DO WE PREFER COWORKERS WHO ARE BETTER OR WORSE THAN US? EVIDENCE FROM THE 'WEAKEST LINK' GAME.

Pillutla, M and Ronson, S (2005) DO WE PREFER COWORKERS WHO ARE BETTER OR WORSE THAN US? EVIDENCE FROM THE 'WEAKEST LINK' GAME. Academy of Management Proceedings, 2005 (1). F1-F6. ISSN 0065-0668

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Abstract

We propose that hierarchical organizations that use peer inputs to hire, reward or promote employees, present a dilemma to individuals. To increase group performance, which could in turn determine individual outcomes, one's peers should be better than oneself. But to increase the probability of getting ahead, one's peers should be worse than oneself. Individuals will have to tradeoff these conflicting motives when making judgments that will affect peers desires (and choices) to remain in the organization. Results from a television game where this dilemma is stark and involves large stakes, indicate that individuals make judgments that could potentially eliminate others who are substantially better or substantially worse performers than themselves. This tendency is moderated by the size of the reward pool and the strength of the player: individuals are more likely to vote out high (rather than low) performers as the size of the reward pool increases and low performers are more likely to vote to eliminate strong performers than strong performers are.

Affiliation: Indian School of Business
ISB Creiators:
ISB Creators
ORCiD
Pillutla, M
https://orcid.org/ 0000-0001-5529-5094
Item Type: Article
Additional Information: The research article was published by the author with the affiliation of London Business School
Uncontrolled Keywords: Co-workers, Game, Weakest Link
Subjects: Organization Behavior
Depositing User: Gurusrinivasan K
Date Deposited: 26 Sep 2021 16:40
Last Modified: 26 Sep 2021 16:40
URI: https://eprints.exchange.isb.edu/id/eprint/1569
Publisher URL: https://doi.org/10.5465/ambpp.2005.18778536
Publisher OA policy: https://v2.sherpa.ac.uk/id/publication/27377
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