Contingent Convertibles and Bankers’ Pay: The Missing Link in India’s Financial Regulation

Kagade, M and Verma, A (2015) Contingent Convertibles and Bankers’ Pay: The Missing Link in India’s Financial Regulation. Economic and political weekly, L (19). pp. 55-61. ISSN 0012-9976

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The compensation practices at large financial institutions are often held as one of the important factors which contributed to the 2007/2008 global financial crisis. Regulators around the world, including India, have therefore moved to enact prescriptions aimed at increasing shareholder oversight of executive pay. Set against this background, the paper makes two novel proposals focusing on the Indian context. First, it nudges the regulators to prescribe creditor-centric compensation rules at banks. The Reserve Bank of India has hitherto focused on pay reforms that will promote incentive alignment between executives and shareholders. This paper argues that such reforms are likely to promote more rather than less risk-taking among bank executives. Second, it argues that the RBI ought to mandate banks to pay a substantial portion of the managerial compensation in contingent capital bonds. The design of these bonds can significantly motivate executives to “think like creditors” and thereby enable avoidance of taxpayer-funded bailouts.

ISB Creiators:
ISB Creators
Kagade, M
Verma, A
Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Finance, Bank, Banking
Subjects: Finance
Finance > Financial Institutions
Depositing User: Veeramani R
Date Deposited: 16 May 2015 06:49
Last Modified: 16 May 2015 06:49
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