Explaining Unfair Offers in Ultimatum Games and their Effects on Trust: An Experimental Approach

De Cremer, D and Van Dijk, E and Pillutla, M (2010) Explaining Unfair Offers in Ultimatum Games and their Effects on Trust: An Experimental Approach. Business Ethics Quarterly, 20 (1). pp. 107-126. ISSN 1052-150X

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Abstract

Unfair offers in bargaining may have disruptive effects because they may reduce interpersonal trust. In such situations future trust may be strongly affected by social accounts (i.e., apologies vs. denials). In the current paper we investigate when people are most likely to demand social accounts for the unfair offer (Experiment 1), and when social accounts will have the highest impact (Experiment 2). We hypothesized that the need for and impact of social accounts will be highest when the intentions of the other party are uncertain. The results provided support for this reasoning.

Item Type: Article
Additional Information: The research article was published by the author with the affiliation of London Business School
Subjects: Organizational Behaviour
Date Deposited: 26 Sep 2021 16:15
Last Modified: 26 Sep 2021 16:15
URI: https://eprints.exchange.isb.edu/id/eprint/1564

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