypotheses (H1a and H1b) on the effect of CBH on the number of economic transactions and the associated values. I employ probit regressions for the binary dependent variable Economic transaction and OLS regressions for the continuous dependent variable Economic value. I use *Same caste dyad* as the independent variable.

H1a: *Economic transaction = β_0 + β_1* Same caste dyad + Control variables + ε*

H1b: *Economic value = β_0 + β_1* Same caste dyad + Control variables + ε*

To investigate the effect of relative social status on the above dependent variables (Hypotheses H2a and H2b), I use Lower caste bricoleur and Higher caste bricoleur as my independent variables, after removing the 7809 undetermined cases where although the castes are the same, bricoleurs and beneficiaries belong to different religions.

H2a: *Economic transaction = β_0 + β_1* Lower caste bricoleur + β_2* Higher caste bricoleur + Control variables + ε*

H2b: *Economic value = β_0 + β_1* Lower caste bricoleur + β_2* Higher caste bricoleur + Control variables + ε*

To test the effect of homophily on the nature of transactions (Hypotheses H3a and H3b), I run Poisson regression on the count variable Number of beneficiaries and OLS regression on the continuous variable Welfare amount, using PSCI and PSCISQ as my independent variables.

H3a: *Number of beneficiaries = β_0 + β_1* PSCI + β_2*PSCISQ + Control variables + ε*

H3b: *Welfare amount = β_0 + β_1* PSCI + β_2* PSCISQ + Control variables + ε*

Robustness checks/additional tests

I use Huber-White (robust) standard errors in all my regression models to account for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. The VIFs are at a reasonable level below 10, indicating collinearity is not of concern. The Hausman-Durbin test is used to determine endogeneity (Nakamura & Nakamura, 1981). The null hypothesis for the test is that endogeneity among regressors does not affect OLS regression estimators. I test the alternative hypothesis using two-stage least squares regression with instrumental variables of **Education level of beneficiary** and **District literacy level**; I find no evidence to reject the null hypothesis (results not shown). As a robustness check, I run my analyses on the entire sample and a religion based subsample where the bricoleurs belong to the Hindu religion, characterized by a deeply embedded caste system. Due to biased results that might occur due to using

proportions as independent variables, I separate them into constituent components and include them as predictors in the model (Wiseman, 2009); the coefficients' nature does not change (results not shown). For testing Hypotheses 3a and 3b, I run the regressions controlling for district fixed effects and individual fixed effects in separate models. As a confirmatory test, I run the *utest* command in Stata to test the overall presence of an inverse U shape.

Results

Table 4.2a shows the descriptive statistics and correlations of all variables used in the regression analyses except for the categorical variables for relative social status and caste category at the dyadic level. About 41% of the interactions result in economic transactions. Interaction among dyads with similar caste and religion exists in 45% of the cases, similar gender in 55% of cases, and similar religion in about 86%. Around 12% of the bricoleurs are ST, 16% are SC, 57% are OBC, less than 1% is a minority, and 14% belong to the general caste. The bricoleurs have a higher caste-based status than beneficiaries in 32% of interactions, the same status in 45%, and lower status in 18% of cases. The status is undetermined in around 5% of the interactions; although the caste of the bricoleurs and beneficiaries are the same, their religion is different. Table 4.2b shows the descriptive statistics and correlations of all variables used in the regression analyses at the bricoleur level. On average, a bricoleur interacts with 41 beneficiaries per month, where about 32% have CBH, 56% have gender homophily, and 84% have religion homophily.

Insert Tables 4.2a and 4.2b about here

Table 4.3 shows the effects of CBH on the likelihood of economic transactions and the values associated with such transactions. Hypotheses 1a and 1b had predicted that caste-

based similarity increases the likelihood and the value of economic transactions. Models 1

and 2 show that the coefficient of *Same caste dyad* is significant and positive for both

likelihood (p < 0.001, β = 0.0506) and the value (p < 0.001, β = 0.494), respectively. This

finding reveals that the presence of CBH results in a 1.6% increase in the chance of an

economic transaction (i.e., using the delta approach in Stata) and a 64 percent (=$e^{0.494}$ -1)

increase in the absolute value. These findings support hypotheses 1a and 1b in general.

Results of the analysis done on a s subsample comprising Hindu bricoleurs also support the

hypotheses (p < 0.001). Within the Hindu community, with the presence of CBH, there is a

2.6% increase in the chance of an economic transaction and a 63 percent (=$e^{0.486}$ -1) increase

in the value.

Insert Table 4.3 about here

Table 4.4 shows the effect of relative social status on the dependent variables of

Economic transaction and Economic value. Hypothesis 2a predicted the likelihood of

economic transactions would be less when the relative social status of the bricoleurs is higher

or lower than their beneficiaries. In Models 1 to 5, in Table 4.4, same caste bricoleur is the

baseline. The results are marginally significant and negative (p < 0.1, β = - 0.0183) when

bricoleurs belong to a lower caste than their beneficiaries and significant and negative (p <

0.001, β = -0.0784) when the bricoleurs belong to a higher caste. This indicates a 0.59% less

chance of an economic transaction happening when the social status is lower than if the

bricoleur is of same caste/social status. When the bricoleur is of a higher caste, there is about

2.5% lesser chance of an economic transaction happening than if the bricoleur is of the same

caste as the beneficiary. These results provide support for Hypothesis 2a. The results of the

subsample of the Hindu population (Model 3) are more substantial (p < 0.001), indicating

about 4% decrease in the likelihood of economic transaction when bricoleurs belong to a

lower caste than their beneficiaries and around 2.33% decrease when the bricoleurs belong to a higher caste than when they belong to the same caste. The likelihood of economic transactions is highest in the same caste bricoleurs as was also seen in case of H1a. These results support Hypothesis 2a, further indicating that the impact of relative social status is more substantial within the Hindu community, where the caste system is also more embedded than in other religions.

Hypothesis 2b had suggested bricoleurs with higher relative social status generate more welfare than those with lower relative social status. In Model 2 (Table 4.4), which is based on the entire dataset and the baseline is same caste bricoleurs, the coefficients for both higher and lower caste bricoleurs are negative and significant. For higher caste ($p < 0.001$, $\beta = -0.479$), the difference is lesser than that of lower caste ($p < 0.001$, $\beta = -0.527$). In the subsample of the Hindu population (Model 4), the difference widens where the coefficients are ($p < 0.001$, $\beta = -0.413$) for higher caste and ($p < 0.001$, $\beta = -0.586$) for lower caste. These results support Hypothesis 2b. When the regressions are run on the non log-transformed value as the dependent variable (Model 5), the amount is seen to ne negative and significant ($p < 0.001$, $\beta = -20175.26$) for lower caste bricoleurs but not significant for higher caste bricoleurs. These results further support hypothesis 2b, showing that relative social status impacts welfare generation with bricoleurs with higher relative social status commanding more resources than those with lower relative status, and the effect is almost the same as that of homophily. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show the graphical representation of the findings.

Insert Table 4.4 and Figures 4.1, 4.2 about here

Table 4.5 shows how CBH influences the nature of interactions over time. Hypotheses 3a and 3b had predicted CBH to have an initial increasing influence followed by a decreasing

effect on the number of beneficiaries (Models 1, 3) and the generated welfare amount (Models 2, 4). The coefficient of PSCI in Model 1 is positive and significant ($p < 0.001$, $\beta = 3.587$), and that of PSCISQ is negative and significant ($p < 0.001$, $\beta = -5.407$), suggesting the possibility of an inverted U relationship between CBH and Number of beneficiaries. The turning point is 0.33 (within an interval of 0.32 and 0.35, as determined by OLS regression and subsequent utest command in Stata), well within the X range of 0 and 0.69, further supporting the presence of an inverted U-curve (Haans et al., 2015). The coefficients of PSCI and PSCISQ in Model 2 ($p < 0.001$, $\beta = 14.03$ and $p < 0.001$, $\beta = -18.99$ respectively), a turning point of 0.37 indicate an inverted U relationship between CBH and Welfare amount as well. Models 3 and 4, run on the subsample, indicate similar results. Table 4.6 shows the same analysis with individual fixed effects instead of district fixed effects for robustness check. These results also support my hypotheses. CBH has an initial increasing return on the number of beneficiaries (indicative of network widening effect) and welfare amount (indicative of network deepening effect), followed by diminishing returns. The number of beneficiaries peaks when around 30% of beneficiaries have caste-based homophily, and the welfare amount peaks at around 37%. After that, any increase in the proportion of participants with CBH reduces the returns. As a robustness, I also test these hypotheses with **_Welfare amount per beneficiary_** as the dependent variable. The results hold, showing CBH's inverted U relationship on deepening effect on welfare generated per beneficiary and are shown in Table 4.7.

Insert Tables 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7 about here

Discussion

The purpose of this study was to examine (1) how CBH affects the dyadic interactions between bricoleurs and their beneficiaries, (2) how performance varies amongst non-ethnic groups due to relative social status inherited from the caste system, and (3) how the transactions over time influence network broadening and deepening bricoleurial behavior. I found that the probability of having transactions that can lead to potential welfare generation and the value associated with the transactions between the bricoleur and beneficiary of a similar caste is higher. When the castes of the two parties are different, then the probability of such transactions is lower, as expected. However, suppose the bricoleur has a higher social status than the beneficiary (by having a higher caste); then the welfare value generated is almost the same as CBH and is significantly greater than the amount generated by the same bricoleurs serving beneficiaries of a higher caste.

My first hypothesis is a baseline hypothesis that tests whether homophily is better than non-homophily and the data supports my hypothesis that indeed non-homophily is worse than homophily. In my second hypothesis, I get into a more nuanced examination of non homophily by bringing in the construct of relative social status, which can have two conditions: (i) when bricoleur's caste (hence relative social status) is higher than beneficiary's and (ii) when it is lower. Since the comparison is done with the baseline as caste based homophily (i.e. bricoleur and beneficiary having the same caste), both coefficients are negative (as Hypothesis 1 shows that caste based homophily condition is the best). Within non-homophily, the first condition when the bricoleur's caster (hence relative social status) is higher than the beneficiary's is seen to be better than the second case when it is lower, with the former's coefficient being less negative than the latter's. The theoretical explanation is given by status characteristics theory (SCT) which suggests: to retain their status in the eyes of the social community and avoid status loss (Cohen & Silver, 1989), a

123

bricoleur belonging to a higher caste relative to the beneficiary will try to garner more resources (Bodemann, 1988) and provide more welfare for their beneficiaries.

I also found evidence of CBH positively impacting bricoleurs seeking to broaden networks with similar ethnicity and deepen networks by strengthening existing relationships simultaneously. This impact on both breadth and depth of networks can lead to the possibility of the initial exclusion of beneficiaries of a different caste. After some time, however, CBH started having a diminishing influence on these effects. These findings can influence socio-economic policies aimed at poverty reduction.

Poverty, inequality and caste-based homophily

Disparities in people's access to resources and opportunities cause poverty (Amis et al., 2021). This inequality is frequently caused by the presence or absence of specific socially identifiable characteristics based on race, ethnicity, or other demographic differences (Amis et al., 2020; Markus, 2017), leading to homophily or lack of it. Homophily can reinforce differences among individuals and put minority groups at a disadvantage. It can impede access to information, job opportunities, and innovation adoption, leading to social inequality (DiMaggio & Garip, 2011; Karimi et al., 2018; Rostila, 2010; Roth, 2004; Takacs et al., 2018; Zaharieva, 2018; Zeltzer, 2020). Valuable insights can be obtained by studying micro-foundations of inequality and inherent power structures institutionalized as accepted norms (Amis et al., 2017).

The caste system in India is an institutional reality, affecting its entire 1.39 billion population, accounting for more than 17 percent of the world's total population. In urban India, the effect of the caste system may be attenuated under the garb of education and modernization. However, its impact in rural India remains unabated. While the reservation policy intended to uplift the discriminated and marginalized sections of society, its

unintended consequence has been to increase the divide (Bapuji & Chrispal, 2018; Hoff 2016; Munshi, 2017). To the best of my knowledge, my study is the first to show how the endemic caste system can be used as an enabler to improve the efficacy of poverty reduction in rural India. The rural setting and interactions among people in lower economic strata offer uniqueness to the context, exhibiting CBH's influence in that environment, whereas prior studies were conducted in an urban setting in India (Chen et al., 2015; Claes & Vissa, 2020; Damaraju & Makhija, 2018). It also adds to the literature on ethnicity-based homophily (Freeman & Huang, 2015; Hegde & Tumlinson, 2014; Ruef, 2014) and homophily and status (Belliveau et al., 1996; Ertug et al., 2018; Pearce & Xu, 2012) primarily conducted in developed economies.

Policy implications

Well-designed policies may not have the intended impact if they fail in execution. The government mechanisms must ensure that the money reaches the people who need it the most and does not trickle away to already fertile grounds amid corruption and other inefficiencies. My research shows CBH is beneficial in such cases in terms of spreading information and resource mobilization, both of which are the highest in the presence of CBH. However, it may not be feasible to ensure CBH always as ethnic diversity is also a reality. In such cases, it is better to have agents of a status higher than potential beneficiaries as that ensures better resource deployment. An implicit way of having higher status is through a higher relative caste. My research has managerial and policy implications by assisting the government and social enterprises in appointing agents of a suitable ethnicity, based on the region's demographic composition, for the success of their projects.

Conclusion and Limitations

There are a few limitations of the study: the data is from northern and central India states, and the southern states are not adequately represented. There may be differences among different regions, which can be undertaken as a future study. The sample pertains to just one organization, and the research can be supplemented by looking at data from other poverty reduction programs. The present context has a high-power distance culture. Whether comparable results prevail in a low power-distance context can be an interesting question to investigate. The research can be further extended by experimentally appointing agents of different caste-based relative social statuses and then measuring the difference in performance before and after such interventions between treatment and control groups. Homophily has a mirror-image phenomenon called heterophily, or the love of dissimilar people, which demands more inquiry. It may be possible to extend my research on non-homophily to how interaction among interethnic people influences the diffusion of practices.

Governments of emerging countries like India spend billions of dollars on welfare programs. A few key challenges faced in such implementation are lack of information and the inability to mobilize resources due to disparity (Banerjee & Duflo, 2013). The world may have grown flatter with the existence of multi-ethnic teams; however, individuals still find themselves amidst social interactions that connote inequality (Markus & Conner, 2014). My study finds an indigenous lever to help tackle one such form of inequality and can have a modest but enduring impact on global poverty reduction.

Table 4.1. Table 4.1. Relative social status of bricoleurs and beneficiaries based on caste

Bricoleur	Beneficiary	Lower caste bricoleur	Same caste bricoleur	Higher caste bricoleur
General	General	0	1	0
General	Minority	0	0	1
General	OBC	0	0	1
General	Backward Class (BC)	0	0	1
General	Most Backward Class (MBC)	0	0	1
General	SC	0	0	1
General	ST	0	0	1
General	Denotified Tribes (DT)	0	0	1
General	Nomadic Tribes (NT)	0	0	1
General	Denotified Nomadic Tribes (DNT)	0	0	1
General	Dalit Tribe (DT)	0	0	1
Minority	General	1	0	0
Minority	Minority	0	1	0
Minority	OBC	0	0	1
Minority	Backward Class (BC)	0	0	1
Minority	Most Backward Class (MBC)	0	0	1
Minority	SC	0	0	1
Minority	ST	0	0	1
Minority	Denotified Tribes (DT)	0	0	1
Minority	Nomadic Tribes (NT)	0	0	1
Minority	Denotified Nomadic Tribes (DNT)	0	0	1
Minority	Dalit Tribe (DT)	0	0	1
OBC	General	1	0	0
OBC	Minority	1	0	0
OBC	OBC	0	1	0
OBC	Backward Class (BC)	0	0	1
OBC	Most Backward Class (MBC)	0	0	1
OBC	SC	0	0	1
OBC	ST	0	0	1
OBC	Denotified Tribes (DT)	0	0	1
OBC	Nomadic Tribes (NT)	0	0	1
OBC	Denotified Nomadic Tribes (DNT)	0	0	1
OBC	Dalit Tribe (DT)	0	0	1
SC	General	1	0	0
SC	Minority	1	0	0
SC	OBC	1	0	0
SC	Backward Class (BC)	1	0	0
SC	Most Backward Class (MBC)	1	0	0
SC	SC	0	1	0
SC	ST	0	0	1
SC	Denotified Tribes (DT)	0	0	1
SC	Nomadic Tribes (NT)	0	0	1
SC	Denotified Nomadic Tribes (DNT)	0	0	1
SC	Dalit Tribe (DT)	0	0	1
ST	General	1	0	0
ST	Minority	1	0	0
ST	OBC	1	0	0
ST	Backward Class (BC)	1	0	0
ST	Most Backward Class (MBC)	1	0	0
ST	SC	1	0	0
ST	ST	0	1	0
ST	Denotified Tribes (DT)	0	0	1
ST	Nomadic Tribes (NT)	0	0	1
ST	Denotified Nomadic Tribes (DNT)	0	0	1
ST	Dalit Tribe (DT)	0	0	1

Table 4.2a. Descriptive statistics and **c**orrelation among variables at the dyadic level

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
(1) Economic transaction	0.412485	0.492283													
(2) Economic value	6.760108	3.648506													
(3) Same caste dyad	0.450851	0.49758	-0.017												
(4) Gender homophily	0.553269	0.497156	-0.027	0.0181											
(5) Religion homophily	0.862136	0.344758	0.081	0.2926	0.0181										
(6) Beneficiary age	32.49734	45.23322	-0.013	0.088	0.0359	0.0131									
(7) Annual income	7.16E+07	1.17E+10	0.006	-0.007	-0.009	0.0025	-0.000								
(8) Marital status	0.635083	0.481408	-0.07	0.0789	0.0275	-0.014	0.5105	-0.001							
(9) Employment status	0.09774	0.296963	-0.042	0.1229	0.0416	0.0131	0.0877	0.0131	0.1139						
(10) Beneficiary gender (F)	0.477248	0.499483	-0.023	-0.025	-0.065	-0.044	-0.054	0.0085	-0.02	-0.075					
(11) Vulnerability	0.025553	0.157796	-0.012	0.0034	-0.027	0.0147	-0.008	-0.001	0.0492	0.0043	0.0587				
(12) Disability	0.008783	0.093303	-0.032	0.0155	0.001	-0.005	0.015	-0.000	0.0006	0.0012	-0.018	0.0464			
(13) Sickness	0.106009	0.307849	-0.077	0.0063	0.0684	0.0837	0.0674	-0.003	0.03	-0.098	-0.067	0.0258	0.0567		
(14) Bricoleur age	28.55282	6.524725	-0.035	-0.070	0.0234	0.0282	-0.002	0.005	0.0133	-0.069	-0.008	0.0053	-0.013	0.2046	
(15) Bricoleur gender(F)	0.50985	0.499904	-0.035	-0.012	-0.063	0.0058	-0.078	-0.007	-0.052	-0.042	0.1359	-0.056	-0.027	-0.208	-0.108

n = 202446 dyadic interactions
Note. Variables for relative social status and caste category are not included

Table 4.2b. Descriptive statistics and **c**orrelation among variables at the bricoleur level

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
(1) Number of beneficiaries	41.03321	52.79309					
(2) Welfare amount	6.82401	5.733226	0.3474				
(3) PSCI	0.322698	0.256486	0.0006	0.0873			
(4) PSCISQ	0.169904	0.177199	-0.0538	0.0263	0.9649		
(5) Gender homophily	0.564277	0.234504	-0.0259	-0.0124	0.0135	0.0239	
(6) Religion homophily	0.84241	0.277116	0.0213	0.0823	0.4376	0.4137	0.0355

n = 4396 bricoleur months

Table 4.3. Effects of caste based homophily on Economic transaction and Economic value

Variables	Full sample		Subsample	
	Model 1 Economic transaction	Model 2 Economic value	Model 3 Economic transaction	Model 4 Economic value
Same caste dyad	0.0506***	0.494***	0.0813***	0.486***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
SC	-0.0558***	-0.919***	0.0756***	-1.121***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
OBC	0.0260*	-0.713***	0.211***	-0.839***
	(0.028)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Minority	0.0298	4.036***	-	-
	(0.525)	(0.000)		
General	0.495***	2.234***	0.664***	2.131***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Gender homophily	0.0188**	-0.190***	0.0199**	-0.216***
	(0.003)	(0.000)	(0.004)	(0.000)
Religion homophily	0.0449***	-0.0134	-0.0469**	-0.393***
	(0.000)	(0.770)	(0.002)	(0.000)
Beneficiary age	0.00294***	0.00949***	0.00305***	0.0114***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Annual income	-3.27e-13+	3.21e-12	-2.99e-13	3.03e-12+
	(0.082)	(0.075)	(0.119)	(0.091)
Marital status	0.220***	-0.298***	0.201***	-0.338***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Employment status	-0.172***	-0.333***	-0.246***	-0.446***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Beneficiary gender (F)	0.000616	-0.0560*	-0.00264	-0.0327
	(0.923)	(0.019)	(0.700)	(0.199)
Vulnerability	-0.192***	0.247**	-0.213***	0.240**
	(0.000)	(0.006)	(0.000)	(0.009)
Disability	-0.244***	-0.993***	-0.269***	-1.123***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Sickness	0.258***	-1.323***	0.267***	-1.523***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Bricoleur age	0.0115***	-0.0532***	0.0114***	-0.0574***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Bricoleur gender (F)	-0.215***	-0.456***	-0.275***	-0.659***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year and Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	-1.356***	8.826***	-1.247***	9.325***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Sample size	192391	79813	164362	71243
R^2 (or Pseudo $R^{2)}$)	0.1632	0.173	0.1669	0.177
Log Likelihood	-130551.6	-216785.6	-112466.9	-194004.7

All tests are two tailed. p-values in parentheses. SE values available on request.
+$p < 0.1$, *$p < 0.05$, **$p < 0.01$, ***$p < 0.001$

Table 4.4. Effects of relative social status on Economic transaction and Economic value

Variables	Full sample			Subsample	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
					Economic
	Economic	Economic	Economic	Economic	value (non
	transaction	value	transaction	value	transformed)
Low caste bricoleur	-0.0183+	-0.527***	-0.120***	-0.586***	-20175.3***
	(0.061)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Higher caste bricoleur	-0.0784***	-0.479***	-0.0706***	-0.413**	-1064.5
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.366)
SC	-0.0141	-0.996***	0.123***	-1.099***	3640.7
	(0.327)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.222)
OBC	0.0656***	-0.854***	0.187***	-0.835***	-72249.0***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Minority	0.108*	3.793***	-		
	(0.024)	(0.000)			
General	0.548***	2.097***	0.632***	2.072***	88100.8***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Gender homophily	0.0130*	-0.188***	0.0181*	-0.202***	-10305.9***
	(0.043)	(0.000)	(0.010)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Religion homophily	0.0983***	-0.189***			
	(0.000)	(0.000)			
Beneficiary age	0.00296***	0.00934***	0.00284***	0.0122***	-198.3***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Annual income	-3.25e-13+	3.18e-12+	-2.94e-13	3.04e-12+	0.00000025*
	(0.086)	(0.075)	(0.126)	(0.088)	(0.021)
Marital status	0.215***	-0.327***	0.199***	-0.382***	-31143.8***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Employment status	-0.178***	-0.373***	-0.243***	-0.469***	-7937.6***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Beneficiary gender [F]	0.00102	-0.0682**	-0.00890	-0.0333	-9687.6***
	(0.874)	(0.005)	(0.209)	(0.203)	(0.000)
Vulnerability	-0.178***	0.248**	-0.205***	0.215*	-10258.8**
	(0.000)	(0.006)	(0.000)	(0.026)	(0.001)
Disability	-0.244***	-0.953***	-0.286***	-1.094***	-13552.7*
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.014)
Sickness	0.259***	-1.367***	0.278***	-1.527***	-64900.9***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Bricoleur age	0.0117***	-0.0571***	0.0124***	-0.060***	-6317.0***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Bricoleur gender [F]	-0.219***	-0.521***	-0.273***	-0.676***	-72875.9***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year and Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	-1.415***	9.820***	-1.233***	9.700***	342296.3***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Sample size	184974	77817	151128	67561	67561
R^2 (or Pseudo R^2)	0.1578	0.175	0.1565	0.176	0.268
Log Likelihood	-125877.4	-211552.6	-103904.8	-184094.4	-905058.2

All tests are two tailed. p-values in parentheses. SE values available on request.

+p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001

**Table 4.5.** Effects of caste based homophily on Number of beneficiaries and Welfare amount with District FE

Variables	Full sample		Subsample	
	Model 1 Num of beneficiaries	Model 2 Welfare amount	Model 3 Num of beneficiaries	Model 4 Welfare amount
PSCI	3.587***	14.03***	3.829***	15.66***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
PSCISQ	-5.407***	-18.99***	-5.580***	-20.98***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Gender homophily	-0.0935	-0.124	0.00917	0.100
	(0.170)	(0.698)	(0.901)	(0.774)
Religion homophily	-0.200**	-0.881**	-0.330***	-1.348***
	(0.008)	(0.003)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Bricoleur age	0.00447	0.0606***	0.00269	0.0825***
	(0.129)	(0.000)	(0.408)	(0.000)
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year and Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	2.591***	4.285***	2.521***	3.475***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Sample size	4362	4362	3643	3643
R^2 (or Pseudo R^2)	0.166	0.274	0.1748	0.295
Log Likelihood	-116149.3	-13801.2	-97142.8	-11589.5

All tests are two tailed. p-values in parentheses. SE values available on request.

$+p < 0.1$, $*p < 0.05$, $**p < 0.01$, $***p < 0.001$

Table 4.6. Effects of caste based homophily on Number of beneficiaries and Welfare amount with Individual FE

Variables	Full sample		Subsample	
	Model 1 Num of beneficiaries	Model 2 Welfare amount	Model 3 Num of beneficiaries	Model 4 Welfare amount
PSCI	3.827***	8.291***	4.101***	9.083***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
PSCISQ	-5.324***	-10.60***	-5.590***	-11.23***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Gender homophily	-0.0781	-0.141	-0.0423	-0.209
	(0.426)	(0.652)	(0.663)	(0.563)
Religion homophily	-0.525***	-0.268	-0.623***	-0.974*
	(0.000)	(0.578)	(0.000)	(0.046)
Num of beneficiaries		0.0216***		0.0213***
		(0.000)		(0.000)
Individual FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year and Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant		6.030***		6.521***
		(0.000)		(0.000)
Sample size	4346	4362	3629	3643
R2 (or Pseudo R2)		0.129		0.142
Log Likelihood	-66552.1	-11728.3	-55195.1	-9747

All tests are two tailed. p-values in parentheses. SE values available on request.
+$p < 0.1$, *$p < 0.05$, **$p < 0.01$, ***$p < 0.001$

Table 4.7. Effects of caste based homophily on Welfare amount per beneficiary

Variables	District FE		Individual FE	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	Entire sample	Sub-sample	Entire sample	Sub-sample
PSCI	9.056***	15.66***	4.557***	4.972***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
PSCISQ	-11.80***	-20.98***	-5.411***	-5.632***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Gender homophily	0.0373	0.100	-0.0313	-0.0513
	(0.883)	(0.774)	(0.901)	(0.860)
Religion homophily	-0.674**	-1.348***	-0.190	-0.693
	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.619)	(0.066)
Num of beneficiaries	0.0166***	0.0355***	0.00705***	0.00694***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Year and Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	3.126***	3.475***	4.789***	5.301***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Sample size	4362	3643	4362	3643
R^2 (or Pseudo R^2)	0.211	0.290	0.0306	0.0393
Log Likelihood	-12492.3	-11589.5	-10298.5	-8528.5

All tests are two tailed. p-values in parentheses. SE values available on request.
+$p < 0.1$, *$p < 0.05$, **$p < 0.01$, ***$p < 0.001$

Figure 4.1 Expected welfare based on caste based homophily

For all bricoleur castes

For different bricoleur castes

0: Absence of caste based homophily (CBH)
1: Presence of caste based homophily (CBH)

Caste Categories: 1 - ST, 2 - SC, 3 - OBC, 4 -
Minority, 5 - General

Figure 4.2 Expected welfare based on caste based relative social status

For all bricoleur castes

For different bricoleur castes

1: Bricoleur lower than beneficiary
2: Bricoleur same as beneficiary
3: Bricoleur higher than beneficiary

Caste Categories: 1 - ST, 2 - SC, 3 - OBC, 4 - Minority, 5 - General

Chapter 5: Conclusion

This dissertation examines the critical role of resource allocation and mobilization in the success of social enterprises. Specifically, my chapters focus on exploring the performance implications of bricolage, a resourcing strategy employed by social enterprises. Bricolage involves creatively utilizing locally available resources, such as indigenous human capital and social connections, to effectively address social problems within the community. This investigation aims to shed light on the nuanced dynamics and outcomes associated with bricolage to resource management within the context of social enterprises.

Chapter 2 finds that locally recruited women in a social enterprise are more inclined to support the enterprise's social mission than men, who are more likely to follow the enterprise's financial mission. When social enterprises recruit women in order to maintain an appropriate gender distribution, mission alignment for the enterprises increases. In other words, empowering women can improve social performance for the enterprise, thus contributing to the literature on gender and social entrepreneurship. To my knowledge, this is the first study to examine how recruiting women entrepreneurs positively impacts a social enterprise's social performance, underscoring the significance of global initiatives for development aimed at mobilizing and empowering women. My theoretical contribution entails the discovery of a new causal mechanism (Makadok et al., 2018) that aids social enterprises to stay dedicated to their social mission while also prioritizing financial gains (Battilana et al., 2015). To quantify the focal phenomena, I have developed a new construct, the mission alignment indicator, which has not been empirically examined in prior studies. I also employ a natural experiment, a popular method in gender and entrepreneurship settings and increasingly used in research to introduce causal elements (Dhar, Jain & Jayachandran, 2022; Jia, Gao & Julian, 2020; Lee & Puranam, 2017; Venkatesh, Shaw, Sykes, Wamba & Macharia, 2017).

The social enterprise's managers also play a pivotal role in shaping strategic decisions that involve transforming readily convertible financial resources into various tangible and intangible resources. Chapter 3 examines how social enterprises utilize resources acquired through optimization or bricolage to compete for funding through value creation. Optimization involves acquiring resources with established efficiency, while bricolage uses resources readily available in the surroundings. I hypothesize and demonstrate how tangible resources (physical capital) obtained through optimization are necessary but not sufficient to add value. Bricolaging of such resources has a negative impact on value creation. On the other hand, intangible resources (social and human capital) obtained through bricolage can be creatively employed to add value. In addition, the reuse of both tangible and intangible resources through internal bricolage accentuates value creation. This chapter significantly adds to the literature on social entrepreneurship and the resource-based view by demonstrating how diverse non-financial resources, such as physical capital, human capital, and social capital, can influence both traditional and non-traditional Ricardian rents as well as entrepreneurial rents (Chadwick & Dabu, 2009). I also theoretically contribute to the body of knowledge on resource mobilization in social enterprises by examining the benefits and drawbacks of the two techniques: optimization and bricolage (Bacq & Eddleston, 2018; Bloom & Chatterji, 2009; Day & Jean-Denis, 2016; Desa & Basu, 2013).

My third essay (Chapter 4) demonstrates how caste-based social status and homophily affect resource mobilization and economic transactions, thus adding to the homophily and status literature (Belliveau et al., 1996; Ertug et al., 2018; Pearce & Xu, 2012). My findings contribute to the research on ethnicity-based homophily by showing the caste system's influence at various levels in India and other geographic contexts (Chen et al., 2015; Damaraju & Makhija, 2018; Freeman & Huang, 2015; Hegde & Tumlinson, 2014; Ruef, 2014). Given the significance of the empirical context in homophily research (Ertug et al.,

2022), the backdrop of a rural environment adds an element of uniqueness since extant research has been conducted in an urban setting.

In summary, all three essays have significant managerial and policy level implications that can help social enterprises judiciously manipulate these indigenous levers to enhance the efficacy of welfare policies. For example, social enterprises can effectively bricolage intangible resources, be cognizant about gender balance and the social status of bricoleurs, and recruit women in a manner to increase welfare generation for their beneficiaries and maximize social returns. My research pertains to India, which is an emerging economy with more than 7% growth rate in the near future, as predicted by the Asian Development Bank. Such economic growth can also increase disparity among the rich and the poor with persistent inequities in access to education, health care, and finance (Dabla-Norris et al., 2015; Gallo, 2002). India also has a long way to go when it comes to reducing the gender gap and implementation of UN's Sustainable Development Goals. A lot is being done, as indicated by improvement in India's rankings in each of the parameters. e.g. India moved up from 135 to 127 amongst 146 countries in Global Gender Gap Index in 2023. In SDG implementation, it has moved up from 121 to 112 among 163 countries.[4] This underscores the importance of social enterprises several of which works towards accomplishing these goals.

Like other emerging economies, India's resource environment is not bountiful. With increased focus on results-based audit contracts that improve funding efficiency, my research can have significant managerial implications for social enterprises in helping them to mobilize scarce resources in less munificent environments. It can help these enterprises to achieve gender parity in mobilizing human resource, knowing the contribution of women in increasing social returns, reducing mission drift and in helping these firms in staying true to

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[4] Source: Global Gender Gap Report 2023; State of India's Environment 2024 report

their mission. Enabling women to earn by increasing their livelihood can have significant impact in both micro and macro levels. With women earning, it can reduce gender discrimination in rural households and can challenge several social norms (like the purdah system) at the macro level of the society. Slowly and steadily, it can percolate the national culture by creating a balance between masculinity and femininity (Hofstede, 1980) and help improve the gender gap index. The caste system is an inherent institution in India. My research points out how caste based homophily and non-homophily can be used effectively to increase resource mobilization among the underprivileged. My findings can help impact investors in designing the policies, processes and organization structures of the firms they fund. In a small and humble way, my research shows directions that can help policy makers in reducing the inequality amongst the rich and the poor and provide humanity with a better quality of life.

There are several limitations of my research. My first essay involves a natural experiment and not a field experiment, where the researcher has more control. The selection of recruitment location for the intervention was effectively random at the panchayat level, although bricoleurs were not randomly assigned during the intervention, as would have been the case for a controlled experiment. While a natural experimental setting increases the external validity, sometimes the internal validity can be questioned. Though the several robustness tests point towards the direction of causality my research establishes, a more controlled experiment in the future may be done. One of the limitations of my second essay is the use of an ordinal scale to measure investment on tangible resources. It can be improved by getting indicative figures for the capital expenditure investment by the training centers. This will enable us to see how an additional unit of investment in physical capital in monetary terms impacts value creation. Finally, DEF data is not representative of entire India; e.g. data from Southern and North-Eastern states are not present. Difference is caste

based practices in different regions can also affect caste based homophily. In future transaction level data from these regions can be added to see the impact across regions throughout India. Caste system is prevalent in some countries outside India too. If possible, interventions can be run in such countries to study the impact of caste based homophily.

Over and above the areas of improvement, there are several other research questions that my current research opens up. e.g. In the intervention to increase women bricoleurs, women had been provided with mentors. Would women have performed the same way in absence of mentoring? The women social bricoleurs were immensely grateful for the new identity that DEF had bestowed on them since a-priori, they lacked their own identity in a society with very high gender gap. Does gratitude help in increasing mission alignment? Would the results be the same for interventions in countries with lower gender gap? Both optimization and bricolage are used by social enterprises to mobilize resources in varying degrees. Pertinent research questions would be how do optimization and bricolage perform in partnership agreements like M&As, alliances? How to integrate theoretical and empirical contributions of Resource Dependence Theory and the Resource Based View? A big source of funding for social enterprises comes from donors, who care about the impact generated by these enterprises (Hehenberger et al., 2019; Lall and Park, 2020). Exploring the social impact created by donors represents a critical area for future investigation. Frugal innovation and entrepreneurship have become important change-makers in emerging markets, serving the needs of the poor (Hossain and Sarkar, 2021). Bricolage also plays an important role in circular economy, particularly in resource mobilization of circular born firms (Klein et al., 2023). Studying the role of bricolage in these emerging areas can be added avenues of future research.

The crux of my dissertation work is bricolage, which has been increasingly recognized as a critical behavioral model in entrepreneurship research (Welter et al., 2016).

Social bricoleurs view resource constraints as both an opportunity and a problem. Consequently, these social bricoleurs can practice parallel (all) or selective bricolage (Baker & Nelson, 2005) in their endeavor to create opportunity in the form of a "future situation which is deemed desirable and feasible" (Stevenson & Jarillo, 1990: 23). Welter and colleagues (2016) point out some interesting research questions pertaining to bricolage, such as where it can be more effective than other approaches and how it can lead to competitive advantage. My dissertation essays address these pertinent research questions, highlighting how bricolage generates non-traditional Ricardian and entrepreneurial rents. My essays additionally demonstrate how locally accessible human and social capital can contribute to a favorable future scenario characterized by reduced poverty as well as knowing the mechanisms that can increase the efficacy of poverty reduction strategies.

Outcomes of distinctive mission elements and resource utilization are crucial differences between social and commercial entrepreneurship (Dacin et al., 2010). The concept of the total value of outcomes, comprising financial and social value (Zahra et al., 2009), helps extend the research domain to enterprises with varying degrees of economic self-sufficiency and legal structures. At one extreme, a commercial enterprise may focus on generating financial gain at the expense of generating social wealth. On the other hand, a social entrepreneur might focus solely on generating social wealth while ignoring the comfort of economic prosperity. Enterprises can reside in any part of the spectrum, but they all need to mobilize resources in a judicious manner. Extant theories of resource based views (RBV) focus on the firm's bundles of internal resources for sustained competitive advantage without discussing external resources (Barney, 1991; Mahoney & Pandian, 1992; Penrose, 1959). Social entrepreneurship, in contrast, must consider managing bundles of relational, cultural, and institutional resources (Austin et al., 2006), which are external to the firm.

Within the bundle, relational resources and social capital explains formal and informal social ties and subsequent access to additional resource channels among entrepreneurs. These entrepreneurs are known to depend on friends and family for their first source of start-up funding (Baron & Markman, 2000; Campbell et al., 1986; Manev et al., 2005). Cultural resources, defined as a community's norms, values, attitudes, and beliefs (Barney, 1986; Fiol & Huff, 1992), can act as barriers when social entrepreneurs are ignorant of them in the social context of their enterprise (Robinson, 2006; Staber, 2005). Likewise, the cultural resources can also act as enablers, given sufficient knowledge. Finally, institutional resources are the political and legal frameworks that people can access. Institutional voids often lead to the setting up of social enterprises in the first place. Cultural and institutional resources can become critical for social bricoleurs as they rely on locally available community resources and support from local institutions. Another differentiator in resource mobilization is that, unlike commercial enterprises, social enterprises do not set up competitive and imitation barriers but tend to use resources cooperatively to promote intentional replication (El Ebrashi, 2013). Possibilities for extending future research opened up by my dissertation by studying the entire gamut of resources—relational, cultural, and institutional—and differential capabilities in social enterprises and contributing to RBV literature.

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