Starting high and ending with nothing: The role of anchors and power in negotiations

Schweinsberg, M and Ku, G and Wang, C S and Pillutla, M (2012) Starting high and ending with nothing: The role of anchors and power in negotiations. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 48 (1). pp. 226-231. ISSN 00221031

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Abstract

ost research suggests that negotiators gain value by making first offers in negotiations. The current research examines the proposition that extreme first offers offend their recipients and cause them to walk away, resulting in an impasse. Results across two experiments support this proposition. As a result, extreme offers can be risky: even though they can anchor counteroffers and final outcomes, bringing benefit to the offerer, they only do so when impasses are avoided. In addition, we find support for the proposition that power moderates the relationship between extreme offers and impasses: although low- and high-power negotiators are equally offended by extreme offers, it is the low-power negotiators who walk away from the negotiation.

Affiliation: Indian School of Business
ISB Creiators:
ISB Creators
ORCiD
Pillutla, M
https://orcid.org/ 0000-0001-5529-5094
Item Type: Article
Additional Information: The research article was published by the author with the affiliation of London Business School
Uncontrolled Keywords: Anchor First, Offer, Impasse, Negotiation
Subjects: Organization Behavior
Depositing User: Gurusrinivasan K
Date Deposited: 26 Sep 2021 15:18
Last Modified: 26 Sep 2021 15:18
URI: https://eprints.exchange.isb.edu/id/eprint/1559
Publisher URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2011.07.005
Publisher OA policy: https://v2.sherpa.ac.uk/id/publication/13924
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