Letting the Briber Go Free: An Experiment on Mitigating Harassment Bribes

Abbink, K and Dasgupta, U and Gangadharan, L and Jain, T (2012) Letting the Briber Go Free: An Experiment on Mitigating Harassment Bribes. Working Paper. Indian School of Business. (Unpublished)

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This paper examines the effectiveness of using asymmetric liability to combat harassment bribes. Asymmetric liability is a mechanism where bribe-takers are culpable but bribe-givers have legal immunity. Results from our experiment indicate that while this policy has the potential to significantly reduce corrupt practices, weak economic incentives for the bribe-giver, or retaliation by bribe- takers can mitigate the disciplining effect of such an implementation. Asymmetric liability on its own may hence face challenges in the field.

ISB Creiators:
ISB Creators
Jain, T
Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Uncontrolled Keywords: harassment bribes, experiment, asymmetric penalty, retaliation
Subjects: Policy
Depositing User: LRC ISB
Date Deposited: 31 Oct 2014 05:18
Last Modified: 20 Jan 2015 10:33
URI: http://eprints.exchange.isb.edu/id/eprint/86
Publisher URL: http://www.isb.edu
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