Letting the briber go free: An experiment on mitigating harassment bribes

Abbink, K and Dasgupta, U and Gangadharan, L and Jain, T (2014) Letting the briber go free: An experiment on mitigating harassment bribes. Journal of Public Economics, 111. pp. 17-28.

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Abstract

This paper examines the effectiveness of using asymmetric liability to combat harassment bribes. Asymmetric liability is a mechanism where bribe-takers are culpable but bribe-givers have legal immunity. Results from our experiment indicate that while this policy has the potential to significantly reduce corrupt practices, weak economic incentives for the bribe-giver, or retaliation by bribe-takers can mitigate the disciplining effect of such an implementation. Asymmetric liability on its own may hence face challenges in the field.

ISB Creators:
ISB CreatorsORCiD
Jain, TUNSPECIFIED
Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Asymmetric penalty; Experiment; Harassment bribes; Retaliation
Subjects: Business and Management
Depositing User: LRC ISB
Date Deposited: 04 Nov 2014 07:15
Last Modified: 20 Jan 2015 10:28
URI: http://eprints.exchange.isb.edu/id/eprint/157
Publisher URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.12.012
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