Explaining Unfair Offers in Ultimatum Games and their Effects on Trust: An Experimental Approach

De Cremer, D and Van Dijk, E and Pillutla, M (2010) Explaining Unfair Offers in Ultimatum Games and their Effects on Trust: An Experimental Approach. Business Ethics Quarterly, 20 (1). pp. 107-126. ISSN 1052-150X

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Abstract

Unfair offers in bargaining may have disruptive effects because they may reduce interpersonal trust. In such situations future trust may be strongly affected by social accounts (i.e., apologies vs. denials). In the current paper we investigate when people are most likely to demand social accounts for the unfair offer (Experiment 1), and when social accounts will have the highest impact (Experiment 2). We hypothesized that the need for and impact of social accounts will be highest when the intentions of the other party are uncertain. The results provided support for this reasoning.

Affiliation: Indian School of Business
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ISB Creators
ORCiD
Pillutla, M
https://orcid.org/ 0000-0001-5529-5094
Item Type: Article
Additional Information: The research article was published by the author with the affiliation of London Business School
Uncontrolled Keywords: Unfair Offers, Ultimatum Games, Trust, Experimental Approach
Subjects: Organization Behavior
Depositing User: Gurusrinivasan K
Date Deposited: 26 Sep 2021 16:15
Last Modified: 26 Sep 2021 16:15
URI: https://eprints.exchange.isb.edu/id/eprint/1564
Publisher URL: https://doi.org/10.5840/beq20102018
Publisher OA policy: https://v2.sherpa.ac.uk/id/publication/28410
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