Letting the briber go free: An experiment on mitigating harassment bribes
Abbink, K and Dasgupta, U and Gangadharan, L and Jain, T (2014) Letting the briber go free: An experiment on mitigating harassment bribes. Journal of Public Economics, 111. pp. 17-28.
Full text not available from this repository. (Request a copy)Abstract
This paper examines the effectiveness of using asymmetric liability to combat harassment bribes. Asymmetric liability is a mechanism where bribe-takers are culpable but bribe-givers have legal immunity. Results from our experiment indicate that while this policy has the potential to significantly reduce corrupt practices, weak economic incentives for the bribe-giver, or retaliation by bribe-takers can mitigate the disciplining effect of such an implementation. Asymmetric liability on its own may hence face challenges in the field.
| ISB Creiators: |
ISB Creators ORCiD Jain, T UNSPECIFIED |
|---|---|
| Item Type: | Article |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Asymmetric penalty; Experiment; Harassment bribes; Retaliation |
| Subjects: | Business and Management |
| Depositing User: | LRC ISB |
| Date Deposited: | 04 Nov 2014 07:15 |
| Last Modified: | 20 Jan 2015 10:28 |
| URI: | http://eprints.exchange.isb.edu/id/eprint/157 |
| Publisher URL: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.12.012 |
| Related URLs: |
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