Player Types and Self-Impression Management in Dictatorship Games: Two Experiments

Murnighan, J K and Oesch, J M and Pillutla, M (2001) Player Types and Self-Impression Management in Dictatorship Games: Two Experiments. Games and Economic Behavior, 37 (2). pp. 388-414. ISSN 08998256

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Abstract

Recent experimental research on dictatorship games shows that many dictators share their outcomes with unknown, anonymous others. The data suggests that dictators can be "typed" as rational (taking the maximum), equal (splitting outcomes equally), or "other." This paper experimentally tests the self-impression management model, which predicts that individuals act to show themselves in a positive light, even when they are the only observer of their own behavior. The model predicts that the "other" type of dictator will avoid being greedy by taking more only as their choices are increasingly restricted. Results from two experiments support the model's predictions. The conclusion advocates differentiating basic psychological motivations in modeling individual behavior.

Affiliation: Indian School of Business
ISB Creiators:
ISB Creators
ORCiD
Pillutla, M
https://orcid.org/ 0000-0001-5529-5094
Item Type: Article
Additional Information: The research article was published by the author with the affiliation of London Business School
Uncontrolled Keywords: Player types, self-impression management, Dictatorship Games
Subjects: Organization Behavior
Depositing User: Gurusrinivasan K
Date Deposited: 26 Sep 2021 16:54
Last Modified: 26 Sep 2021 16:54
URI: https://eprints.exchange.isb.edu/id/eprint/1573
Publisher URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.2001.0847
Publisher OA policy: https://v2.sherpa.ac.uk/id/publication/15564
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